(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s holding "that an agreement to arbitrate does not survive expiration of a collective bargaining contract statutorily as a term or condition of employment under the public employment relations act” because of "the strong precedent favoring arbitration as . . . consensual.” Ante, p 328. Our holding in Central Michigan Univ Faculty Ass’n v Central Michigan Univ, 404 Mich 268, 277; *351273 NW2d 21 (1978), compels the application of the unilateral preimpasse doctrine to mandatory subjects of bargaining. Because arbitration is a mandatory subject of bargaining, I would apply the unilateral preimpasse doctrine to the case at bar.
I
The inquiry whether the contractual provision for arbitration survives the expiration of the contract does not stop, with an examination of its viability under the contract.1 Instead, the Court must also determine whether the pera provides life support to the arbitration clause.
Section 152 of the pera compels a public employer to bargain collectively with its employees’ representatives. Additionally, the statute directs a public employer to participate in collective bargaining in "good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . .” This Court has held that "other terms and conditions of employment” are referred to as " 'mandatory subjects’ of bargaining.” CMU Faculty, p 277. "Once a specific subject has been classified as a mandatory subject of bargaining, the parties are required to bargain concerning the subject, and neither party may take unilateral action on the subject absent an impasse in negotiations.” Id.
Accordingly, when determining whether the pera prohibits unilateral action affecting an established practice, the Court must determine (1) *352whether the established practice is a mandatory subject of bargaining, and (2) whether negotiations have reached an impasse. See id. If the Court concludes that the established practice is a mandatory subject of bargaining and negotiations have yet to reach an impasse, then CMU Faculty directs the Court to apply the preimpasse unilateral change doctrine.3 In the case at bar, there was not an impasse in negotiations at the time the appellee extinguished the grievance procedure of arbitration. Thus, the only inquiry remaining is whether arbitration is a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The majority concedes that "[t]his jurisdiction has similarly deemed grievance procedures and arbitration as mandatory subjects of bargaining. See Ottawa Co v Jaklinski, 423 Mich 1; 377 NW2d 668 (1985); Pontiac Police Officers Ass’n v Pontiac (After Remand), 397 Mich 674; 246 NW2d 831 (1976).” Ante, p 337, n 9. Despite the majority’s acknowledgment of established precedent, it announces that arbitration, while a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, is judicially excluded from the preimpasse unilateral change doctrine.
II
Before today’s holding, this Court has not dimin*353ished the Legislature’s command that public employers bargain "in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment . . . .”4 MCL 423.215; MSA 17.455(15). I would adhere to the practice of applying the preimpasse unilateral change doctrine to mandatory subjects of bargaining. See CMU Faculty. Furthermore, I reject the majority’s application of federal precedent interpreting § 8(d) of the nlra, to § 15 of the PERAj in this instance.
The majority finds support for its position mainly in federal precedent interpreting § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act,5 29 USC 158(d). Admittedly, this Court has looked to federal precedent interpreting the nlra when construing the pera in the past.6 Reliance on federal cases is not appropriate in the case at bar, however, because it *354is not concerned with the pera and its effect on public employees. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the pera’s prohibition against strikes by public employees7 and the possible penalties faced by public employees who choose to strike,8 places public employees in a disadvantaged position as compared to their private sector counterparts, warranting broad protection under § 15 of the pera. Thus, their status as public employees9 compels rejection of federal precedent interpreting the nlra and its effect on private employees in this instance.10
The majority supports its position with the premise that the availability of interest arbitration under 1969 PA 31211 somehow diminishes the rights afforded to public employees under § 15 of the pera. The majority states:
Additionally, and most importantly, the Legislature has made the determination when, after expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, public employees’ lack of the right to strike creates an imbalance of power that is contrary to public *355interest. It determined that an imbalance affected only certain types of public safety employees, whom it gave the right to interest arbitration in 1969 PA 312; MCL 423.233; MSA 17.455(33). It thus appears that the Legislature did not believe that a purported imbalance in other public sector employment required adjustment. [Ante, p 342.]
What the majority fails to acknowledge is that "Act 312 was clearly intended to supplement pera.” Local 1277, AFSCME v Center Line, 414 Mich 642, 652; 327 NW2d 822 (1982). Section 15 of the pera prevents a preimpasse unilateral change in mandatory subjects of bargaining. Once an impasse is reached, however, a public employer can unilaterally change mandatory subjects of bargaining. Act 312 picks up where § 15 of the pera left off, providing additional protection to public safety employees. Act 312 is "directed toward the resolution of major collective bargaining impasses and the prevention of police and fire department employee strikes.” Local 1518, AFSCME v St Clair Co Sheriff, 407 Mich 1, 12-13; 281 NW2d 313 (1979). While Act 312 obviously provides supplemental protection to public safety employees,12 it does not detract from the protections afforded to all public employees under § 15 of the pera.
Finally, the majority’s treatment of this issue effectively nullifies the protections afforded under the pera. This Court recognized that an employee may retain rights afforded under an expired contract on the basis of either (1) a contractual *356claim,13 or (2) the statutory right to "good-faith bargaining” under § 15 of the pera. Ottawa Co v Jaklinski, 423 Mich 1, 12-13; 377 NW2d 668 (1985).14 Under the majority’s approach, a right to arbitration can exist only under a contract theory, which, of course, vitiates the protection afforded to public employees by the Legislature.
