We have fully considered the briefs, oral arguments and extensive appendix submitted by the respective parties, and the briefs of the several amicus curiae. It is our conclusion that the negative-aid provisions of school district financing, as mandated by secs. 121.07 and 121.08, Stats., are violative of the rule of uniform taxation set forth in art. VIII, sec. 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution.
As pertinent to this action, sections 121.07 and 121.08, Stats., provide:
“121.07 General provisions; state aid computation. In this subchapter: it
“'(¿/shared COST, (a) ‘Shared cost’ is the cost of operation, minus the operational receipts and amounts received under s. 79.04(1) (e), plus the principal and interest payments on long-term indebtedness and annual capital outlay, for the current school year. The sum of the principal and interest payments on long-term indebtedness and annual capital outlay included in shared cost shall not exceed $100 per pupil. Any amounts contributed by the school district to provide food service programs for the elderly shall not be included.
“(b) In computing state aid for a school district, that portion of its shared cost per pupil which is more than 10% above the average per pupil shared cost for the previous school year [for school districts of like organization],1 as determined by the state superintendent, shall be excluded except as provided in par. (c).
*555“(c) In computing state aid on the shared cost excluded under par. (b), the secondary guaranteed valuation shall be used.
“(7) SCHOOL DISTRICT GUARANTEED VALUATIONS FOR DISTRICTS OPERATING BOTH ELEMENTARY AND HIGH SCHOOL GRADES. ‘School district guaranteed valuation’ is the amount set forth in pars, (a) and (b) multiplied by the number of resident pupils enrolled.
“ (a) The primary guaranteed valuation shall be $71,-200 in the 1973-74 school year and $75,500 thereafter.2
“(b) The secondary guaranteed valuation shall be an amount rounded to the nearest $100 determined by dividing the equalized valuation of the state by the number of pupils enrolled in the state.
“(10) MILL LEVY RATE. ‘Mill levy rate’ is the sum of the rates derived in pars, (a) and (b).
“(a) The primary required levy rate is the quotient of the shared cost not excluded by sub. (6) (b) divided by the school district primary guaranteed valuation.
“(b) The secondary required levy rate is the quotient of the shared costs determined in sub. (6) (c) divided by the school district secondary guaranteed valuation.”
121.08 State aids; payments by certain districts. (1) The state shall pay to the school district a sum equal to the amount by which the primary guaranteed valuation exceeds the school district equalized valuation, multiplied by the primary required levy rate and a sum equal to the amount by which the secondary guaranteed valuation exceeds the school district equalized valuation multiplied by the secondary required levy rate.
“(2) The school district shall pay to the state the sum of pars, (a) and (b).
“(a) Beginning with the 1977-78 school year the amount by which the school district equalized valuation exceeds the primary guaranteed valuation, multiplied by the primary required levy rate.
*556“ (b) The amount by which the school district equalized valuation exceeds the secondary guaranteed valuation, multiplied by the secondary required levy rate.
“(8) If the net amount computed under subs. (1) and (2) results in a negative sum, that amount shall constitute the negative aid payment due. The negative aid payment due shall be certified to the school district by the state superintendent on or before March 15. The school district treasurer shall transmit the amount certified to the state treasurer on or before May 15. The state treasurer shall credit this amount to the negative aid payment appropriation under s. 20.255(1) (k). No negative aid payment shall be required under this subsection prior to the 1976-77 school year.”
In addition, sec. 121.07 (8) and sec. 121.07 (9), Stats.,3 establish different primary and secondary guaranteed valuations for school districts operating only elementary grades (k-8), and for school districts operating only high school grades (9-12). The effect of these different valuations is to reduce the positive aid which such districts might receive, or to increase the negative aid which they might pay in relation to school districts which operate both elementary and high school grades (k-12), and thus to encourage districts to operate both elementary and high school grades (k-12). Section 121.08(4) provides for phased transitional computations ending in 1984.4
The foregoing statutes contain a district power equalization factor based upon the equalized valuation of real estate for taxation purposes located within each school district. As a result of the introduction of the district power equalization factor into the procedure for financing school districts, certain of the school districts in the *557state will not receive any state aid. Instead, they will be required to pay a portion of their property tax revenues into the general state fund to ultimately be redistributed to other school districts in the state. The districts so required to make payments into the state fund have become known as “negative-aid districts.” The school districts receiving state aid have become known as “positive-aid districts.”
This is a class action, brought on behalf of all property taxpayers residing in negative-aid school districts and on behalf of all such school districts themselves. The petitioners are Glenn A. Busé, a property taxpayer residing in the Nicolet Union High School District, a negative-aid school district; other property taxpayers residing in other negative-aid districts; Joint School District No. 1, located principally in the city of West Allis; and other negative-aid school districts. A stipulated statement of facts has been submitted.
Sec. 121.08, Stats., is intended to achieve equalization of taxing power among the school districts of Wisconsin. Power equalization legislation is based on the premise that student equality of opportunity results when: (a) Regardless of a school district’s actual property valuation, its tax levy rate for school purposes produces the same net amount of available school revenue as the same tax levy rate in every other like school district; and (b) there are no per-pupil spending disparities between districts.
