dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. This is a teacher termination case.
As pointed out by the majority, there have been a number of instances where teachers have sought and obtained review by summons and complaint in the district court. In most of these cases, the question of writ versus declaratory judgment was not raised. Furthermore, before the creation of the court of appeals, there was no question as to forum. However, at the time of the termination in this case, the *236teacher’s exclusive avenue for review was by writ of certiorari to this court.
In Strand v. Special School District No. 1, 392 N.W.2d 881 (1986), a termination case, the supreme court, after acknowledging that previously the state of the law was generally unsettled, stated:
Now, however, we take this opportunity to conclude that it was the intention of the legislature and this court in its rule-making capacity to vest certiorari jurisdiction for cases of this nature in the court of appeals.
Id. at 883.
Previously, in Grinolds v. Independent School District No. 597, 366 N.W.2d 667 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), cert. denied (Minn. Jan. 18, 1985), a termination case, this court stated:
We see no need to analyze this point any further. Jurisdiction to hear appeals from school board actions lies with the court of appeals and not the district courts.
Id. at 668 (emphasis added); see Collins v. Independent School District No. 745, 416 N.W.2d 174 (Minn.Ct.App.1987).
In Jenson v. Joint Independent School District No. 287, 408 N.W.2d 203 (Minn.Ct.App.1987), this court did permit a civil action by a teacher in district court. The court acknowledged the Grinolds’rule, but made an exception, stating:
The practicalities of the present circumstances show that review by certiorari was an inadequate remedy * * *.
Id. at 207. No such practicalities are present here.
The majority argues that an exception should be made in this case because the statutes do not specifically provide for a hearing when a teacher is terminated while on authorized leave and that, therefore, the teacher may proceed in district court to make a “record” for review. This is contrary to the supreme court’s ruling in Grinolds v. Independent School District No. 597, 346 N.W.2d 123 (1984). There, the school district and the teacher (superintendent) stipulated to resolve a termination dispute in the district court. The supreme court held that the trial court could not make de novo findings of fact and that what had to be reviewed was the action of the school board. The “record” for judicial review must be the proceedings or actions of the board.
In this case, the material facts are not disputed and the “record” that would have come to this court pursuant to a writ would have been the same as that furnished the trial court and upon which he based his finding and order for partial summary judgment. Neither party claims the “record” was not adequate to support those findings.
It should be noted that the trial court did not expressly rule on the jurisdiction question and it was briefed for the first time on appeal to this court.