IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-40182
CLAUDIA GONZALEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WANDA GAINES, in her official capacity
as Financial Aid Officer of Panola
College; RICHARD W. RILEY, Secretary
of Education of the United States, in his
official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Texas
(9:92-CV-12)
June 19, 1996
Before LAY*, HIGGINBOTHAM, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:**
Claudia Gonzalez appeals the district court's denial of her
application for attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. We affirm.
I.
*
Circuit Judge of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
**
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
This appeal arises from an unusual sequence of events. In
1991, Claudia Gonzalez applied for federally funded financial aid
to attend Panola College during the 1991-1992 school year, but her
application was denied because she did not have INS documentation
as required by the United States Department of Education regulation
construing the alien eligibility provision of the Higher Education
Act. See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5). In February 1992, Gonzalez sued
Wanda Gaines, in her official capacity as Financial Aid Officer of
Panola College, and the Secretary of Education of the United States
in his official capacity.1 Gonzalez challenged the denial of her
application for federal financial aid and the Secretary's reading
of 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5), asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702.
The case was assigned to then-Chief Judge Robert M. Parker of
the Eastern District of Texas. In July 1992, Gonzalez moved for a
preliminary injunction requesting that the district court grant her
financial aid for the 1992-1993 academic year. In August 1992, the
defendants filed their opposition to her preliminary injunction
request along with their motion for summary judgment. Later that
month, the Department of Education was notified that Gonzalez had
been accepted into the Family Unity Program, whereupon the parties
entered a stipulation that she was eligible for federal financial
1
Richard W. Riley was substituted for Alexander as the named
federal defendant as a result of Riley's July 1993 replacement of
Lamar Alexander as Secretary of Education.
2
aid for 1992-1993 as a result of her acceptance into that program.
This stipulation mooted her request for a preliminary injunction.
Following the August stipulation, Gonzalez moved for leave to
file a class complaint and for certification of that class. Her
proposed amended complaint included additional challenges to the
Secretary's interpretation and sought to extend the injunctive and
monetary relief requested in the original complaint to "all persons
rendered ineligible to receive federally-funded student financial
aid" by the Secretary's regulatory interpretation.
In April 1993, then-Chief Judge Parker granted partial summary
judgment for Gonzalez, holding that the Secretary's interpretation
was "arbitrary, capricious and not in accordance with the law." In
June 1993, he denied Gonzalez' motion for class certification.
Gonzalez filed a motion requesting a memorandum opinion or findings
of fact and conclusions of law on the issue of class certification.
Secretary Riley's response to that motion included a cross-motion
requesting that the district court issue a final judgment awarding
Gonzalez' relief on her individual claims and dismissing the case
with prejudice. Gaines did not join Riley's cross-motion.
In September 1993, then-Chief Judge Parker issued a final
judgment ordering "that Defendant shall award Plaintiff the student
financial aid she would have received had Defendant properly
interpreted the provision at issue in this case." He also found
"that Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this case" and ordered
Gonzalez "to submit evidence in affidavit form concerning her
3
costs, expenses and attorney's fees within (30) days of the entry
of [the] order." The order did not expressly specify whether the
judgment ran against Gaines, Riley, or both.
On November 9, 1993, Gonzalez filed her motion seeking to
recover attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses from Gaines pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and from Riley pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(b) and 2412(d)(1)(A). Thereafter,
Riley filed his notice of appeal on November 17, 1993, and Gaines
filed her notice of appeal on November 22. On November 29, 1993,
the parties moved jointly for a stay of consideration of Gonzalez'
request for attorneys' fees pending the appeals. On December 1,
1993, Gonzalez cross-appealed the denial of her motion for class
certification. On December 8, 1993, the district court granted the
request for a stay of attorneys' fees proceedings pending appeal.
On December 20, 1993, Congress amended 20 U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5)
to duplicate the language of the Department of Education regulation
that Gonzalez had challenged. Pub. L. No. 103-208 § 12(h)(15), 107
Stat. 2476, 2477. All parties then moved to dismiss their appeals,
and this court dismissed those appeals in March 1994.
In April 1994, Riley informed the district court that the
parties' appeals had been withdrawn, thus leaving only the issue of
Gonzalez' request for attorneys' fees. By that time, then-Chief
Judge Parker had been appointed to this court, and the case was
assigned to Judge John Hannah, Jr. In August 1994, Gaines filed
her response opposing Gonzalez' request for attorneys' fees on the
4
ground that Gonzalez "was not held to be a prevailing party against
Wanda Gaines/Panola College, and therefore cannot collect anything
from the college." Later that month, Riley filed his opposition to
attorneys' fees. Then, in September 1994, Gaines filed a motion to
dismiss the case against her, insisting that the district court had
"found that the plaintiff was the prevailing party against only one
of the defendants, the federal government/Department of Education."
In November 1994, Judge Hannah held a hearing that included
testimony from witnesses and oral argument on Gonzalez' request for
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. In February 1995, Judge
Hannah entered an order denying Gonzalez' request in its entirety.
He held that attorneys' fees were not available from Gaines under
42 U.S.C. § 1988 or from Riley under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) because
there was no action under color of state law. Judge Hannah further
held that Gonzalez was not entitled to attorneys' fees from Riley
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) because he found the federal
government's actions and litigating position to be "substantially
justified" in light of the language and legislative history of the
Higher Education Act, congressional acquiescence in the Secretary's
interpretation, and subsequent congressional validation by way of
technical amendment. In a separate order, he also denied as moot
Gaines' motion to dismiss.
II.
Gonzalez appeals the district court's denial of her request
for attorneys' fees and costs from Gaines under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
5
and from Riley under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2412(b) and 2412(d)(1)(A). We
are persuaded that district court did not err in concluding that
Gonzalez cannot recover attorneys' fees from either defendant.
With respect to Gaines, we interpret then-Chief Judge Parker's
final judgment for Gonzalez as attaching liability only to Riley,
not to the college. The trial court's analysis indicates that the
judgment of liability was on Gonzalez' APA claim, not her § 1983
claim. Since the APA claim reaches only the federal government,
the judgment for Gonzalez can run only against Riley.
With respect to Riley, we agree with the district court's
conclusion that attorneys' fees are not available under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(b) because there was no action under color of state law.
Since we are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding that the government's litigating position was
"substantially justified,"2 we also agree that attorneys' fees are
not available under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
AFFIRMED.
2
A "district court's determination of whether the government's
position was `substantially justified' is reviewed for abuse of
discretion." Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir.
1992) (relying on Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 562 (1988)).
"Substantially justified" means "`justified in substance or in the
main' — that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person." Underwood, 487 U.S. at 565.
6