The two objectives are pursued concurrently by means of the aid formula set out in sec. 121.08, Stats. The formula possesses two fiscal components: The “primary guaranteed valuation” per pupil figure and the “secondary guaranteed valuation” per pupil figure. The secondary guaranteed valuation figure is always less than the primary guaranteed valuation figure. The primary figure is set biennially by the legislature while the second*558ary figure equals the actual statewide equalization valuation per public school pupil. The secondary figure is used only to compute positive or negative aid for a school district on that portion of its shared cost per pupil which is more than ten percent above the average per pupil shared cost for the previous school year. See: sec. 121.07 (6) (b) and (c).
Thus, the secondary guaranteed valuation per pupil figure serves as a built-in disincentive to spend above and beyond 110 percent of the state average per pupil shared cost for the previous school year. If a positive-aid district spends beyond this level, it will receive less aid. If a negative-aid district spends beyond this level, it will be required to pay more of its revenue to the state. The obvious aim of this secondary aspect to the formula is to encourage districts to remain close to the median state per pupil spending ceiling.
As the objective of the aid formula is to treat each school district as if its equalized valuation per pupil equals the state guaranteed valuation figures, the first computation is to determine the difference (positive or negative) between the state guaranteed valuation figures (both primary and secondary) and a district’s actual equalized valuation per pupil. The district’s equalized valuation per pupil is computed by dividing the full value of the taxable property in the school district (as determined by sec. 121.06, Stats.) by the total number of children enrolled therein as . determined by sec. 121.07 (1), Stats.5
The positive or negative difference computed as above is then multiplied by the primary required mill levy rate, and the secondary required mill levy rate. The primary required mill levy rate is established by applying the provisions of sec. 121.07(10) (a), Stats. The primary re*559quired mill levy rate is the district’s per pupil cost or the state shared cost per pupil ceiling (as determined hy sec. 121.07(6) (b)), whichever is less, divided by the primary guaranteed valuation per pupil, as fixed by the provisions of sec. 121.07(7) (a).6
The secondary required mill levy rate is determined by the applying of the provisions of sec. 121.07(10) (b), Stats. The secondary required mill levy rate is the district’s per pupil cost, if any, above the state shared cost per pupil ceiling (as determined by sec. 121.07 (6) (b)) divided by the secondary guaranteed valuation per pupil. The secondary guaranteed valuation per pupil is fixed by the provisions of sec. 121.07(7) (b). (See: Footnote 6.)
The result of these computations determines whether a district is a negative-aid district and therefore pays a portion of its tax-generated revenue into the state fund or is a positive-aid district and receives payments from the state fund.
In applying these statutory formulas, two factors determine whether a particular school district is a negative-aid district which pays money to the state or is a positive-aid district which receives money from the state. First, how the actual equalized valuation of the district compares to the amount fixed by the legislature as the state primary guaranteed valuation per pupil and the secondary guaranteed valuation per pupil as determined by applying the statutory formula. Second, whether the district spends more or less in actual cost per pupil (teachers’ salaries, transportation, interest on long-term indebtedness, annual capital outlay, etc.) than the state primary shared cost ceiling.
The following are some of the results of application of the formula:
*5601. If the local district’s equalized valuation per pupil is less than the state secondary guaranteed valuation per pupil, the district will always be a positive-aid district, whether its per pupil cost is less than or greater than the state shared cost ceiling.
2. If the local district’s equalized valuation per pupil is less than the state primary guaranteed valuation per pupil but more than the state secondary guaranteed valuation per pupil, the district’s status will be positive-aid until its per pupil cost is significantly greater than the state shared cost ceiling.
8. If the local district’s equalized valuation per pupil is equal to the state primary guaranteed valuation per pupil, it will receive no positive aid and will pay negative aid in proportion to the amount by which its per pupil cost exceeds the state shared cost ceiling.
4. If the local district’s equalized valuation per pupil is greater than the state primary guaranteed valuation per pupil, the district will always be a negative-aid district whether its per pupil cost is less than or greater than the state shared cost ceiling.
The power equalization objective of the aid formula is realized when the computed negative and positive aids are incorporated in a determination of the actual mill rate which a district will have to impose in order to achieve a desired actual cost per pupil. The intention is to achieve equal tax dollars for educational purposes (i.ean equal actual cost per pupil) from equal tax effort. That is, any two school districts who choose to spend a given amount per pupil on education, will receive that amount, regardless of how much their actual equalized valuation per pupil differs, by taxing at the same mill rate.
The aid formula achieves its basic objective of district tax power equalization when viewed in terms of money spent per pupil. The formula purports to get equal tax *561dollars for educational purposes from equal tax effort regardless of the disparity in tax base. Thus, if the actual cost per pupil were precisely the same in each of approximately 450 school districts, the actual mill rate for educational revenue would be the same in each district of the same classification.
