(dissenting). This Court granted leave to appeal to reconcile the conflicting prerequisites of MCR 2.308(A)(1)1 and the Michigan Rules of Evidence regarding the admissibility of a deposition at trial. I would hold that the trial court erred in excluding the deposition because it was properly admissible pursuant to MCR 2.308(A)(1)(b). However, the contents of the deposition should have been subject to consideration under the hearsay rules as provided within MCR 2.308(A). Accordingly, I would reverse the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I concur with Justice Griffin’s recitation of the facts in this case.
i
The question before us today requires us to examine the interplay between the Michigan Court Rules and the Rules of Evidence concerning the use and grounds for admission of depositions. Plaintiff argues that the court rule at issue here be applied in a fashion similar to that of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure *79432(a).2 However, upon examination of the federal provision, it is readily distinguishable from the development of MCR 2.308(A)(1). With regard to the federal rule, there is no question that it serves as an independent basis for the admission of a deposition. It is well settled that a deposition’s compliance with Rule 32 prerequisites cures any potential hearsay objection pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 802. See, e.g., United States v IBM, 90 FRD 377 (1981).3
Further, MCR 2.308(A)(1) lacks the language concerning the application of the rule, i.e., as "though the witness were then present and testifying,” that is present in its federal counterpart. However, the historical basis for the absence of this language, as thoroughly documented by the majority, remains inconclusive upon the issue whether the court rule is to be applied in a fashion comparable to the use of Federal Rule 32.
In light of a nondefinitive history concerning the absence of this language from the present day MCR 2.308, at issue is whether the admission of a deposition pursuant to the instant court rule serves to undermine the preeminence of the evidentiary rules *795concerning the use of evidentiary material at trial. I observe that in light of the court rule’s development, the position advocated by the plaintiff best harmonizes the rules of procedure and MRE 802’s mandate that evidence which constitutes hearsay shall be found to be admissible only pursuant to the evidentiary rules.
I construe MCR 2.308(A)(1)(b) to call for a two-fold consideration by a trial court. Initially, the trial court may look to the court rules to determine whether the deposition as a document, i.e., irrespective of its contents, may potentially be admissible where the deponent was an employee at the time of the transaction or occurrence giving rise to the litigation. However, once this document is determined to be admissible, the court rule then provides that the extent of this admissibility is limited by the Rules of Evidence. It is at this point that the trial court must consider the substantive content of the deposition and determine the basis upon which a party seeks to introduce the deponent’s statements at trial. I find that this construction strikes an acceptable balance between the hearsay rules and MCR 2.308(A)(1), and does not serve to make the court rule an exception de facto to the evidentiary provisions as the substance of the deposition remains subject to the scrutiny of MRE 801-804.
In the instant case, the majority correctly observes that due to the plaintiffs failure to establish Ms. Du-dash’s unavailability at trial, the deposition as a whole would not be admissible pursuant to MRE 804(a)(l)-(5).4 The lower court record fails to reveal *796any attempt by the plaintiff to establish a factual record as to the basis of Ms. Dudash’s absence at trial. Further, the entire text of Ms. Dudash’s statements would not be admissible as nonhearsay pursuant to MRE 801(d)(2)(D)5 given the fact that she was not an agent or servant of the defendant at the time which the deposition was taken.
Nonetheless, irrespective of the evidentiary tactics pursued here, I maintain that, as a matter of procedure, it would have been appropriate for the trial court to examine the deposition and redact all material found to constitute hearsay.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, I would hold that while the deposition in this case should have been admitted pursuant to MCR 2.308(A)(1), its substance should have been subjected to the scrutiny of the hearsay rules. Accordingly, the only portions of the deposition which should have been admitted are either those which constituted nonhearsay or in which the plaintiff es*797tablished compliance with an exception to the hearsay rules. Therefore, I would reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court and remand the case for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.
MCR 2.308(A)(1) provides:
(A) In General.
(1) At the trial, or the hearing on a motion, or a preliminary proceeding, a part or all of a deposition so far as admissible under the rules of evidence may be used against a party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or had reasonable notice of it, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(b) The deposition of a party or anyone who at the time of the transaction or occurrence out of which the action arose or at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, employee, or agent of a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.
(a) Use of Depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(2) The deposition of a party or of anyone who at the time of taking the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a public or private corporation, partnership or association or governmental agency which is a party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.
For a listing of additional federal rules and acts of Congress which serve as exceptions to FRE 802 concerning the admissibility of depositions and other affidavits, see 4 Weinstein & Berger, Evidence, pp 802-1 to 802-2.
(a) Definition of Unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness” includes situations in which the declarant—
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) has a lack of memory of the subject matter of his statement; or *796(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means, and in a criminal case, due diligence is shown.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if—
(2). . . The statement is offered against a party and is . . . (D) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship ....