¶ 34. (dissenting). I am unable to join the majority because, in my estimation, its opinion (1) addresses an issue it should not; (2) fails to adequately analyze the issue it must; and (3) incorrectly accepts the City's assertion — an assertion belied by the record — that BOZA considered the "public convenience" of television viewers living outside the city limits. Because the record fails to establish that BOZA considered the "public convenience" of viewers outside the city limits, and because the City concedes that BOZA was required to do so, we must remand.
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¶ 35. The majority explains that because Hearst determined that it did not need to install supplemental anchor points to increase the height of its tower, it did *519not pursue its initial request for a variance. See majority at ¶¶ 3, 6. The majority acknowledges that Hearst "does not challenge BOZA's conclusion that it failed to satisfy the variance criteria." Id. at ¶ 29. And the majority concludes that "BOZA's denial of Hearst's application based on the special use standard is sufficient to sustain its denial- of Hearst's permit." Id. at ¶ 24.
¶ 36. Why, then, does the majority discuss variance law? See id. at ¶¶ 25-31. The majority says it does so "only to address a number of the arguments raised by both parties in their briefs." Id. at ¶ 24. But the majority fails to do so. Instead, obfuscating the variance issue that may be lurking in this case, the majority does not even mention the competing MATC tower, discuss its significance, dr really recognize Hearst's argument —that BOZA's invocation of the variance criteria was nothing more than a pretext paying what Judge Haese termed "lip service" to Judge Lamelas' ruling that BOZA's denial of Hearst's application "was arbitrary and represented its will and not its judgment."
II.
¶ 37. The majority recognizes that the central issue in this case is whether Hearst established, under Milwaukee Code of Ordinances § 295-59-5-b-l, that increasing the height of its tower to comply with the FCC's DTV-signal directive "is necessary for the public convenience." See majority at ¶¶ 16-17. According to the record, BOZA's denial of a special-use permit to do so would remove Channel 12 access from between at least one-half of one percent and two percent of Hearst's viewers within the city limits (a loss to between 2,985 and 11,940 viewers), and between one and two percent of Hearst's viewers beyond the city limits.
*520¶ 38. The majority then, without a single legal reference, writes, "We cannot agree with Hearst that this loss is so great as to create a 'public inconvenience,' such that top-mounting rather than side-mounting 'is necessary for the public convenience at a particular location.'" Id. at ¶ 23. Why? Under what legal standard? At what number — how many thousands of viewers without Channel 12 television service — would the majority draw the line? The majority simply does not say.
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¶ 39. It is undisputed that the denial of Hearst's special-use permit to increase the height of its tower will result in the loss of Channel 12 access for thousands of viewers — both inside and outside the City of Milwaukee. Whether, in reviewing Hearst's special-use request, BOZA was required to consider the interests of citizens outside the city limits might be an interesting issue. In this case, however, that potential issue dissolved because the City conceded that such consideration was necessary. Significantly, however, the record fails to establish that BOZA took non-city residents into account.
¶ 40. At oral argument before this court, the City did indeed concede that BOZA, in determining whether Hearst's requested special use was "necessary for the public convenience," had to consider the Channel 12 viewers beyond the city limits. The majority, however, incorrectly insists that BOZA did so.
¶ 41. The majority asserts that "BOZA did account for the effect of its decision on the periphery communities." Id. at ¶ 23 n.10 (emphasis added). To support its assertion, however, the majority relies not *521on BOZA's findings or conclusions, but rather, on Hearst's contentions about the loss of viewers outside the city as well as evidence supporting those contentions. See id. The majority then refers to a BOZA member's comments about the "geographical viewing area" to reach its conclusion that BOZA "implicitly incorporated Hearst's entire geographical area into its decision." Id. (emphasis added). The record, however, suggests otherwise.
¶ 42. As Hearst's counsel specifically referenced at oral argument, the BOZA chairman, two times, clarified that BOZA's determination must focus on the "public convenience" of city residents. At one point the chairman declared: "But what this board's role is is to determine based on the standard what's best for this community. Based for the City of Milwaukee viewership . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Later, the chairman added, "Let's again talk about the City of Milwaukee because that's what's before us." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the chairman set the boundary for BOZA's analysis and, given that explicit boundary, neither Hearst's contentions, nor the evidence supporting them, nor a BOZA member's passing reference to the "geographical viewing area" moved the analysis, implicitly or otherwise, beyond the city limits.
¶ 43. Hearst offers compelling arguments in support of its contention that BOZA, "once again improperly focused on its own policy rationale for its prior decision to grant MATC's application, rather than ... on the applicable ordinance standard." Deciding this appeal on its narrowest possible ground, however, see State v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989) ("cases should be decided on the narrowest possible ground"), we, at the very least, should remand to require BOZA to do exactly what the City *522concedes it must: evaluate whether Hearst's special-use request should be granted, giving full consideration to all Channel 12 viewers regardless of whether they reside inside or outside the city limits. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.