dissenting.
During the pleading stage of the proceedings before the Hendricks Circuit Court, the Department admitted:
“That following the defendant’s failure to rescind the discipline imposed at Step I and Step II of the complaint processing procedure established in the Indiana Department of Highway’s ‘Employees Handbook’, a Step III hearing was held in front of the defendant’s Complaint Board on or about March 3, 1986.” Record at 72.
Immediately prior to the March 3, 1986 hearing, the Board denied a continuance sought by Pigg. Pigg had asserted that a witness, his foreman, was unavailable. The evidentiary hearing was conducted on March 3. A Board decision was not forthcoming upon that evidence, however. Rather, the Board unilaterally decided, and on March 17, advised Pigg, that the hearing was to be reopened to hear testimony of an additional witness or witnesses whom Pigg could cross-examine. The hearing was in fact resumed on June 11 and the decision adverse to Pigg was communicated thereafter.
The multi-step complaint procedure utilized in this case is authorized by Department Rules and Regulations. 120 IAC 1-3-1 et seq., which in turn was authorized by I.C, 8-9.5-4-8 (West 1982). Whether the job description held by Pigg was within a professional/technical category so as to compel the complaint procedures followed is, in my view, not determinative. But see Indiana Department of Highways v. Dixon (1987) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 512 N.E.2d 1113, trans. pending. The fact remains that the Department accorded Pigg some of the protective procedures provided by the Rules and Regulations. The Department did so, quite obviously because the Employees Handbook provides all employees with a multi-step complaint procedure. Although the complaint procedure for Professional-Technical employees differs from that promised to other employees, such as Pigg, the fact remains that protective procedures are afforded and according to the Handbook, are to be “fairly, consistently and evenhandedly” administered.
Whether or not, the ultimate decision of the administrative agency is subject to judicial review upon the merits of the ultimate decision is one thing. Whether an employee is entitled to insist that the agency comply with a prior grant of protective procedures in the adjudicative process is quite another.
The Department specifically admits that the Employee Handbook extends to all at-will employees the protections afforded by 120 IAC 1-3-1 et seq., supra. In this regard, I am therefore unpersuaded by the Department’s attempt to avoid the complaint procedure protections by cavalierly stating that the Handbook guarantees were “never meant to carry the force of law.” Appellant’s Brief at 5.
It has been held that an employee at will may by circumstances and by representations of the employer have a reasonable and justified expectation of employment protections such as here involved. Wells v. Auberry (1985) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 476 N.E. 2d 869, trans. denied. Such is the case before us. The procedures which Pigg claims were denied were conferred by unilateral act of the employer. The Department should be bound by the procedures which it has created and to which employees have a “legitimate claim of entitlement.” See Town of Speedway v. Harris (1976) 2d Dist., 169 Ind.App. 100, 346 N.E. 2d 646, trans. denied.
In the court below, the Summary Judgment Motion filed by the Department was denied. The Motion was premised upon the *187Department’s contention that Pigg was not entitled to judicial review. In denying the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Hendricks Circuit Court did not necessarily determine that the decision of the Department was subject to judicial review. It remanded to the Department for further hearing with the mandate to follow unspecified procedures afforded by the employer. This relief comported with the prayer of the Petition for Judicial Review, i.e., for a new hearing. It may well have been that the court denied the Motion for Summary Judgment because such ruling was the only way in which the court could proceed to order the Department to honor its commitment to administer the complaint procedures fairly and consistently.
The court below did not review and pass upon the validity of the Department’s decision to discharge Pigg. It merely remanded to the Department with instructions for such further hearing as would comport with the complaint procedures granted. I find no fault with this decision.
I would additionally state my parenthetic view that the “administrative adjudication” rendered in this case (I.C. 4-22-2-3 (Burns Code Ed.Repl.1986))1 was subject to judicial review without regard to specific statutory or rule provision. State ex rel. State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Marion Superior Court (1979) 271 Ind. 374, 392 N.E.2d 1161; Salk v. Weinraub (1979) 271 Ind. 115, 390 N.E.2d 995; St. Joseph Medical Building Associates v. City of Fort Wayne (1982) 3d Dist.Ind.App., 434 N.E.2d 130; Johnson v. Moritz (1981) 1st Dist.Ind. App., 426 N.E.2d 448.
The decision of the Hendricks Circuit Court should be affirmed.
. Pigg was without question a "person” to whom the adjudication made by the administrative agency here was applicable. Whether he was technically entitled to the procedures which led to the adjudication does not detract from the fact that the determination was of an issue applicable to Pigg. Although the adjudication concerned the discharge of Pigg as an employee, the law authorized the complaint hearing procedures. The determination was, therefore, within the statutory definition of “administrative adjudication."