The new aid formula replaced Wisconsin’s old “foundation plan” of educational financing which was in effect from 1949 to 1973. Under the former program a minimum or foundation valuation per pupil was guaranteed to the state’s school districts. The state set a “guaranteed valuation per pupil.”
If the actual equalized property valuation per pupil in a given district was less than the statutorily provided guaranteed valuation per pupil, the state, from general state funds, provided the difference between the amount per pupil which the district actually raised by applying its mill rate to its own equalized valuation per pupil and the amount the district would have raised had its own mill rate been applied to the state guaranteed valuation per pupil.
Thus under the foundation plan, any district that was at or below the guaranteed valuation per pupil figure was roughly equalized in terms of taxing power with any other district similarly situated.
A district above the guaranteed valuation received no state aid under the above formula. Such a district, however, as well as below-guaranteed valuation districts, received a flat aid payment from the state, granted on a per-pupil basis. The foundation plan included no negative-aid requirements.
In reaching our conclusion in this case, we consider the following issues:
1. Are the negative-aid school districts barred from challenging the constitutionality of the new school aid formula?
*5622. Does art. X, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which requires the legislature to “. . . provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable,” impose a constitutional duty upon the legislature to provide an equal opportunity for education for all school children in the state?
3. Do section 4 and the other sections of art. X, Wisconsin Constitution require some measure of local control over primary and secondary education? If so, what measure of control?
4. Is the negative-aid payment provided for in section 121.08(2) and (3), Stats., a tax? If so, what is its nature?
5. Does the required negative-aid payment to the state fund of a portion of the tax revenues raised by a school district for redistribution by the state to positive-aid districts, violate art. VIII, sec. 1, Wisconsin Constitution ?
6. Is the negative-aid classification an unconstitutional infringement upon the rights of residents of negative-aid districts to due process and equal protection under the laws as provided by section 1, article I, Wisconsin Constitution and the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution ?
STANDING.
The petitioners include five negative-aid school districts.
The general rule is that a political subdivision of the state does not have the legal right or status as against the state or another state agency to contest the constitutionality of a statute. Columbia County v. Wisconsin Retirement Fund (1962), 17 Wis.2d 310, 116 N.W.2d 142; Town of Germantown v. Village of Germantown (1975), 70 Wis.2d 704, 235 N.W.2d 486. There are limited exceptions to the rule, but they are not here relevant. See Ful*563ton Foundation v. Department of Taxation (1961), 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 109 N.W.2d 285; and Associated Hospital Service v. Milwaukee (1961), 13 Wis.2d 447, 109 N.W.2d 271.
The establishment and operation of public schools is a governmental function of the state, and the legislature may and has delegated portions of that power to the various school districts. State ex rel. Wis. Luth. H. S. Conference v. Sinar (1954), 267 Wis. 91, 65 N.W.2d 43; School Dist. v. Burnett County School Committee (1952), 262 Wis. 484, 55 N.W.2d 874.
School districts, in exercising that delegated power, act as agencies or arms of the state, and thus under these circumstances, lack the standing to challenge the constitutional validity of these acts of the state. Joint School District v. State Appeal Bd. (1973), 56 Wis.2d 790, 203 N.W.2d 1; State ex rel. La Crosse v. Rothwell (1964), 25 Wis.2d 228, 130 N.W.2d 806, 131 N.W.2d 699.
The other six petitioners are resident taxpayers in negative-aid school districts and parents of children who attend schools within those districts. They are directly affected in a financial and personal way by the enactment of the negative-aid provisions of the new school aid formula and thus they have standing to challenge its validity, both on their own behalf and on behalf of other taxpayers and parents-residents in negative-aid districts.
ARTICLE X, SEC. 3, WISCONSIN CONSTITUTION.
Article X, sec. 3, Wisconsin Constitution reads:
“District schools; tuition; sectarian instruction; released time. SECTION 3. [As amended April 1972] The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable ; and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years; and no sectarian instruction shall be allowed there*564in; but the legislature by law may, for the purpose of religious instruction outside the district schools, authorize the release of students during regular school hours. [1969 J.R. 37,1971 J.R. 28, vote April 1972]»
The Wisconsin Constitution, unlike the United States Constitution,7 explicitly commands that the legislature “. . . shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, . . .” There is no question that one of the functions of all government is to promote an efficient educational system (See State ex rel. Dudgeon v. Levitan (1923), 181 Wis. 326, 329, 193 N.W. 499, and State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel (1953), 265 Wis. 558, 61 N.W.2d 903) and that the subject of public education and the establishment and operation of public schools is a governmental function of this state.
In the early case of State ex rel. Comstock v. Joint School District (1886), 65 Wis. 631, 636, 27 N.W. 829, this court stated:
“. . . The constitutional requirement is that ‘the legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools/ Inasmuch as there must be school districts before there can be district schools, and inasmuch as the school district system was in full operation in the territory when the constitution was framed and adopted, it is clear that section 3 of article X is a recognition of that system, and a mandate to the legislature to preserve and continue its essential features. . . .”
