(concurring). Title 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f) (2) (1988) provides that, in connection with the rental of housing, it is unlawful for a landlord to discriminate against a person with a handicap. Title 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h) (1988) defines “handicap” as “(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (2) a record of having such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment, but such term does not include current, illegal use of or addiction to a controlled substance (as defined in section 802 of title 21).” Thus, the statute recognizes that a person who has suffered from addiction to a controlled substance may, on that account alone, have a recognized and protected handicap if he or she is in recovery — that is, if he or she is not a “current” user.
The court announces its agreement with the landlord’s argument that the judge erred in concluding that the tenant was not a “current” drug user despite the fact that he was drug-free at the time of the trial and was enrolled in a rehabilitation program. The court makes that announcement even though it appears to recognize that “[tjhis case does not raise the issue of personal use of a controlled substance [,] . . . [but rather] concerns a tenant who possessed a controlled substance with intent to distribute.” Ante at 606. Then, noting that the tenant had effectively pleaded guilty to a charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and had offered a marihuana cigarette to a security guard, the court concludes that “there was evidence that the tenant was engaging in the ‘current, illegal use’ of drugs,” ante at 607, and that the tenant’s “distribution activities” were “current,” as though use and distribution activity were interchangeable terms. Ante at 607. In my view, the court *610makes two errors: it improperly substitutes itself for the trial judge as fact finder on the question whether the tenant is a “current” drug user, and it incorrectly suggests that use and distribution of a controlled substance are one and the same thing for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h).
The judge’s finding that the tenant was not a “current” drug user should stand. The cases of Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 54 (1992), and United States v. Southern Management Corp., 955 F.2d 914 (4th Cir. 1992), make clear that one of Congress’s purposes in enacting the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., was to encourage substance abusers to seek treatment and regain control of their lives, and not to punish past drug use. Based on those cases, the judge was fully warranted in finding that the tenant was not a “current” user of drugs and in concluding that his earlier addiction constituted a “handicap,” entitling him to statutory protection.
In addition, the tenant had another handicap, quadriplegia. Surely, whether he was a current user of controlled substances or not, that handicap alone entitled him to protection against discrimination as provided by the Fair Housing Act.
The tenant is entitled, by 42 U.S.C. § 3604, to protection against discrimination on account of either or both handicaps, past addiction and quadriplegia. A landlord’s refusal reasonably to accommodate a tenant’s handicap is discriminatory. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (f) (3) (B). The critical question in this case, then, is whether the defendant tenant has a statutory right to accommodation in the form of a continuing landlord-tenant relationship despite his conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. As the court notes, ante at 607, “The landlord commenced eviction proceedings not as retroactive punishment for past substance abuse, but on the basis of a one month old conviction of possession with intent to distribute.” As the court also recognizes, with appropriate statutory and case references, . “ ‘[reasonable accommodation’ does not require a landlord *611to permit the sale of illegal drugs on his property.” Ante at 608 & n.5. The result is that the plaintiff landlord has not discriminated against the defendant tenant because of either of his handicaps. The landlord is entitled to evict the tenant because the tenant was engaged in drug distribution. However, whether the tenant’s distribution activity was “current” or not is of no consequence. The current use provision of 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h), by its terms, concerns use, not distribution. To the extent the court considers whether the tenant’s distribution activity is “current,” it either confuses distribution with use or incorrectly applies the current use provision of 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h) beyond its terms.
Since I agree with the court that “ ‘[reasonable accommodation’ does not require a landlord to permit the sale of illegal drugs on his property,” ante at 608, it follows that I agree with the court’s reversal of the judgment below. I write separately because I do not agree with the court’s conclusion that the judge erred in finding that the tenant was not a current user and is handicapped by reason of his past addiction, and I disagree with the court’s failure to keep distinct from one another the concepts of use and distribution. The court’s discussion has the potential, in my view, seriously to interfere in this Commonwealth with Congress’s effort to encourage substance abusers to overcome their addictions. In that regard, I share what I perceive to be the Chief Justice’s concern as expressed in his dissenting opinion.