concurring in result.
I view the issue presented by Virginia Bickel to be that the court erroneously failed to consider the military retirement benefits as a marital asset. I do not believe she focuses exclusively upon failure to directly award those benefits or a portion thereof to her.
Clearly, if the benefits were includable as a marital asset, the court would be required to consider them in effecting an equitable property distribution. The court, however, would not necessarily have to award the benefits or a portion thereof directly to her. The court might very well achieve equity by awarding her other property.
In any event, I do not subscribe to the test stated by the majority as a generality for determining whether or not benefits other than military retirement benefits have become vested pursuant to IC 31 — 1— 11.5-2(d)(2) (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1987). See Porter v. Porter (1988) 1st Dist. Ind. App., 526 N.E.2d 219, trans. pending. Be that as it may, I concur in result because appellant concedes that the pension benefits were not vested at the time the petition for dissolution was filed (Appellant’s brief at 12) and for the further reason that Virginia’s evidence is deficient in establishing whether the pension benefits were vested or whether contributions made, if any, might be recovered.