concurring.
Redmond assigns as error that the district court erred in failing to include malice as an element of second degree murder and in finding there was sufficient evidence to convict him of second degree murder. Neither assignment of error has any merit.
Redmond was charged with first degree murder and was convicted by the district court of second degree murder. The district court found that Redmond shot Clinton intentionally but without premeditation. Redmond could not have been convicted of manslaughter because the killing was intentional. See State v. Jones, 245 Neb. 821, 515 N.W.2d 654 (1994), overruled on other grounds, State v. Burlison, 255 Neb. 190, 583 N.W.2d 31 (1998).
*423It makes no difference whether State v. Burlison, supra, is retroactively applied. For purposes of Redmond’s argument, even if malice were an element of second degree murder, the State has proved malice beyond a reasonable doubt. Malice is defined as the intentional doing of an unlawful act without just cause or excuse. See, State v. Hall, 249 Neb. 376, 543 N.W.2d 462 (1996) (Wright, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds, State v. Burlison, supra; State v. Dean, 246 Neb. 869, 523 N.W.2d 681 (1994), overruled on other grounds, State v. Burlison, supra. The unlawful act was the killing of Clinton. Because the district court found that Redmond killed Clinton intentionally but without premeditation, the only crime for which Redmond could have been convicted was second degree murder. The evidence was sufficient to support this conviction.