(concurring in part, dissenting in part). The statutory revision of MCLA 552.391; MSA 25.181 by 1975 PA 40 removed the absolute bar to a name change where there were minor children. However, the statute imposed a new restriction applicable only to adoption of "another surname” (other than her birth name or surname she bore prior to her marriage to her husband in the divorce). The new restriction im*219posed was, "if the change is not sought with any fraudulent or evil intent”.
That phrase is not set off in a separate clause, which would permit its application back to all circumstances in which a name may be changed, but is applicable only to adoption of "another surname”.
In my opinion it was not the intent of the Legislature to mandate a change of name by divorce judgment whenever a woman prays for it. It is not uncommon for a divorced woman to be so vengeful or bitter at the time of divorce that she seeks complete disassociation from her former husband’s name, without consideration of future consequence.
The Legislature added the new phrase to protect third parties from fraudulent or evil intentions. By the retention of the discretionary word "may” and by the form, punctuation and placement of phrases, the Legislature intended to recognize the right of the judge to use his discretion to protect the interests of the minor children in appropriate cases. It is inconceivable that the Legislature would intentionally derogate the right and duty of the judge to protect the interests of children of divorced parents.
The issue of restoration of use of the birth name was discretionary with the judge. He did not abuse his discretion. He acted in what he though was the best interest of the children.
The judgment should be affirmed as to this issue.
I concur in the affirmance on the other issues.