dissenting:
The majority asserts that a violation of the due process right to a hearing before an unbiased decision-maker can never be deemed harmless error. 212 111. 2d at 380. I disagree because the majority should not have ad-' dressed the constitutional issue and, further, because the majority’s pronouncements on the questions addressed are, in my view, erroneous. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
First, it is a well-established rule that this court will not address a constitutional issue when the case can be decided on other grounds. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 396 (1994). This appeal clearly could have been, and should have been, decided on other grounds. Furthermore, the majority asserts, without analysis, that each of the criteria for application of the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine has been met. 212 Ill. 2d at 382-83. I see nothing in the record to justify the conclusion that any of the criteria have been met. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appeal as moot.
Second, the issue in this case concerns whether Girot failed to comply, as a matter of law, with the secure-binding requirement of the Election Code (10 ILCS 5/10 — 4 (West 2002)). Where, as here, the issue is a question of law concerning only compliance with the Election Code, due process is satisfied. See, e.g., Ayers v. Martin, 223 Ill. App. 3d 397, 400 (1991) (holding that where “the issues are basically questions of law and the trial court has reviewed them de novo, due process is provided”). Consequently, even if this case meets the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, the majority should uphold the Electoral Board’s decision on the basis that Gerot failed to comply with the Election Code.
Third, the alleged bias in this case did not violate Girot’s due process rights. The alleged bias of Grygiel is that, in her capacity as a fact finder, she was required to assess the credibility of Girot, who testified contrary to her own testimony. According to the majority, because Grygiel testified regarding the filing of the nominating petitions in question, she was required to assess her own credibility and Girot’s credibility. If the case turned on the credibility of witnesses, a risk of bias could be present that may violate Girot’s due process rights. This case, however, was not decided adversely to Girot because of conflicting testimony. Instead, the Electoral Board’s decision was based on its determination that Girot failed to comply, as a matter of law, with the secure-binding requirement of the Election Code.
In its recitation of the facts, the majority notes that Girot admitted that the nominating petitions were secured only by a paper clip when he tendered them to Grygiel. He further conceded, on cross-examination, that no staple marks appeared on the documents and that Grygiel could have stapled something else. Grygiel denied stapling the documents, but admitted that she was not certain whether they were attached by a paper clip when delivered to her, or whether she affixed the paper clip. Thus, there was no material difference in the testimony of the witnesses on this dispositive point. Both agreed that the documents were attached by paper clip and not stapled or otherwise secured in a suitable manner.
Accordingly, the Electoral Board was not required to assess witness credibility in determining that attaching documents by paper clip was not compliant with the Election Code requirement that the documents be fastened together in a secure and suitable manner. The Electoral Board expressly found that “affixing the petition sheets and Statement of Candidacy by a paper clip does not comply with the mandate of being ‘bound’ as required by Section 10 — 4.” Therefore, I would hold that Grygiel’s dual capacity as witness and fact finder did not affect the outcome of the hearing and, under these circumstances, did not violate Girot’s due process rights. Even if due process was implicated, I would hold that any violation in this case was “so unimportant and insignificant that [it] may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 709, 87 S. Ct. 824, 827 (1967).
Moreover, the majority’s reliance on Huff v. Rock Island County Sheriff’s Merit Comm’n, 294 Ill. App. 3d 477 (1998), is misplaced. That case correctly held that, “[t]o prove bias, the plaintiff must overcome a presumption of honesty by showing in the record that the administrative proceedings were either tainted by dishonesty or contained an unacceptable risk of bias.” Huff, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 481. The Huff court determined, however, that no taint or risk was demonstrated, despite the fact that one of the commissioners had served as the sheriffs political campaign chairman and that another commissioner may have made a disparaging remark about the plaintiff at an earlier disciplinary hearing.
In the case before us, the only possible risk of bias demonstrated by the record is a credibility assessment by Grygiel. The majority asserts that she adjudicated contested issues of fact regarding her own credibility. 212 111. 2d at 381. As noted earlier, there was no contested issue of fact regarding the means used to secure the petitions. The Electoral Board was simply not required to assess credibility in determining whether using a paper clip satisfied Election Code requirements.
Furthermore, “[n]ot all allegations of bias *** rise to the level of a due process violation” (Ryan v. Landek, 159 Ill. App. 3d 10, 12 (1987)) and simply being a witness to this transaction as a result of a statutory duty is insufficient to establish bias. I am aware of no authority requiring a disqualification of an electoral board member whenever a party alleges bias. In fact, “ ‘[t]he case law, both federal and state, generally rejects the idea that the combination [of] judging [and] investigating functions is a denial of due process ... .’ ” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712, 726, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 1467 (1975), quoting 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 13.02, at 175 (1958). Therefore, I am persuaded that, under the specific facts of this case, the error was harmless.
Additionally, the majority holds that under the Election Code, as well as due process considerations, it was error for the Electoral Board to deny Girot’s motion to substitute Grygiel, because section 10 — 9(6) of the Election Code allows the substitution of an Electoral Board member in the event of a conflict. 212 111. 2d at 377. This conclusion is based on the majority’s reliance on the holding in Kaemmerer v. St. Clair County Electoral Board, 333 Ill. App. 3d 956 (2002). Kaemmerer is clearly distinguishable on its facts.
Kaemmerer involved the Election Code’s provision for substitution of an Electoral Board member. Section 10 — 9(6) of the Election Code provides a method of filling a vacancy on the Electoral Board created by a single specific circumstance — a board member being a candidate for the office that is the subject of the objector’s challenge. The statute provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
“In the event that any member of the appropriate board is a candidate for the office with relation to which the objector’s petition is filed, he shall not be eligible to serve on that board ***.” 10 ILCS 5/10 — 9(6) (West 2002).
In Kaemmerer, an objector filed challenges to a Republican slate of candidates, including the candidates for county clerk and county treasurer. The first challenge to be heard was that of the objector to the petitions of the candidate for county clerk. The Republican candidate for that office objected to the Democratic county clerk, who was a candidate for reelection, serving as a member of the Electoral Board. The incumbent recused himself, and the incumbent Democratic county treasurer was substituted. The Republican candidate again objected, noting that the basis of the challenge to the county treasurer’s opponent’s candidacy was the same as the challenge to the county clerk’s opponent’s candidacy, and the treasurer would, in effect, be deciding the issues raised in the challenge to his opponent. The objection was denied, the hearing proceeded, and the challenge was unsuccessful. The circuit court affirmed and the appellate court reversed. The appellate court applied section 10 — 9(6) of the Election Code, holding that “each member of the Electoral Board whose opponent was being challenged should have recused himself,” noting that the conflict the statute was intended to resolve remained, despite literal compliance, in the first instance, with the statutory language. Kaemmerer, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 960.
In the case at bar, the conflict created by Grygiel’s dual capacity is neither directly nor indirectly addressed by section 10 — 9(6), because the express language of that statute only applies to vacancies caused by an office holder’s disqualification in cases when the election opponent’s petitions are the object of a challenge. The statute was clearly not designed to resolve conflicts of the kind presented in this case. The majority’s application of the statute is a forced interpretation, not justified by the clear, unambiguous language of section 10 — 9(6). As we have often explained, legislative intent is determined primarily from the language used in the statute, and courts should not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with express legislative intent. Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 56 (1998); Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 389 (1996). I believe the majority’s application of section 10 — 9(6) violates this principle, by enlarging its scope beyond the specific conflict addressed by the legislature, and is thus erroneous. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.