I respectfully dissent from the holding affirming the judgment entered on the slander of title action. The traditional rule in tort as well as contract cases is that the statute of limitations begins to run upon the occurrence of the last fact essential to the cause of action. Although sometimes harsh, the fact plaintiff is neither aware of his cause of action nor of the identity of a wrongdoer will not toll the statute (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 296 [146 Cal.Rptr. 271]; Howe v. Pioneer Mfg. Co. (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 330, 340 [68 Cal.Rptr. 617]).1 The “rule of discovery” applied by the majority, has been devised and applied by courts to ameliorate the harshness of this rule. This judicially recognized exception has been applied in the area of professional malpractice. (See Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176 [98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421].) But the cases granted that exception have refused extension of it to ordinary tort and contract actions, justifying the distinction upon the special nature of the relationship between the professional and the client (Neel, supra, at p. 188).
The majority rely upon Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 725 [152 Cal.Rptr. 27], which had relied upon Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 310 [132 Cal.Rptr. 860]. A careful reading of Cain discloses several infir*696mities. First, the defendant bore no significant relationship to the plaintiff, and thus did not fall into the Neel distinction. Second, the court invoked the discovery rule for an entire class of injury with little reasoning beyond citation of cases applying the discovery rule in other contexts. Third, no consideration was given to whether applying the rule was an encroachment upon the legislative preserve.
The majority, in an endeavor to avoid direct confrontation with these infirmities, indicate in their footnote 6 they find other factors “considerably more persuasive.” What other factors? The majority opinion cites only two: (1) the close relationship between defamation actions and an action for slander of title; and (2) the eminently practical policy underlying the discovery rule. The first is a bootstrap argument, extending the unsupported, and I submit improperly founded, trend to yet another entire class of injury. The latter is a clear judicial intrusion of the legislative function.
The court’s holding is arrived at in violation of the fundamental rules guiding construction of a statute. The court should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal. Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224]). “An equally basic rule of statutory construction is, however, that courts are bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.” (Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal. App.2d 591, 604 [45 Cal.Rptr. 512].) “If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 183 [217 P.2d 1].) Code of Civil Procedure section 1858 provides: “In the construction of a statute . .., the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, ...”
In those situations where the Legislature has deemed it proper that a cause of action not accrue until the aggrieved party discovers, or should discover, the existence of the cause of action, it has specifically provided for it. (See e.g., Code Civ. Proc.,2 §§ 337, subd. 3; 338, subd. 4; 338, subd. 5; 338, subd. 6; 339; 339, subd. 3; 340, subd. 5; 340.2, subd. *697(a)(2); 340.2, subd. (c)(2); 340.6.) No such statutory language exists in section 338, subdivision 7 providing the limitation period for an action for slander of title to real property, even though such language is found within the same general section relating to fraud or mistake (§ 338, subd. 4), embezzlement (§ 338, subd. 5), malfeasance or misfeasance (§ 338, subd. 6) and actions under sections 17536 of the Business and Professions Code (§ 338, subd. 8).
There was no evidence concerning, and the majority never sought to ascertain, the intent of the Legislature. The majority does not seek to interpret, but to substitute their sense of logic for that of the Legislature.
I would reverse the judgment entered on the slander of title action.
A petition for a rehearing was denied December 24, 1981, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied March 10, 1982.
Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
The time periods after which redress for different types of legal injuries is prohibited are established by the Legislature.
A11 statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.