(dissenting). In this case we are presented with the issue whether workers’ compensation death benefits are available to the widow of a nonresident worker employed in Michigan for work to be performed outside Michigan. Because I believe the plain language of the workers’ compen*528sation statute1 precludes jurisdiction of the bureau over plaintiff’s claim, I would affirm the decision of the bureau.
I
Plaintiff is the widow of a carnival operator who was killed in a motor vehicle accident in Indiana. Plaintiff’s decedent was a resident of Illinois and was employed in Michigan to move a carnival from Michigan to Mississippi. The Michigan magistrate and workers’ compensation appellate commission agreed that plaintiff was precluded from bringing a workers’ compensation claim in Michigan. The Court of Appeals denied leave "for lack of merit in the grounds presented.”2 This Court granted leave to appeal.
II
The statute defining the limit of the jurisdiction of the bureau is clear and unambiguous: jurisdiction over controversies arising out of injuries suffered outside Michigan exists where (1) "the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of injury and [(2)] the contract of hire was made in this state.” MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845). The definition of employee, MCL *529418.161(l)(d); MSA 17.237(161)(l)(d),3 does not conflict with the jurisdictional section, but rather is part of that provision. If the worker is not an "employee,” as defined by the statute, no question of jurisdiction would arise because the injured party does not come under the workers’ compensation act.4 If the employee satisfies the broad definition in the statute and is injured outside Michigan in the course of his employment, the court must look to MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845) to determine whether it may take jurisdiction over the compensation claim. Every employer and employee satisfying the definitional provisions of the act is bound thereby, MCL 418.111; MSA 17.237(111); however, if the jurisdictional provision is not satisfied as well, the act "otherwise specifically provide[s]” that the board shall not have jurisdiction over the claim. As Justice Levin noted in his dissenting opinion in Austin v W Biddle Walker Co, 11 Mich App 311, 324; 161 NW2d 150 (1968), every employee falling within the broad definition and every contract executed in Michigan, does not fall within the coverage of the workers’ compensation statute. MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845) declares in unambiguous language that the bureau *530will have jurisdiction over out-of-state injuries only where the employee is a Michigan resident and the employment contract was made in Michigan.
No construction is required where the plain language of the statute identifies when an out-of-state injury is within the purview of the Michigan workers’ compensation act. See Owendale-Gagetown School Dist v State Bd of Ed, 413 Mich 1, 8; 317 NW2d 529 (1982). In MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845), the Legislature established the boundaries and limits of the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation over out-of-state injuries. Daniels v Trailer Transport Co, 327 Mich 525, 530; 42 NW2d 828 (1950).5
The earlier case of Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644; 244 NW 188 (1932), however, essentially eliminated the employee residency requirement from the jurisdiction provision. The Court found that the workers’ compensation act of 1921 contained inconsistent provisions, essentially the identical provisions existing in the present statute. Part 1 fixed the rights and liabilities of employees and employers. Part 3 was the procedural part of the act and contained the limitation on the jurisdiction of the industrial accident board. Id. at 647.6 Plaintiff in the instant case argues that after the *531decision in Roberts, a nonresident employee could receive workers’ compensation benefits for an injury suffered out of state where the contract of employment was executed in Michigan.7
Subsequent decisions of the Court of Appeals have split in their treatment of Roberts. In Austin, supra at 314, a majority of the Court of Appeals acknowledged that MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845) facially requires the employee to be a Michigan resident and the employment contract to be executed in Michigan. The Court reasoned that it was compelled, however, to follow Roberts, hence awarding benefits to a nonresident employee for an injury suffered in Kentucky because the employment contract was executed in Michigan. Judge Levin dissented, favoring a case-by-case approach to determinations of Michigan workers’ compensation jurisdiction. He reasoned that Roberts eliminated § 19 altogether, id. at 320, and that the premise of Roberts was undermined by the elimination of the optional nature of the workers’ compensation statutes and by the elimination of the statutory language regarding an electing employer’s agreement " 'to cover and protect all employees employed in any and all of his businesses’ . . . .” Id. at 327. Judge Levin concluded that because the workers’ compensation scheme was optional, if an employer chose to take part in the workers’ compensation scheme, it created a contract with its employees that followed the employee wherever the employee worked. He further asserted that subsequent Supreme Court *532cases rejected the place of contracting as determinative of application of Michigan’s workers’ compensation scheme.8
In Wolf v Ethyl Corp, 124 Mich App 368, 370; 335 NW2d 42 (1983), the Court of Appeals rejected Roberts, finding it inapplicable to "today’s modern mandatory workers’ compensation scheme.” The Court of Appeals instead determined that Roberts applied only to the "earlier, voluntary workers’ compensation statute.” Id. The Court then held that a nonresident plaintiff who contracted for employment in Michigan but was injured in New York could not recover Michigan workers’ compensation benefits because the two requirements of MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845) were not met. The Court of Appeals in the following cases also applied the unambiguous language of MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845) and refused to follow Roberts’ elimination of the residency requirement. Hall v Chrysler Corp, 172 Mich App 670; 432 NW2d 398 (1988) (no benefits were awarded to a nonresident employee injured in Delaware, even though the contract for hire was executed in Michigan); Bell v FJ Boutell Driveaway Co, 141 Mich App 802; 369 NW2d 231 (1985) (no benefits were awarded to a nonresident employee injured in Ohio); Jensen v Prudential Ins Co of America, 118 Mich App 501; 325 NW2d 469 (1982) (no benefits were awarded to a nonresident employee injured in Wisconsin; the *533contract for hire was executed in Minnesota, although the job was to be performed primarily in Michigan). I believe that this line of authority properly follows the clear language of the jurisdictional statute.
