dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s resolution of Marley’s statutory construction claim, which I believe to be dis-positive of her appeal. Initially, I would observe that the Effects of Battery Insanity Statute, Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-11, is a particular species of the insanity defense 4 that applies only when a “defendant in a prosecution raises the issue that the defendant was at the time of the alleged crime suffering from the effects of battery as a result of the past course of conduct of the individual who is the victim of the alleged crime.” Ind.Code § 35^41-3 — 11(b)(1). Our legislature has defined “effects of battery” as
a psychological condition of an individual who has suffered repeated physical or sexual abuse inflicted by another individual who is the
(1), victim of an alleged crime for which the abused individual is charged in a pending prosecution; and
(2) abused individual’s:
(A) spouse or former spouse;
(B) parent;
(C) guardian or former guardian;
(D) custodian or former custodian; or
(E) cohabitant or former cohabitant.
Ind.Code § 35-41-1-3.3. Contrary to the majority, I am unable to conclude that either of Marley’s victims in this unfortunate incident, Donald Marley (“Donald”) or Gloria Smalling (“Smalling”), falls within any of the relationships identified in Indiana Code Section 35-41-1-3.3. As *1018such, I would conclude that the trial court committed reversible error when it required Marley to present evidence of battered woman’s syndrome (“BWS”) within the framework of Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-11 when, by definition, she did not suffer from a mental disease or defect specifically brought about by the “effects of battery.”
Where a statute has not previously been construed, as here, the interpretation is controlled by the express language of the statute and the general rules of statutory construction. Blackmon v. Duckworth, 675 N.E.2d 349, 351 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). The threshold inquiry in cases of statutory interpretation is whether the statute is ambiguous. Sullivan v. Day, 661 N.E.2d 848, 853 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), vacated in part on other grounds, 681 N.E.2d 713 (Ind.1997). Only when a statute is ambiguous is it susceptible to judicial interpretation. Id.
The evidence is undisputed that Donald was never Marley’s spouse, parent, guardian, or custodian. Therefore, in order for the Effects of Battery Insanity Statute to apply, he would have to be Marley’s “cohabitant or former cohabitant.” While the record indicates that Marley lived with Donald for several months prior to his death, and thus, technically inhabited the same residence during this period, I cannot agree that her doing so constituted a “cohabitation” within the intended scope of Indiana Code Section 35-41-1-3.3.
When a statute is susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation, we endeavor to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Blackmon, 675 N.E.2d at 351-52. In effecting legislative intent, undefined words in a statute are to be given their “plain, ordinary and usual meaning.” State v. D.M.Z., 674 N.E.2d 585, 588 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. Courts may consult English language dictionaries to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory term. Id. Black’s Law DictionaRY 260 (6th ed. 1990) defines “cohabitation” as follows:
To live together as husband and wife. The mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and obligations which are usually manifested by married people, including but not necessarily dependent on sexual relations.
Similarly, The AmeRican HeRitage DictionaRY 289 (2d ed. 1991) defines “cohabit” as “[t]o live together as husband and wife” or “[t]o live together in a sexual relationship when not legally married.” Clearly, the plain and ordinary meaning of “cohabitant” imparts a limited application to those living together in a quasi-marital or sexual relationship.
This interpretation is further bolstered by the long-standing treatment of the terms “cohabitant,” “cohabitate,” and “cohabitation” by our courts and the legislature. Indiana cases utilize those words solely in the context of marital relation and dissolution claims and actions involving parties who have lived together as husband and wife. See, e.g., Bright v. Kuehl, 650 N.E.2d 311, 315 (Ind.Ct.App.1995) (holding that a party who “cohabi-tates with another without subsequent marriage” is entitled to relief for contributions made during “cohabitation” upon a showing of an express contract or viable equitable theory such as implied contract or unjust enrichment); Beach v. Beach, 642 N.E.2d 269, 280 (Ind.Ct.App.1994) (addressing termination of maintenance provision in dissolution decree requiring former wife to notify former husband in the event that she remarry or “cohabitate with a male”); Oliver v. Estate of Oliver, 554 N.E.2d 8, 11 (Ind.Ct.App.1990) (interpreting Ind.Code § 29-1-2-14, the adultery/forfeiture of rights statute, and holding that the trial court may infer “adulterous cohabitation” from circumstantial evidence when determining whether spouse living in adultery at time of other spouse’s death should be prohibited from taking any part of the estate); Dunlop v. Dunlop, 101 Ind.App. 43, 198 *1019N.E. 95, 98 (1935) (holding that “cohabitation” does not itself constitute common law marriage, but is merely evidence of marriage). Indeed, when common law marriages were recognized in Indiana, this court observed, “Cohabitation will be inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of the living together of husband and wife. We use the terms ‘cohabit’ and ‘cohabitation’ as implying sexual intercourse.” Graves v. Graves, 123 Ind.App. 618, 621, 112 N.E.2d 869, 870 (1953).
A review of other statutes containing “cohabit” within their provisions also reflects a legislative intent that such term be used in the limited context of marital and quasi-marital relations. See, e.g., Ind.Code § 31-11-10-2 (governing marriages which are voidable on the ground that it was brought about through fraud; “[i]t is a defense in an action brought under this section that, after the discovery of the alleged fraud, the alleged victim continued to cohabit with the other party to the marriage.”); Ind.Code § 31-16-14-1 (governing actions for support of dependants by dependant spouse; grounds include when the other spouse “joins a sect or denomination that requires a renunciation of the marriage or that forbids the spouses to cohabit as husband and wife”). Likewise, I believe that the legislature, in deliberately choosing the word “cohabitant” in defining “effects of battery,” was fully aware of the term’s historical usage and distinct legal implications. Cf. Holmes v. ACandS, Inc., 709 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (observing that when a legislature enacts a statute, we presume it is aware of existing statutes in the same area), on rehearing in part, 711 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied; Thompson v. State, 617 N.E.2d 576, 579 (Ind.Ct.App.1993) (recognizing presumption that the legislature is aware of the common law and does not intend to make any change therein beyond what it declares either in express terms or by unmistakable implication), trans. denied; see also Burks v. Bolerjack, 427 N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ind.1981) (noting that the language employed in a statute is deemed to have been used intentionally).
Thus, in keeping with the foregoing principles of statutory construction, the term “cohabitant” appears to be one of limited application, meaning, as Marley suggests, a person who lives with another as husband and wife or in a comparable sexual relationship. The majority’s much broader construction encompasses anyone living together under the same roof-friends, acquaintances, and roommates— relationships which the legislature surely did not intend to elevate to the same level as a spouse, guardian, or custodian. See Blackmon, 675 N.E.2d 349 (noting that statute must be construed in such a way as to prevent absurdity and hardship).
Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court’s application of the Effects of Battery Insanity Statute in this case was error because Marley and Donald were not “cohabitants” within the meaning of Indiana Code Section 35-41-1-3.3. The error is even clearer with respect to Smalling, who was merely Donald’s neighbor at the time of the incident and had no relation to Marley, as a “cohabitant” or otherwise. In the absence of a mental disease or defect specifically brought about by the “effects of battery,” I respectfully dissent from the majority and would reverse the trial court’s application of Indiana Code Section 35-41-3-11 in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion.
. See Ind.Code § 35-41-3-5.