specially concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court.
The sole issue presented by this direct appeal is whether section 110 — 6.2 of the Code of Criminal^ Procedure, entitled “Post-conviction Detention,” is constitutional. The statute provides that a court shall order a person found guilty of an imprisonable offense incarcerated without bond unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the person is not likely to flee and does not pose a danger to others; and (2) the defendant’s appeal is not for the purposes of delay and raises a substantial question of law or fact that will likely result in reversal or a new trial (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 38, par. 110 — 6.2(b)). Admittedly, there is merit to these legislative guidelines. There is little question but that such factors are commonly considered by judges who are deciding whether to set bail on appeal. The decision to grant or deny bail in criminal proceedings, however, is an inherent power of the courts. By enacting section 110 — 6.2, the Illinois legislature is intruding in an area where it lacks jurisdiction.
This court in People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 62, 66, stated that “the constitution has placed responsibility for rules governing appeal in the Supreme Court, and not in the General Assembly.” The Constitution of 1970 provides that the “[gjeneral administrative and supervisory authority over all courts is vested in the Supreme Court and shall be exercised *** in accordance with its rules.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, §16.) Pursuant to its constitutional authority, this court adopted Supreme Court Rule 609(b), which states that a defendant may be admitted to bail at the discretion of a trial judge or a reviewing court. (134 Ill. 2d R. 609(b).) Determining whether defendants should be admitted to bail during the pendency of the criminal appeals process is a power that is exclusively vested in the judiciary.