Other decisions, although involving Michigan resident employees, recognize the two requirements of MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845). Crenshaw v Chrysler Corp, 394 Mich 513; 232 NW2d 166 (1975) (no benefits were awarded to a Michigan resident injured in Ohio where the contract of employment was executed in Ohio); Rodwell v Pro Football, Inc, 45 Mich App 408; 206 NW2d 773 (1973) (benefits were awarded to a Michigan resident employee who was injured in Pennsylvania where the contract for hire was executed in Michigan; the residency of the employer was irrelevant).
The legal premise of the Roberts decision is not persuasive in light of the compulsory nature of the present workers’ compensation act. The Roberts Court reasoned that its construction of the extraterritorial effect of the act was in accord with the construction of other optional compensation acts. Id. at 649. An optional act becomes a part of the employment contract when both the employer and the employee choose to be bound by the act’s terms. It is arguable that, as with other contract terms such as wages and hours, the terms of the act would therefore follow the employee wherever the employee acted within the scope of his employment. Id. at 652; see also Crane v Leonard, Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich 218, 231; 183 NW 204 (1921).
Application of the terms of the workers’ compensation act is now required by statute, rather than by contract. Both the Crane and the Roberts Courts recognized the reasoning that distinguishes between these two types of acts.
*534"[I]t may be stated on the weight of authority that acts not construed to be contractual in character do not, in the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, apply where the injury occurs outside the State . . . [Crane, supra at 222, quoting 1 Honnold, Workmen’s Compensation, §8.]
"We are told that no distinction in construction is to be based upon whether the act is compulsory or elective. That is true as to some provisions of compensation acts. But that the statute is elective has controlling bearing on one thing that is most highly important. Where the statute is elective as to both employer and employee, payment of compensation is not the performance of a statute duty, but the performance of conditions in the contract of hiring . . . .’’[Id. at 225.]
"Where the statute compels submission by the employer and employee, there is no contract, as a general rule, enforceable outside of the State.” [Id. at 226.]
"[A]cts not construed to be contractual in character do not, in the absence of unequivocal language to the contrary, apply where the injury occurs outside the State, while, on the other hand, acts construed to be contractual protect one injured outside the State, where the contract of employment was made within the State and is governed by the laws of the State.” [Roberts, supra at 651.]
Whether the modern act covers an employee depends upon whether the requirements of the statute have been met. Therefore if the extraterritorial jurisdiction requirements are not met, an injury is not compensable under the act.
The majority asserts that if Roberts is overruled, "all Michigan employees who suffer an out-of-state injury in the course of their employment and who *535reside in neighboring states will not be subject to the bureau’s jurisdiction.” Ante at 523-524. If the employee is not a Michigan resident and suffers an injury during the course of. his employment outside Michigan, labeling him as a "Michigan employee” is misleading. There is no legal or logical authority for defining a "Michigan employee” solely as one who has contracted for employment in Michigan. Although the denial of benefits may seem harsh, it is not within this Court’s authority to alter the clear provisions of the statute under consideration. Workers’ compensation is a matter of statutory grace, Selk v Detroit Plastic Products, 419 Mich 1, 11; 345 NW2d 184 (1984), and is not an equitable remedy. Equitable considerations are not proper where the Legislature has clearly enunciated the limits of the workers’ compensation bureau. That the employee may or may not receive benefits in another state9 is not a pivotal factor, and is not a criteria in the statutory definitions of an employee or the jurisdictional limits of the bureau. Although there may be some employees who therefore are left without Michigan workers’ compensation coverage, this Court is bound to follow the language of the statute, rather than the equities of a single situation.
