Opinion
PARAS, J.Following the rejection of their claim against the State of California (State), plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that defendant entered plaintiffs’ property by cutting a wire fence in order to fight a grass fire of unknown origin. The complaint further alleged that after extinguishing the fire and vacating plaintiffs’ property, defendant negligently and carelessly failed to repair the fence or to notify plaintiffs of its condition so that they might repair it; as a proximate result, plaintiffs’ cattle went through the opening onto Interstate Highway 5 where they were struck and killed by vehicles traveling thereon, to plaintiffs’ damage in the sum of $1,765.60. The trial court sustained defendant’s demurrer with leave to amend. Plaintiffs declined to amend, judgment of dismissal was entered, and this appeal followed.
*894The question is whether Government Code section 850.41 confers immunity upon the public entity for the conduct of its employees under the facts in this case. Section 850.4 provides in pertinent part as follows; “Neither a public entity, nor a public employee acting in the scope of his employment, is liable for any injury resulting from the condition of fire protection or firefighting equipment or facilities or . . . for any injury caused in fighting fires.” (Italics added.)
Plaintiffs concede that the State, pursuant to section 821.8, had the authority to cut the fence and enter the property to fight the fire.2 They maintain, however, that neither section 821.8 nor section 850.4 immunizes the defendant, because they have not alleged that the State was negligent “in fighting fires” on their property; rather the alleged negligence was in not repairing the fence or notifying the plaintiffs, after the fire had been extinguished.
We have carefully considered the plaintiffs’ contention and have concluded that it cannot be sustained. The plaintiffs’ injury came about because the defendant State, according to the complaint, “entered plaintiffs’.. . property by cutting a wire fence in order to fight a grass fire of unknown origin;” the cattle then went through the open fence and were destroyed. Nothing could be more clear than that the injury was “caused” by the defendant “in fighting fires”3 within the meaning of section 850.4; therefore again nothing could be more clear than that immunity for this injury was intended by the statute. To accept plaintiffs’ argument would be to transpose this positive reality into its negative counterpart and then to mischievously nullify it. Much of the immunity conferred by section 850.4 would thus evanesce, for with a theoretical negative ever present, a plaintiff need only allege his affirmative facts in their negative counterpart to thwart the legislative intent.
This semantic technique could be applied in turn to other immunity statutes, similarly emasculating them. Paradigmatically, section 856.2 gives public entities immunity for injury caused by an escaped inmate of *895a mental institution; a plaintiff is injured by the escapee; the plaintiff would say that the injury was caused not by the escaped inmate, but by the public entity’s negligent failure to apprehend him. Section 818.2 provides, inter alia, an immunity against any injury caused by the adoption of an enactment; a plaintiff is injured by the passage of an ordinance; the plaintiff would assert that it was not the adoption of this law which caused the injury, but the failure to repeal it. Section 818.4 provides, inter alia, for public entity immunity against any injury caused by the issuance of a permit or license; a plaintiff is injured by a permittee who, without the permit, would not have injured him; the plaintiff would claim that it was not the issuance of the permit that caused the injury but the failure to revoke it thereafter. Section 818.8 gives a public entity an immunity for injury caused by a misrepresentation of its employee; a plaintiff is injured by such a misrepresentation; he maintains that it was not the misrepresentation that caused the injury but the failure later to retract it or to warn of it.
Moreover our Supreme Court has already ruled on this very issue in closely analogous circumstances. In Heieck and Moran v. City of Modesto (1966) 64 Cal.2d 229 [49 Cal.Rptr. 377, 411 P.2d 105], the plaintiff claimed that when the fire department attempted to fight a fire on his property, it was unable to do so because city employees had earlier (a month before) closed a valve in the water main for relocation of other mains and failed to reopen it, without giving notice of such failure. Thus plaintiff argued the analogue of this case, that it was not the condition (the closed valve) of the firefighting equipment (as to which § 850.4 gave conceded immunity) that caused the damage, but the failure later to reopen it. The Supreme Court summarily rejected the contention, saying: “Thus whether the alleged injury to plaintiff’s premises be viewed as resulting from ‘failure to provide or maintain sufficient... fire protection facilities’ (§ 850.2), or from the closed ‘condition’ of the water valve (§ 850.4) the conclusion is inescapable that the Legislature intended to establish immunity under the circumstances alleged by plaintiff.” (Italics added.) (Heieck and Moran v. City of Modesto, supra, at p. 233.) The Heieck court explained further: “It may be noted that this view is consistent with the report of the California Law Revision Commission, which in commenting on Government Code sections 850, 850.2, and 850.4 makes clear that it rejected suggested limitations on immunity for negligent fire protection, such as those now advanced by plaintiff. ‘Section 850.4 provides for absolute immunity from liability for injury caused in fighting fires (other than injuries resulting from operation of motor vehicles).....’ (4 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., p. 862; italics *896added.) Professor Van Alstyne also recognized (Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability (Cont. Ed. Bar 1964) pp. 309, 618) that the Legislature did not adopt suggested limitations on such immunity made in his study (reprinted in 5 Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep., pp. 467-468), but instead adhered to existing immunity rules when it recast the entire law of governmental liability and immunity in 1963.” (Id., at p. 233, fn.3.)
Commenting on Heieck, Professor Van Alstyne noted the Supreme Court’s clear conclusion that with regard to the subject matter of section 850.4 the legislative intent was that of “expanded immunity.” (Van Alstyne, Cal. Government Tort Liability Supp. (Cont. Ed. Bar 1969) § 7.28, pp. 71-72.) Heimberger v. City of Fairfield (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 711 [117 Cal.Rptr. 482], also supports our conclusion as does Connelly v. State of California (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 744, 751 [84 Cal.Rptr. 257].
The judgment is affirmed.
Puglia, P. J., concurred.
A11 section references are to the Government Code.
Section 821.8 provides: “A public employee is not liable for an injury arising out of his entry upon any property where such entry is expressly or impliedly authorized by law. Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability for an injury proximately caused by his own negligent or wrongful act or omission.”
A proximate cause of an injury is a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred. (Cal. Jury Instructions, Civ. (BAJI) (5th rev. ed. 1969) No. 3.75; see also Blanton v. Curry (1942) 20 Cal.2d 793, 805 [129 P.2d 1].)