O'LAUGHLIN v. Barton

DeBRULER, Justice,

dissenting.

On December 1, 1987, the trial court issued its order and judgment that the cash bail not be forfeited and paid to the State Treasurer, but that it be paid in partial satisfaction of the judgment of Barton against Fadli.

On February 13, 1990, this Court rendered its opinion and decision which reversed the December 1, 1987, judgment and ordered the trial court in lieu thereof to order that the cash bail be forfeited and paid to the State Treasurer. Due to the filing and pendency of a petition for rehearing, this decision did not become final, so as to require the trial court to comply, until April 24, 1990.

On March 20, 1990, Senate Enrolled Act No. 15, amending I.C. 85-83-8-7 became effective, requiring that cash bail "not be declared forfeited by the court and the court shall order the deposited funds held by the clerk." |

From this outline, it may be seen that on the day the new amendment became effective, there had been no actual order or judgment of forfeiture made the trial court or finally required by order of this Court.

The general rule is that a law shall be prospective only in the absence of an express statement that it be retroactive. Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville (1940), 216 Ind. 399, 24 N.E.2d 937. The trial court below followed this principle of law in rendering this judgment. It gave prospective application to this new amending statute and did not give it retroactive force. The obligation of the statute is intended to fall upon the trial court, whenever it is called upon to determine the disposition of a revoked bail. At the point in time when the new amendment to the statute became binding and effective, the judicial process of determining the proper disposition of this revoked bail was still in fier? and had not yet culminated in a final order of forfeiture. The State's right to payment had not *1262yet vested. Thus the judgment of the trial court cannot now be reversed upon the basis that it incorrectly accorded the amendment retroactive force. Surely the legislature intended for courts to apply this new procedure whenever, after the effective date of the amendment creating that new procedure, courts decide what to do with revoked bail money.

An issue here, separate from that of statutory retroactivity, is whether this amendment to the statute is unconstitutional under the Indiana Constitution, Article 4, Sections 22 and 28; and Article 8. This is not void as special legislation. It is presumed constitutional. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, Inc. (1980), 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585. It is true that it provides a great benefit to the plaintiff Barton, but at the same time the statute does and will benefit other crime victims within the class of which she is representative, is broad and general in scope and application, and is in the spirit of recent legislation recognizing the need of the oft-forgotten crime victim. Furthermore, I would not refuse to apply this amendment because of the separation of powers doctrine. By this amendment, the other two branches of the state government announced that, effective immediately, the State's interest in the receipt of money from this source is exceeded by the interest of the class of injured citizens of which Barton is representative. Under these somewhat unique circumstances I would not refuse enforcement of their judgment in this case. See In re the Matter of Public Law No. 154-1990 (1990), Ind., 561 N.E.2d 791, 797 (opinion of De-Bruler, J., concurring and dissenting).

DICKSON, J., concurs.