dissenting.
I cannot agree with the majority's opinion that the Journey's Account Statute applies to probate matters and, therefore, dissent.
Indiana courts have consistently held that a proceeding to contest the validity of a will is purely statutory and can only be brought and successfully maintained in the manner and within the limitations prescribed by the probate statutes. Willman v. Railing (1988), Ind. App., 529 N.E.2d 122, reh'g den., trans. den.1 The time limita tion for contesting a will is jurisdictional. Modlin v. Riggle (1980), Ind.App., 399 N.E.2d 767; Brown v. Gardner (1974), 159 Ind.App. 586, 308 N.E.2d 424. The provisions create a condition precedent to the right to contest the will; it is not merely a statute of limitations, but a statute of repose, which bars the right not just the remedy. In re Plummer's Estate (1966), 141 Ind.App. 142, 219 N.E.2d 917. The Journey's Account Statute does not apply to original complaints that do not invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 19 ILE Iimitations of Action § 88 (1959), citing State ex rel. Hardin v. Superior Court of Marion County (1956), 235 Ind. 604, 135 N.E.2d 517 (zoning case case in which complaint was defective could not be amended after the expiration of the jurisdictional time limit); Gossard v. Vawter (1939), 215 Ind. 581, 21 N.E.2d 416 (election contest which omitted jurat from affidavit was defective and could not be refiled).
The exceptions to the bringing of claims beyond the period of time established by the probate statutes are strictly limited. See Matter of Estate of Niemiec (1982), Ind. App., 435 N.E.2d 999. The reason for imposing this limitation is to provide for the uniform, expeditious distribution of the property of a decedent, to shorten the time and minimize the costs of administration, and to free courts from the burden of protracted estate administration proceedings. Kuzma v. Peoples Trust & Savings Bank (1961), 132 Ind.App. 176, 176 N.E.2d 134. The trend, both in our state and other jurisdictions, has been to reduce the time limit for filing of will contests. Pedersen v. Dempsey (1950), 341 Ill.App. 141, 93 N.E.2d 85. "The reason for these reductions in time within which the validity of a will may be questioned is the pressing importance of securing an orderly settlement of estates, to prevent embarrassment to creditors and others, and to avoid as much confusion as possible in the vast amount of property rights and titles that pass through probate." Matter of Estate of Moerschel (1980), 86 Ill.App.3d 482, 41 Ill.Dec. 633, 407 N.E.2d 1131, 1133, quoting Pedersen, 93 N.E.2d at 86.
For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court.
. But see Milligan v. Denham (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 595, adopting, Ind.App., 553 N.E.2d 1265 (where complaint was timely filed under IC 29-1-7-17, but clerk did not issue summons as requested within the statutory five month period, trial court erred by dismissing contestors' first amended complaint). Milligan was distinguished from Willman in the opinion authored by Judge Chezem in that, unlike Willman, the Milligan contestors Amended Complaint was filed within the statutory five month time period and the original Complaint was not defective).