concurring in results.
I agree that the judgment should be affirmed but for different reasons than expressed by Justice Paulson.
Rule 52(a), NDRCivP, defines the scope of review in cases tried to the court. Findings of fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness. Stee v. “L” Monte Industries, Inc., 247 N.W.2d 641 (N.D.1976). None of the specific findings made in this ease were attacked by the appellant, nor were any of the conclusions of law — only the “decision” was referred to as “clearly erroneous.”
“An appellate court will not reverse a judgment in a nonjury case because of the admission of incompetent evidence, unless all of the competent evidence is insufficient to support the judgment or unless it affirmatively appears that the incompetent evidence induced the court to make an essential finding which would not otherwise have been made.” Schuh v. Allery, 210 N.W.2d 96, 100 (N.D.1973).
See also Keidel v. Rask, 304 N.W.2d 402 (N.D.1981). A showing that incompetent evidence was permitted into a case is no reason to reverse the judgment. It does not affirmatively appear that all of the competent evidence is insufficient to support the findings or that any incompetent evidence induced the court to make an essential finding which would not otherwise have been made.