concurs with separate opinion.
I respectfully concur in the majority's result, but write separately to highlight the dangers posed by identity theft. An identity theft survey report conducted by the Federal Trade Commission in 2003 discovered that within the previous year, almost ten million Americans learned that they were the victim of some form of identity theft. Federal Trade Commission-Identity Theft Survey Report at 4 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.fte.gov/o8/2003/09/synovatere-port.pdf. Although this case centers more on misidentification, it does illustrate the dangers posed by identity theft when executing an arrest warrant. It seems quite possible that a victim of identity theft could find herself arrested pursuant to a seemingly valid arrest warrant for actions committed by the individual who stole her identity. The likelihood of something like this occurring is heightened by our current statute, which only requires that a warrant "specify the name of the person to be arrested." Ind.Code § 85-38-2-2(a). For instance, let us assume that someone has stolen my identity and committed a crime in my name. Under Indiana Code section 35-33-2-2, the State could obtain a valid warrant for my arrest by providing no more information than my name. The police then could arrest me for a crime that I did not commit, and I likely would not be able to recover any compensation for the loss of my freedom because there was nothing to suggest to the police officers that the arrest warrant was anything but valid. For this reason, I fully agree with the majority's recommendation that the *26legislature revisit Indiana Code section 35-33-2-2 and consider adding further requirements like physical identification information.
Furthermore, I believe the majority properly admonishes the various personnel involved in drawing up the arrest warrant here. The errors in this arrest warrant are gross, and force one to wonder how and why this warrant was even issued. Mistakes such as this tend to undermine the entire judicial system.
Although I agree with the majority's conclusion that the officers' actions here were not willful, wanton, or malicious, I believe a question left unanswered by this opinion is how many problems must there be with an arrest warrant before a police officer's enforcement of that warrant moves from being merely negligent to willful, wanton, or malicious. This is, of course, a problem of line drawing. However, if Long had shown that the social security number on the second warrant was incorrect, that the birth date on the second warrant was incorrect, and that the officers had in their possession both the first and second warrants, would that have been sufficient evidence to show that the officers had acted willfully, wantonly, or maliciously? Would some combination of only two of these facts or even one of these facts standing alone been sufficient to show willful, wanton, or malicious conduct? Nevertheless, because the trial court properly granted summary judgment, I concur with the majority opinion.