However, it is a fundamental rule that when dealing with the state constitution as contrasted with the federal constitution, the search is not for a grant of power to the legislature, but for a restriction thereon. Manitowoc v. Manitowoc Rapids (1939), 231 Wis. 94, 97, 285 N.W. 403; Outagamie County v. Zuehlke (1917), 165 Wis. 32, 35, *565161 N.W. 6. Thus this court in Manitowoc, supra, p. 98, established that the clear purpose of sec. 3, art. X was not to grant a power to the legislature to establish schools, for that power would exist without grant, but to compel the exercise of the power “to the extent designated.”
The “extent designated” was specifically set forth in art. X, sec. 3. First, the legislature was to provide for the establishment of district schools; second, those schools were to be “as nearly uniform as practicable”; and third, those schools were required to be “free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years.”
The respondents frequently advance the phrase “equality of educational opportunity.” All would agree this is an altruistic goal; however, so far as the state is concerned, its efforts toward such an objective must fall within the dictates of the criteria set forth in art. X, sec. 3. These are to establish district schools which are “as nearly uniform as practicable,” and provide schools which are “free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years.”
As to the latter criteria, this court has held that when the legislature has provided for each child, the privileges of a district school, which he or she may freely enjoy, that constitutional requirement is complied with. See: State ex rel. Comstock, supra, p. 636. Equality of opportunity for education is equated with the right of all school children to attend a public school free of charge and without charge for tuition; although charges may be imposed for out-of-district residents, for vocational school training, and for certain incidentals. See: State ex rel. Comstock, supra; Manitowoc, supra; and Board of Education v. Sinclair (1974), 65 Wis.2d 179, 222 N.W.2d 143.
What the framers of the constitution intended the phrase “as nearly uniform as practicable” to mean was *566discussed by this court in State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer (1928), 197 Wis. 284, 289, 290, 221 N.W. 860, 223 N.W. 123, wherein it was stated:
“. . . An examination of the debates in the conventions that framed our present constitution and the constitution of 1846 (which contained a similar provision) discloses that the members of those conventions, when they were framing- the article relating to schools, were concerned, not with the method of forming school districts, but with the character of instruction that should be given in those schools after the districts were formed, —with the training that these schools should give to the future citizens of Wisconsin.”
The same conclusion was expressed in Joint School Dist. v. Sosalla (1958), 3 Wis.2d 410, 420, 88 N.W.2d 357, and Larson v. State Appeal Board (1973), 56 Wis.2d 823, 827, 202 N.W.2d 920.
If “character of instruction” was all that was required to be “as nearly uniform as practicable” under the mandate of the constitution, then it was left up to this court to ultimately determine what subjects were to be included in “character of instruction” and to the legislature to determine what uniformity was “practicable.”
Pacyna v. Board of Education (1973), 57 Wis.2d 562, 204 N.W.2d 671, concerned the age of admission of children to kindergarten. It was there decided that all children of identical age should have an equal opportunity to enter public schools and that such uniformity was mandated by the constitution unless such uniformity throughout the state was found to be impracticable by the legislature. However, in arriving at that conclusion, this court stated at p. 564:
“Art. X, sec. 3, of the Wisconsin Constitution, provides a limitation upon the power and the authority of the legislature in the establishment of district schools. The article requires district schools to be ‘as nearly uniform *567as practicable’ and to be ‘free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of 4 and 20 years.’ . .
The involvement of the legislature from the framing of the constitution to the present and the many cases which have come before this court, emphasize that the equal opportunity for education as defined by art. X, sec. 3, is a fundamental right.
To hold that the right to equal opportunity for education is a fundamental right under the Wisconsin Constitution and to hold that the legislature is constitutionally mandated to provide an equal opportunity for education as that term is defined by the criteria set forth in see. 3, art. X, is not necessarily to validate as constitutional any means chosen by the legislature to achieve that end.
We understand respondents to suggest that once the constitutional mandate to provide an equal opportunity for education is established, then it must follow that the means chosen by the legislature to accomplish that end, i.e., the school aid formula, is valid.
We cannot subscribe to such rationale. First, the phrase equal opportunity for education, as used above, is not an all inclusive phrase under which any action which moves toward such equality is immediately validated. That phrase is defined by words of the constitution — by the criteria set down in sec. 3, art. X; the second of which is the requirement that all district schools shall be “as nearly uniform as practicable.” Thus what was meant by the framers of the constitution when they used the terms “as nearly uniform as practicable” is all-important. Second, even if it were to be determined that the equal opportunity for education mandate requires an equal dollar expenditure per pupil or the equalization of the revenue raising power of the various school districts, yet if the means chosen to accomplish that end *568violates other provisions of the constitution, it must he held invalid. See State ex rel. Dudgeon v. Levitan, supra, pp. 389, 340.
In its interpretation of constitutional provisions this court is committed to the method of analysis utilized in Board of Education v. Sinclair, supra. The court will view:
(1) The plain meaning of the words in the context used;
(2) The historical analysis of the constitutional debates and of what practices were in existence in 1848, which the court may reasonably presume were also known to the framers of the 1848 constitution, see State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Dammann (1930), 201 Wis. 84, 88, 89, 228 N.W. 593, and State ex rel. Comstock, supra; and
(3) The earliest interpretation of this section by the legislature as manifested in the first law passed following the adoption of the constitution. Payne v. Racine (1935), 217 Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 437.