If the Legislature deems it appropriate to redefine the scope of collective bargaining obligation of the public employers generally or of particular public employers and the representatives of their employees to include "wages, hours, and some other terms and conditions of employment,” it may do so.
This Court cannot properly decide ad hoc that what has uniformly been regarded a "condition” of employment is not such a condition as applied to a particular public employer although it continues to be such a condition for other employers, public and private. By eschewing redefinition, we underscore the prerogative of the Legislature to give such consideration as it deems warranted to the claims of public employers that the scope of the collective bargaining obligation impinges unduly on their power to govern. [CMU Faculty, p 280, quoting Pontiac Police Officers Ass’n v Pontiac (After Remand), 397 Mich 674, 684; 246 NW2d 831 (1976) (opinion of Levin, J.). Emphasis in original.]
III
It is clear that arbitration is an "other term and *357condition of employment” that cannot be unilaterally changed absent an impasse in negotiations. Because the appellee unilaterally changed the arbitration process before reaching an impasse in negotiations with the newly certified union, it violated the pera. Accordingly, I would reverse the holding of the Court of Appeals.
Levin and Mallett, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, C.J.A contractual provision can remain viable, pursuant to the expired contract, if (1) the parties expressly agreed to the terms, or (2) the contractual claim vested or accrued before the contract’s expiration. The agreement to arbitrate, however, failed to survive under either of these methods.
MCL 423.215; MSA 17.455(15).
In Ottawa Co v Jaklinski, 423 Mich 1, 13; 377 NW2d 668 (1985), this Court recognized the logical conclusion compelled by prior precedent.
Under this line of reasoning, it logically follows that as part of its duty to bargain in good faith the joint employers had a duty prior to reaching impasse not to unilaterally alter the grievance arbitration mechanism ....
The Court did not examine the propriety of the logical conclusion compelled by Michigan precedent, instead, it rejected the plaintiffs asserted § 15 claim because (1) the plaintiff’s grievance arose after negotiations had reached an impasse, and (2) the plaintiff failed to follow the proper procedure for filing her § 15 claim.
In fact, before today this Court had vigorously advanced the mandates of the pera: CMU Faculty, p 279 (The "pera was intended by the Legislature to supersede conflicting laws and is superimposed even on those institutions which derive their power from the Constitution itself”); Pontiac Police Officers Ass’n v Pontiac, 397 Mich 674; 246 NW2d 831 (1976) (A majority of the Court concluded that the mandates of the pera prevail over contrary provisions of the charter of a home-rule city); Rockwell v Crestwood School Dist Bd of Ed, 393 Mich 616, 628-629; 227 NW2d 736 (1975) (The mandates of the pera prevail over conflicting provisions of the teacher tenure act); Wayne Co Civil Service Comm v Bd of Supervisors, 384 Mich 363, 371; 184 NW2d 201 (1971) (The pera supersedes conflicting provisions of the county civil service act).
In Litton Financial Printing v NLRB, 501 US 190; 111 S Ct 2215; 115 L Ed 2d 177 (1991), the United States Supreme Court held that arbitration is not subject to the nlra’s preimpasse unilateral change doctrine because arbitration arises by consent and not by operation of law.
Although we cannot state with certainty, it is probably safe to assume that the Michigan Legislature intentionally adopted § 15 pera in the form that it did with the expectation that merc and the Michigan courts would rely on the legal precedents developed under nlra, § 8(d) to the extent that they apply to public sector bargaining. [Detroit Police Offcers Ass’n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 53; 214 NW2d 803 (1974). Emphasis in original.]
MCL 423.202; MSA 17.455(2).
See, generally, Rockwell, n 4 supra, p 628 (The pera allows a public employer to terminate or discipline a public employee striking in violation of the pera).
While it is true that the merc has announced a policy similar to that found in the federal cases interpreting the nlra, such an interpretation, while persuasive, is not binding upon this Court. We must refrain from perpetuating agency interpretations that are hostile to the clear mandate of the Legislature.
'"[W]e must keep in mind that because public employees in Michigan are forbidden to strike, 'section 15 of pera must be even more expansively construed than its nlra counterpart’ in order to adequately protect public employees’ rights.” [Central Michigan Univ Faculty Ass’n v Central Michigan Univ, 75 Mich App 101, 113; 254 NW2d 802 (1977) (Cavanagh, P.J., dissenting), rev’d 404 Mich 268; 273 NW2d 21 (1978).]
1969 PA 312; MCL 423.233; MSA 17.455(33).
After "Act 312” interest arbitration is invoked, neither party to the dispute may alter existing "wages, hours, [or] other conditions of employment” without the consent of the other during the pendency of proceedings before the arbitration panel. [Jaklinski, supra, p 14.]
See n 1.
It is true that public employers are required to bargain in good faith to impasse regarding "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.” MCL 423.215; MSA 17.455(15). Because "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment” are regarded as mandatory subjects of bargaining, once a party negotiating a collective bargaining agreement proposes such a subject, neither party may take unilateral action regarding it prior to impasse. Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 391 Mich 44, 54-55; 214 NW2d 803 (1974).