specially concurring:
I concur in the above opinion, but feel it necessary that I comment briefly. The practice of law is, and I always hope that it will be, a profession. It has repeatedly been said that when one accepts a license to practice law he assumes as a part of that privilege the duty to represent the indigent upon occasion. Times have changed and the public defender represents the great majority of those unable to employ counsel. When practicing attorneys are occasionally called upon to represent those without funds, they cannot and should not expect to be reimbursed in full for their efforts. The legislature has so recognized this, as pointed out in the above opinion. Counsel herein requested *8,662.08 for fees and overhead. Section 113 — 3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 38, par. 113 — 3(c)) now provides that a fee not to exceed *1000 may be awarded for the defense of felony cases. The statute, as pointed out in the opinion herein, then provides that in “extraordinary circumstances” payment in excess of that amount may be made. In People v. Sanders (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 196, 317 N.E.2d 552, the trial court did not find “extraordinary circumstances”, notwithstanding the fact that in that case counsel averred that they had spent 463 hours, as compared to 333 hours herein, for all counsel concerned. While it is true that the trial court herein did find “extraordinary circumstances,” I do not feel that the legislature ever contemplated that fees anywhere in the neighborhood of those requested herein should be awarded. While this case is being reversed for re-assessment of fees, I feel that the trial court should be most circumspect in such determination, remembering that we, as lawyers, are engaged in an ancient and honorable profession that includes the defense of the indigent when called upon but not at, or near the fees which might be charged to those able to retain a private attorney.