(dissenting, with whom Liacos, J., joins). I readily recognize and acknowledge, as does the court in *194its opinion, that at common law a person (a) “may change his name at will, without resort to legal proceedings, by merely adopting another name, provided that this is done for an honest purpose” (Merolevitz, petitioner, 320 Mass. 448, 450 [1946]), and (b) has the “freedom of choice to assume a name which he deems more appropriate and advantageous to him than his family name in his present circumstances, if the change is not motivated by fraudulent intent.” Rusconi, petitioner, 341 Mass. 167, 169-170 (1960). However, in my opinion, this common law right cannot and does not override or render unenforceable the statutory mandate for the making and keeping of the many important public records involved in this case, nor does it give the persons to whom those records relate the right or option to determine and dictate, at their discretion, the names and other information required by statute to be entered on those records.
The Legislature, in the exercise of its “full power and authority... to make, ordain, and establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, directions and instructions... as... [it] shall judge to be for the good and welfare of this Commonwealth, and for the government and ordering thereof, and of the subjects of the same” (Mass. Const. Part II, c. 1, § 1, art. 4), has enacted a series of statutes mandating the making and keeping of certain public records containing data relating to the lives of individuals. The records are referred to as “vital records” in G. L. c. 17, § 4, as amended through St. 1976, c. 486, § 3.
The principal mandated vital records are those relating to a person’s birth, adoption, marriage, divorce, change of name by court proceeding, or death. While the initial record of such an event is to be found in the office of a municipal clerk, or of a clerk of court or register of probate in the city or town where it occurred, the statutory scheme requires that the clerk or register send a copy of his record or a report of the happening of the event to the Commonwealth’s central “registry of vital records and statistics” under the supervision of the Commissioner of Public *195Health. There is also a statutory provision for the completion or correction of such vital records at the local level, with a requirement for the forwarding of any such correction to the central registry.
An examination of the entire statutory scheme on vital records establishes beyond question that the Legislature intended that the vital records show more than the fact that on a certain date and at a certain place a person was born, married, or died. The clear emphasis of the legislation is on the requirement of a record containing accurate information from which it can be determined who was born, married, or died. Each such record must show when the record was made, when and where the recorded event occurred, and who was born, married, or died, as the case may be. G. L. c. 46, § 1, as amended through St. 1977, c. 161. Additionally, the birth record must state the child’s “sex, names, places of birth and residence of his parents, including the maiden name of the mother and occupation of the father.”1 The record of a marriage must further state the “name, residence and official station of the person by whom [the marriage was] solemnized, names and places of birth of the parties married, residence of each, age of each, the number of the marriage (as first or second) and if previously married, whether widowed or divorced, the occupation of each and the names of their parents, and the maiden names of the mothers [and i]f the woman is a widow or divorced, her maiden name shall also be given.”2 The same statute requires the following additional information on a death record: “sex, color, condition (whether single, widowed, married or divorced), supposed age, residence, occupation, place of death, place of birth, names and places of birth of the parents, maiden name of the mother, disease or cause of death... place of burial, name of the *196cemetery, if any [certain information if the deceased was a veteran], and if deceased was a married or divorced woman or a widow, her maiden name and the name of her husband.”
Having thus devised and enacted a statutory scheme to ensure the completeness and authenticity of the vital records with which we are dealing, the Legislature took the next logical step by enacting the following pertinent provisions of G. L. c. 46, § 19, as amended through St. 1976, c. 486, § 13: “The record of the town clerk relative to a birth, marriage or death shall be prima facie evidence of the facts recorded, but nothing contained in the record of a death which has reference to the question of liability for causing the death shall be admissible in evidence. A certificate of such a record, signed by the town clerk or assistant clerk, or a certificate of the copy of the record relative to a birth, marriage or death required to be kept in the department of public health, signed by the commissioner of public health or the registrar of vital records and statistics, shall be admissible as evidence of such record.”
It is my opinion that when the detailed and comprehensive statutory scheme for the making and keeping of vital records is read in its entirety, the basic intent of the Legislature which permeates this scheme is the following: (1) that on the birth record of a legitimate child the surname of the father shall be entered as the surname of the child, (2) that on the birth record of an illegitimate child the surname of the mother shall be entered as the surname of the child, unless (a) both the father and mother request in writing that the name of the father and other information relating to him be recorded (G. L. c. 46, § 1), in which event the name of the father and such other information shall also be entered on the birth record of the child, and the surname of the father shall be entered thereon as the surname of the child, or (b) the surname of the mother of the illegitimate child having been originally entered on the birth record as the surname of the child, it is subsequently changed to that of the father in any manner from time to time permitted by statute (G. L. *197c. 46, § 3, and G. L. c. 190, § 7), and (3) that a child’s name and surname (collectively hereafter referred to as “name”) shall continue to be the appropriate record name of that person for the purpose of vital records concerning him or her, unless it is lawfully changed of record by or as the result of (a) an adoption accompanied by a change of name (G. L. c. 210, § 6A), (b) a change of name by decree of the Probate Court (G. L. c. 210, §§ 12-13) (c) marriage (see G. L. c. 210, § 123), (d) an order or decree of the Probate Court granting a divorce and allowing “a woman to resume her maiden name or that of a former husband” (G. L. c. 208, § 23, as appearing in St. 1973, c. 379), or (e) a statutorily authorized correction of a name appearing in a record of birth, marriage, or death (G. L. c. 46, § 13).
When the statutory scheme is viewed in historical context, it becomes clear that the Legislature intended the results outlined above. These statutes have their origin in quite detailed colonial laws dating back more than 300 years. The Legislature has codified and amended these statutes at least twenty times over their history. The parties in the present case agree that “custom and usage... for over two hundred years, with respect to the recording of births by city and town clerks, [has been] to record the birth or birth certificate of a legitimate child in the surname of the father... [and] of an illegitimate child in the surname of the mother.” In the course of its periodic review and modification of these statutes, the Legislature surely considered and acquiesced in this custom and usage. Such acceptance is entitled to considerable weight in assessing the meaning of these statutes.
I would interpret the various statutes relating to vital records in a manner which would give full effect to what I believe to have been the intent of the Legislature.
*198In my view the position taken by the court does not give sufficient weight to the important public interests which are dependent on the proper maintenance of these vital records. Unless these records are consistently kept in a manner which permits ready and reliable determination of the relationship between various persons, particularly between parents and children, between spouses, former spouses and parents of spouses, and between deceased persons and surviving spouses or other heirs, it will become impossible to construct chains of familial relationships on which so many important issues, including the distribution of property of a deceased, may depend. The result reached by the court today in the name of “the common law principle of freedom of choice in the matter of names,” if followed by many persons, will certainly undermine those qualities of consistency and reliability which I believe the Legislature thought indispensable to vital records.
There is ample room in our system of law for both the kind of vital records which the Legislature intended and the exercise of the “freedom of choice” which would permit any person to indulge his desire for a different name for himself or his children outside the sphere of vital records. Neither the legal prescription on the contents of vital records, nor the individual freedom of choice of names, need exclude the other.
This statute also provides: “In the record of birth of an illegitimate child, the name of and other facts relating to the father shall not be recorded except on the written request of both father and mother.”
For yet further record requirements applicable to notices and certificates of intention of marriage, see G. L. c. 207, §§ 19-37.
The second sentence of this statute is: “No change of the name of a person, except upon the adoption of a child under this chapter or upon the marriage or divorce of a woman, shall be lawful unless made by said court for a sufficient reason consistent with public interests” (emphasis supplied).