The majority does not dispute that the language of the extraterritorial provision is clear or that the analysis in Roberts is no longer persuasive.10 Hence, the majority’s argument rests primarily on the principle of legislative acquiescence, rather than on the propriety of the Roberts decision. "Because of the indirect nature of the support it *536provides, the legislative acquiescence principle, even when applicable, is not alone controlling.” Lamb v Bureau of Pardons, 106 Mich App 175, 183; 307 NW2d 754 (1981), citing Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co, 380 Mich 513, 520; 158 NW2d 473 (1968). Considering the changes in the nature of the workers’ compensation system, as well as the clarity of the statutory language, the principle of legislative acquiescence should not be used to continue a decision that lacks persuasive legal foundation. Moreover, the clarity of the conjunctive language used in MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845) also supports the argument that the Legislature could not change the language of the statute after Roberts to add a residency requirement, because the clear language already existed in the statute and nothing else needed to be added. Therefore, legislative acquiescence to the Roberts decision is not as clear as the majority suggests. Ante at 525-526.
By failing to recognize the change in the nature of the compensation act, the majority imposes a responsibility on the employer beyond that which is required by statute. Despite contrary precedent from 1932, I would recognize the existing clear language of MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845) defining coverage by the Michigan workers’ compensation act to exist with regard to out-of-state injuries only where the claimant is a Michigan resident and the contract of employment was executed in Michigan. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Griffin, J., concurred with Riley, J.MCL 418.845; MSA 17.237(845) provides for jurisdiction of the bureau of workers’ compensation over claims
arising out of injuries suffered outside this state where the injured employee is a resident of this state at the time of the injury and the contract of hire was made in this state.
Unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered January 8, 1992 (Docket No. 145746). Citing as support Hall v Chrysler Corp, 172 Mich App 670; 432 NW2d 398 (1988), and Wolf v Ethyl Corp, 124 Mich App 368; 335 NW2d 42 (1983).
Every person performing service in the course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of an employer at the time of the injury, provided the person in relation to this service does not maintain a separate business, does not hold himself or herself out to and render service to the public, and is not an employer subject to this act.
I disagree that a conflict existed in the former act between the definition of employer and employee rights and liabilities and the extraterritorial application of the act. Section seven of part one broadly defined employee. See Roberts v IXL Glass Corp, 259 Mich 644, 647; 244 NW 188 (1932). This provision encompasses all employees, even those who contracted for employment outside the state. The Court did not indicate how the place of hire then became a limitation on the definition of employee. As discussed above, satisfaction of the employee definition is the first step to determine whether the workers’ compensation act will apply.
In Daniels, a Michigan employer hired an Illinois resident. The contract for hire was made in Texas and provided for application of Michigan workers’ compensation laws. Plaintiff was injured in Tennessee. The trial court granted Michigan workers’ compensation benefits, reasoning that because the Michigan employer was covered by the act, the broad employee definition encompassed the plaintiff’s claims. This Court reversed, finding that the facts did not bring the plaintiff within provisions of the act defining the board’s jurisdiction. Therefore, despite a contract provision requiring application of Michigan workers’ compensation law, the workers’ compensation commission exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding benefits to plaintiff.
The Court also found peculiar that a nonresident family could recover benefits for the death of a resident worker, but a nonresident worker could not recover benefits. Id. I do not find this strange because whether benefits will be awarded depends upon the residency status of the worker, not the status of the worker’s family.
Identifying the Michigan statute as the "narrowest type of statute” regarding coverage of out-of-state injuries, Larson declared that Roberts rendered a dead letter the residency requirement. 4 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, § 87.12, p 16-71. Larson also noted that Wolf, n 2 supra, did not explain how the change from an optional to a mandatory act changed the interpretation of this provision. 4 Larson, § 87.12, p 16-71, n 8.
Judge Levin cited the following cases as evidence that the strength of Roberts has been undermined. Thiede v GD Searle & Co, 278 Mich 108; 270 NW 234 (1936) (an employee was a resident of Michigan, the contract was executed in Illinois, and the injury occurred in Michigan. The act applied on the basis of significant Michigan contacts); Conover v Rust Engineering Co, 279 Mich 16; 271 NW 536 (1937) (the Michigan act applied where a contract was executed in Pennsylvania, the employee was a resident of Colorado, and the employee lost his life in Michigan); Daniels, supra.
It is arguable that these cases do not undermine Roberts because the out-of-state injury provision only applies where the injuries occurred outside Michigan.
See ante at 519-520.
[T]here is no vested right in the continuation of judicial error. If we have been wrong in our interpretation, we are not only free to, but obligated to, correct that error. [Magreta v Ambassador Steel Co, 380 Mich 513, 517; 158 NW2d 473 (1968).]