Whether absolute uniformity of an equal opportunity for education in all school districts of the state is socially desirable, is not for this court to decide. We can only conclude that the plain meaning of sec. 3, art. X does not mandate it.
Both petitioners and respondents presented excellent source material on the constitutional debates that preceded the adoption of the constitution, and on the historical background of education in the state.8 State ex rel. Comstock v. Joint School District, supra, recognized that the school district system was in full operation in the territory when the constitution was framed and adopted, and that sec. 3, art. X was a recognition of that system, and a mandate to the legislature to preserve and continue its essential features.
*569One of the essential features of that system was that it was then locally funded and supported although not exactly free. Prior to 1836, all schools in the territory of Wisconsin were private schools. They were community organized, maintained, supported and controlled, with the territorial government exercising no control whatever over them. Patzer, p. 5.
The first general law relating to the organization of common (district) schools was passed by the legislative assembly in 1839. This law was amended in 1840, and in 1841 there was enacted a comprehensive school law embodying the laws of 1839 and 1840. The 1841 law was further amended in 1843. These general laws had several common threads:
1. They created county, town, and school districts as subordinate units of the territory and delegated to these subdivisions powers in regard to the organization and maintenance of schools.
2. They created powers in the various county commissioners to levy property taxes for the maintenance of the schools.
3. They created powers in the electors of each town to levy property taxes for school purposes.
4. They set up a system inspection of the various schools.. (Patzer, p. 7)
In 1845, a special school law was passed, authorizing the establishment of a free public school system in the village of Southport. Thus, impetus was given to the establishment of free schools in other parts of the territory, and to the shaping of public sentiment favoring a free public school system. (Patzer, pp. 14, 15) Yet the other essential characteristics of the school system, i.e., local control and funding, remained in effect.
In their adoption of art. X of the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution, the framers recognized the fact that public education was a function of the state. While elevating the free school concept into a constitutional mandate, the *570framers preserved in part local funding and support of district schools. Free school supporters believed that public education supported by all classes of the population was essential to the success of democracy. (Jorgenson, pp.68-98)
We cannot agree with the contention of the respondents that the mandate in art. X, sec. 3, especially when read in conjunction with the other provisions of art. X, requires that revenue raising powers of the school districts must be equalized in the manner prescribed by secs. 121.07 and 121.08, Stats.
LOCAL CONTROL UNDER ART. X, SEC. 4.
The language of art. X, sec. 3, provides that “district schools” were to be established by the state, that is, schools in each separate district. Art. X, sec. 4, requires that each town and city raise tax “. . . for the support of common schools therein, . . .” (Emphasis added.) Thus the clear implication is that the various districts, at least as to a part of the funding of their schools, did possess some measure of control.
Experience Estabrook, Chairman of the Constitutional Committee on Education and School Funds, expressed his rationale for the minimum local tax requirement of art. X, sec. 4, as follows:
“. . . It was intended that whatever the amount of the school fund might be, one-third of the expense of supporting schools, should be borne by each town. If a sufficient sum was not contributed by the school fund, the towns should have power to raise more. This provision was directly for the advantage of the poor. The gentleman who had last spoken, might not appreciate this; but a poor man with a family of children, and no fancy lots to dispose of, could understand the advantage. Experience had shown that if nothing was contributed by the town, the common schools languished, and select schools rose *571on their ruins. The school fund of Connecticut was so large as to be sufficient to defray the expenses of the education of every child within the limits of the state. Yet there, until a year or two, the district school-system had declined. No adequate interest was felt by the people, in common schools, unless they contributed to their support. To obviate this danger, the committee had inserted the section.” Journal and Debates Constitutional Convention 1847-48, p. 335.
With the adoption of the constitution and the creation of the state, the subject of public education became an expressed concern of the state, with the state assuming the control of the establishment and operation of district schools. Respondents seem to argue that the very nature of the subject makes that power an unlimited plenary power over education.
While the state’s power over education is extensive, there remains some local control.
In the forward to Coons, Clune and Sugarman, Private Wealth and Public Education (1970), at p. vii, Professor James S. Coleman described the basic competing forces underlying the development of education in America:
“THE HISTORY OF EDUCATION SINCE the industrial revolution shows a continual struggle between two forces; the desire by members of society to have educational opportunity for all children, and the desire of each family to provide the best education it can afford for its own children. . .
That the framers of the constitution recognized the importance of local interest and some measure of local control over local schools is evident from the statement of Experience Estabrook set forth herein.
Sec. 40 of ch. 19 of the Revised statutes of 1849 first manifested a construction of the state-local division of power in school matters when it empowered district boards to teach, in addition to those required subjects *572any “. . . such other branches of education as may be determined upon by the board.” Provisions similar to sec. 40 have been included in the Wis. Stats., since 1849. (See sec. 118.01 and secs. 120.12-120.13, Stats.)
