(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. As part of his pri-ma facie case of racial discrimination, Villarreal must show that he is qualified for the position from which he was discharged. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth elements of prima facie case of discrimination); Hubbard v. United Press Int’l, Inc., 330 N.W.2d 428, 442 (Minn. 1983) (same). Villarreal is collaterally es-topped from proving that issue because he was found to be unqualified to teach in the proceeding under Minn.Stat. § 125.12, subd. 9 (1990). See Graham v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 472 N.W.2d 114, 117, 119 (1991) (doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents employee from relitigating factual issues adjudicated in a school termination proceeding).
After a three-day hearing, the independent hearing examiner found Villarreal’s violent *78and explosive behavior constituted conduct unbecoming a teacher, gross inefficiency, and willful neglect of duty. The school district adopted these findings and immediately discharged Villarreal. Unlike a retaliatory discharge claim, proof of racial discrimination involves producing evidence of the plaintiffs qualifications. Compare Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.1987) (retaliatory discharge claim requires proof by plaintiff that discharge was motivated by good faith refusal to violate law) and Minn.Stat. § 181.932, subd. 1(a) (1990) (prohibiting employers from discharging employees for reporting employer’s violations) with Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 442 (discrimination claim requires plaintiff to prove he or she is qualified for job). The issue of Villarreal’s qualification to teach was the precise issue before the hearing examiner, and Villarreal was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on that issue. See Graham, 472 N.W.2d at 116 (elements of collateral estoppel). Because collateral estoppel applies to prevent Villarreal from proving an essential element of his discrimination case, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district. See id. at 119 (in interest of judicial economy, findings of teacher misconduct should be binding for some causes of action because of elaborate procedural and due process safeguards built into teacher termination proceedings).