The grant of power embodied in sec. 40, ch. 19, of the Eevised statutes of 1849, and subsequent similar statutes could be termed a delegated power and not a constitutionally granted power. School districts are after all, but arms of the state, carrying out state duties. Nevertheless, the power to determine educational subjects over and above those imposed by the state is a necessary adjunct to the constitutionally granted power of localities to raise revenues for the support of schools therein, art. X, sec. 4. Localities are empowered to raise funds for education, and to spend those funds for educational purposes over and above those required by the state.
Considering the expressed provisions of art. X, sec. 4; the expressed concern of the framers of the constitution that local interest in local school systems be maintained; and the contemporaneous construction evidenced by sec. 40, ch. 19, Eevised statutes of 1849, it is evident that the power possessed by local districts to determine what educational subjects it will offer over and above those required by the state, and to raise funds therefor, is not merely a delegated power. Eather the state-local control dichotomy in that limited regard is part and parcel of the constitution. That dichotomy has been an essential feature of our educational system since the adoption of the constitution and that fact in itself is entitled to some weight. Board of Education v. Sinclair, supra.
Local districts retain the control to provide educational opportunities over and above those required by the state and they retain the power to raise and spend revenue “. . . for the support of common schools therein, . . .” (Emphasis added.) These rights of the local districts have their foundations in the constitution.
*573 NEGATIVE-AID PAYMENTS; A TAX?
Both respondents and amici assert that the negative-aid payment provided for in sec. 121.08, Stats., is something other than a tax. Respondents argue that negative-aid is a “cost of doing business,” while amici argue that it falls within the exercises of the police power of the state. We find neither of these arguments convincing.
The only possible source of revenue for the required payments is the basic source of school district funds, i.e., local property taxes. See sec. 120.16 (6), Stats., which requires payment out of “general property taxes.” Under the statutorily created negative-aid formula, the method of meeting the required payments are made an integral part of the local taxing process.
Respondents confuse the purpose of the tax with the definition of the nature of state and local taxes. It is undisputed that education is a statewide concern and that money raised through the negative-aid provision will go toward the fulfillment of the state’s duty to provide education. But to determine whether a tax is to be classified as a state or a local tax, one must look to the entity which directly levies the tax, and which in turn directly provides governmental benefits therefor. If that entity is the state, it is a state tax. If that entity is a political subdivision of the state, it is a local tax. The question is who directly (and not indirectly) levies the tax?
The funds paid to the state in the form of negative-aids can only be derived from revenues produced by taxes levied by the local district on property located within the negative-aid school district. The revenues from which these negative-aid funds are derived are raised by local taxes, not state taxes. The tax is a local property tax, locally levied, locally assessed and locally collected. For the last 128 years it has been locally spent for educational *574purposes of the district. It is a tax, and a local tax, not a state tax.
Negative-aid payments are not part of the levy, assessment or collection of these district taxes, hut they are part of the distribution and disbursements of the proceeds of these taxes. They are an integral part of the taxing process, and subject to those constitutional rules which relate to the distribution and disbursement of tax proceeds.
The parties concede that the state has the power to levy a statewide property tax for the purpose of supporting education, and in fact some form of such tax was in effect in Wisconsin from 1885 until 1933. However, the present statutory scheme vests the power of property taxation in local districts, and the taxes which they impose pursuant to this delegated power are local taxes, not state taxes.
RULE OF TAXATION UNIFORM, ART. VIII, SEC. 1.
At the time the briefs were filed in this case, there were 19 negative-aid districts in the state. Among them were k-8, 9-12, and k-12 school districts. Pursuant to secs. 121.07 and 121.08, Stats., they were required to pay into the state fund a portion of the revenues raised by their local tax levies. The funds received from the districts are commingled with state revenues and ultimately disbursed by the state as state school aids to the positive-aid districts throughout the state.
The respondents suggest the enactment is valid because: (1) There is a strong presumption of constitutionality; (2) public education is a matter of statewide concern; and (3) the purpose of the statutes are to insure equality of tax burden among the property taxpayers of Wisconsin. The latter would be achieved if all school districts in the state had the same spending level; thus *575resulting in all property being taxed at the same mill rate. These are correct general statements and set forth laudable social and public policies with which few, if any, would disagree. However, as applied to the instant case, the latter proposition has two fallacies. First, each school does not spend at the same level. Second, and most important, we are not here concerned with a statewide property tax, but rather with a local property tax levied by the individual districts. The fact that a relatively few districts are required to pay the state but a small portion of their tax revenues is of no consequence.
The levying of taxes constitutes the enforcement of proportional contributions from persons and property, levied by the state or municipality for the support of its government and its public needs. Fitch v. Wisconsin Tax Comm. (1930), 201 Wis. 383, 230 N.W. 37.
The genesis of the rules of taxation are found in art. VIII, sec. 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides in pertinent part: “The rule of taxation shall be uniform. . . .”
In Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County (1859), 9 Wis. 378 (*410), p. 389 (*420), it was stated:
“. . . Its mandate, it is true, is very brief, but long enough for all practical purposes; long enough to embrace within it clearly and concisely the doctrine which the framers intended to establish, viz.: that of equality. . . .”
Cooley9 states the general rule concerning the requirement of equality and uniformity:
“The requirement of equality and uniformity of taxation relates to the rate of taxation, the valuation for taxation, territorial equality, and, according to one view, the inclusion of all property as the subject of taxation. The rate of taxation must be the same, at least as to the same class. . . The valuation must be based upon the same percentage, at least as to the same class of property . . . *576There must be territorial equality throughout the taxing district.”
Knowlton, supra, pp. 387, 388, 389 (*419, 420, 421), also held:
“. . . This principle of justice and equality which requires that each person should contribute towards the public expenses his proportionate share, according to the advantages which he receives, lies at the foundation of our political system; and, in our opinion, it was to give to it a greater permanency and force, and to secure its more rigid observance, that the section above quoted was introduced into the constitution. We have already said that all are agreed that the levying of taxes by the properly constituted authorities of a county, city or town government, for their support, is as much an exercise of the taxing power as when they are levied directly by the state. . . . [T] here can be no umforrn rule which is not at the same time an equal rule, operating alike upon all the taxable property throughout the territorial limits of the stale, municipality or local subdivision of the government, within and for which the tax is to be raised. . . (Emphasis added.)
Gottlieb v. Milwaukee (1967), 33 Wis.2d 408, 419, 147 N.W.2d 633, set forth the emphasized portion of the above stated rule and pronounced adherence to this interpretation of the constitutional provision here under consideration.
It is well established that there are certain inherent limitations and restrictions on the power to tax, particularly as they relate to territorial equality or uniformity. Cooley, supra, sec. 86, pp. 211, 212, states two of them to be: “. . . [the] inherent limitation on the power of the legislature to tax a local subdivision for a purely local purpose, or to compel such subdivision to tax itself for such a purpose. ...” A state purpose must be accomplished by state taxation, a county purpose by county taxation, and a public purpose for an inferior district by *577taxation on such district. State ex rel. Owen v. Donald (1915), 160 Wis. 21, 125, 126, 151 N.W. 331.
Wisconsin has long recognized this rule of constitutional interpretation, i.e., the purpose of the tax must be one which pertains to the public purpose of the district within which the tax is to be levied and raised. This court so held at least as early as State ex rel. New Richmond v. Davidson (1902), 114 Wis. 563, 576, 88 N.W. 586, 90 N.W. 1067, and in doing so, quoted extensively from Pennsylvania cases:
“. . . Thus, in an early Pennsylvania case it is held that:
“ ‘By taxation is meant a certain mode of raising revenue for a public purpose in which the community that pays it has an interest. The right of a state to lay taxes has no greater extent than this.’ Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. 148.
“In a later case in that state it is held that:
“ ‘An act authorizing the levy of contributions for a private purpose, or a purpose which, though public, is one in which the people from whom it is exacted have no interest, is not a law, but a judicial sentence, and not within legislative authority.’ Grim v. Weissenberg, 57 Pa. St. 433.
“So in that state it is further held that:
“ ‘The rule is, local taxation for local purposes, or taxation on the benefits conferred, but not beyond them. The legislature, by its general powers, cannot levy, or authorize a municipality to levy, a local tax for general purposes. Taxation exacts money or services from individuals as their respective shares of contribution to any public burden.’ Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146.”
Davidson emphasizes that the theory of equality of taxation is that the taxpayer is compensated for the taxes he pays in some public purpose by the unit of government which imposes the tax.10 The equality, so far as prac*578ticable, is inherent in the very idea of tax and as stated in Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, supra, without equality there can be no uniformity.
In Lund v. Chippewa County (1896), 93 Wis. 640, 648, 649, 67 N.W. 927, the legislature authorized the state to receive funds for buying land and constructing a state institution in Chippewa county. Chippewa county responded to this legislation and raised money by issuing bonds to be amortized out of future tax levies. The action of the county was challenged. This court found the legislation not to be violative of art.. VIII, sec. 1, and in so doing held that the state legislature could authorize the county to give money for this purpose [state institution] but “ ‘. . . the legislature has no power, against the will of the municipal corporation, to compel it to contract debts for local purposes in which the state has no concern, or to assume obligations not within the ordinary functions of municipal government. . . . The state, in such cases, may remove the restrictions and permit action, but it cannot compel it.’ . . .”11
The rule was repeated in Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. State (1906), 128 Wis. 553, 661, 108 N.W. 557. In State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, supra, 126, 127, it was stated:
“There may lurk in the field of present protection to person or property or both, or, in what seems quite idealistic, a high moral duty to mankind, in general, without regard to place or time, the essential element of consideration, yet it must be remembered that even the demands of charity, springing from dire distress in some foreign jurisdiction, or any outside of the particular taxing unit, are not a legitimate basis for taxation of property in the particular jurisdiction, because of the absence of reciprocal obligations and benefits, in a governmental sense. State ex rel. New Richmond v. Davidson, 114 Wis. 563, 575, 88 N.W. 595, 90 N.W. 1067. ‘There *579can be no legitimate taxation unless for the uses of the government’ levying it. 2 Dillon, Mun. Corn. (4th ed.) §736.”
More recently, in State ex rel. Wisconsin Development Authority v. Dammann (1938), 228 Wis. 147, 183, 277 N.W. 278, 280 N.W. 698, the rule was simply stated as “It is the general rule applicable to appropriations that a tax must be spent at the level at which it is raised.” The same principle was subsequently enunciated in State ex rel. American Legion 1941 Conv. Corp. v. Smith (1940), 235 Wis. 443, 293 N.W. 161, and State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum (1973), 59 Wis.2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780.
Regardless of the merits of the legislative enactments or the worthiness of the cause, we conclude that the state cannot compel one school district to levy and collect a tax for the direct benefit of other school districts, or for the sole benefit of the state. The statutes here under consideration are violative of art. VIII, sec. 1, of the WiscoiasirTCon^titution.
DUE PROCESS ANIKEQUAL PROTECTION.
Petitioners argue that the 'negative-aid classification constitutes a deprivation of the due process and equal protection rights of the residents^ of negative-aid districts.
It has been established that the right to equal opportunity for education is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution. This court has held that art. I, sec. 1, Wis. Const., is substantially the equivalent of the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th amendment of the U. S. Const. (See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. La Follette (1969), 43 Wis.2d 631, 169 N.W.2d 441; and State ex rel. Sonneborn v. Sylvester (1965), 26 Wis.2d 43, 132 N.W.2d 249) and has followed *580federal doctrine that where a statutory classification adversely affects or interferes with a fundamental constitutional right, the classification is subject to strict scrutiny and the normal presumption of constitutionality will not apply. Town of Vanden Broek v. Reitz (1971), 53 Wis.2d 87, 93, 191 N.W.2d 913.
The strict scrutiny standard should here be applied to the negative-aid classification. Petitioners contend that the negative-aid classification constitutes illegal discrimination against the residents of negative-aid districts in that: (1) The classification ignores the ability to pay of the residents of the negative-aid districts (age, average annual income, etc.) ; (2) the classification ignores the overburden of other municipal taxes which may exist in negative-aid districts; (3) the classification ignores the cost variations for factors of education, such as transportation, between districts, and (4) the classification creates a strong incentive for taxpayers in negative-aid districts, both consolidated and nonconsolidated, to spend less per pupil than taxpayers in positive-aid districts.
We are of the opinion that the classifications established thereunder would survive the strict scrutiny test. The first three factors are as likely to occur in positive-aid districts as in negative-aid districts and thus no claim of systematic discrimination against negative-aid districts may be heard in regard to them. The fourth factor is based upon speculation and conjecture, and thus will not serve as a basis to invalidate as unconstitutional, the law which establishes the classifications.
We are satisfied there is adequate justification for the classification sufficient to meet the requirements of the strict scrutiny test. The petitioners have presented no arguments nor advanced any authority which convinces us that any disincentives to negative-aid districts rise to the level of discrimination violative of the due process and equal protection rights of the residents of negative-aid districts.
*581We have considered and examined the authorities of other jurisdictions submitted by the respective counsel. The various school aid programs under consideration in those authorities are, we deem, significantly different from the one here under consideration, and, therefore, not of material assistance.
By the Court. — The negative-aid provisions of secs. 121.07 and 121.08 of the Wisconsin statutes are declared unconstitutional as violative of art. VIII, sec. 1, of the Wisconsin Constitution.
Deleted by eh. 39, Laws of 1975, effective July 31, 1975.
Amended by eh. 39, Laws of 1975, effective July 31, 1975, increasing the primary guaranteed valuation from $75,500 to $102,-700. Thus it appears the West Allis district, one of the petitioners, may no longer be classified as a negative-aid district.
Amended to increase primary guaranteed valuations by eh. 39, Laws of 1975, effective July 31, 1975.
Sec. 121.09, Special transitwnal cdd, created by ch. 39, Laws of 1975, effective July 31, 1975, supplements transition.
Amended by creation of sec. 121.07(1) (bm), eh. 39, Laws of 1975, effective July 31,1975.
Different primary and secondary guaranteed valuations for k-8 and 9-12 districts are fixed by sec. 121.07(8) and sec. 121.07 (9). Otherwise the formulas remain the same.
San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 93 Sup. Ct. 1278, 36 L. Ed.2d 16, 411 U.S. 959, 93 Sup. Ct. 1919, 36 L. Ed.2d 418.
The Founding of Public Education in Wisconsin, Jorgenson (1956); Public Education in Wisconsin, Patzer (1924); and Journal and Debates Constitutional Convention (1847-48).
Law of Taxation, Cooley, 1924, see. 260, p. 562.
See: Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee (1860), 13 Wis. 42, 49 (*37); Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee (1865), 19 Wis. 658, 671 (*624).
See: State ex rel. Board of Education of City of Oshkosh v. Haben (1868), 22 Wis. 629 (*660).