(dissenting) :
The history of this protracted litigation is clearly set forth in the Court’s majority opinion. That history reveals that the Supreme Court has on two occasions overruled findings of this Court on jurisdictional grounds.
I
Jurisdiction
On June 18, 1973, the Supreme Court held that this Court was without jurisdiction to issue a preliminary injunction restraining a temporary surcharge on shipping rates for recyclable commodities. The Court reasoned that section 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act1 vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Interstate Commerce Commission to suspend rates, pending a final decision of their lawfulness.2 On November 19, 1973, the Supreme Court vacated another injunction issued by this Court restraining the Commission and railroads from collecting certain rate increases on recyclable commodities, which the railroads intended to place in effect at the expiration of the statutory suspension period.3 The case was remanded to this Court for further consideration in the light of Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade.4 *1311These decisions by the Supreme Court clearly require this Court to reconsider its prior holdings and to determine whether it has jurisdiction in this matter.
In Wichita, the Supreme Court held that judicial review of Interstate Commerce Commission decisions in rate cases is limited in scope and that such decisions are not to be disturbed unless they are unsupported by evidence, are made without a hearing, exceed constitutional limits, or for some other reason amount to an abuse of power. Since the Commission in the present case has not yet determined that the rates in question are reasonable, this Court is clearly without jurisdiction to suspend them. Arrow Transportation Co. v. Southern Railway Co.5 The Supreme Court in Wichita also pointed out that Congress, in establishing the Interstate Commerce Commission, had created an administrative agency whose function was to develop an understanding of national transportation problems and to úse that expertise to determine what our national transportation policy should permit. Consequently, a court should ordinarily refrain from expressing any view on such policy before the Interstate Commerce Commission expresses its view. For this Court to issue an injunction during an ongoing administrative proceeding would be to undercut the policies served by the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and would slide the Court “unconsciously from the narrow confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy.”6
It is the established rule that general revenue orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, such as the suspension orders directed to individual rates in this case, are not reviewable by the courts.7 The Supreme Court has ruled in this case that N.E.P.A. was not intended to repeal by implication any other statute.8 There is no indication that Congress intended N.E.P.A. to overrule the long line of judicial decisions holding that general revenue orders, such as those presented in this case, are not reviewable by the courts.
This Court, therefore, clearly does not have jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of the increased rates on recyclable materials. It follows that since the Commission’s orders are non-reviewable at this stage, this Court is without jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.
II
N.E.P.A.
Assuming arguendo that the Court has jurisdiction to review the adequacy of the N.E.P.A. statement submitted by the Interstate Commerce Commission, I find the statement to be sufficient and in substantial compliance with the requirements of N.E.P.A.
The mandates of N.E.P.A. pertain to procedure. Although N.E.P.A. itself creates no substantive rights in citizens to safe, healthful, productive, and culturally pleasing surroundings, the responsible federal agency is required to take these factors into account before commencement of a project. Upper Pecos Ass’n v. Stans.9 The record in this case reveals that the Commission gave extensive consideration to the possible environmental’impact of increased rates for *1312certain recyclable commodities. The function of this court is not to decide whether it agrees with the Commission’s substantive findings but only to decide whether the record reveals that the procedure set forth in N.E.P.A. was followed and whether the Commission has fully and in good faith considered all factors mandated by N.E.P.A. The Commission in my view has substantially complied with the requirements of N. E.P.A. Based on the substantial record already compiled, to remand for further hearings under N.E.P.A. would require the Commission to conduct a largely ritualistic act.
On November 7, 1973, the Commission reopened its investigation in this case for the purpose of further evaluating, in accordance with N.E.P.A., the environmental effects of increased railroad freight rates and charges on the movements of commodities being transported for the purpose of recycling. The Commission then spent several months preparing a draft statement which was issued on March 13, 1973. After soliciting and receiving the comments of interested persons and agencies the final Impact Statement was released on May 7, 1973. The comprehensive statement anticipates a potential adverse environmental effect stemming from the proposed rate increases but concludes that the increases are justified by the need to insure a viable and efficient railroad system. This Court has already recognized the financial plight of the nation’s railroads.10 The logic of the Commission’s conclusion therefore seems unassailable. Moreover, it is buttressed by extensive findings which cover in detail the five categories set out in § 102(A)-(C) of N.E.P.A. The Commission has clearly taken the “hard look” at possible environmental consequences mandated by Congress. National Resources Defense Council v. Morton.11
Finally, the fact that the Commission’s final impact statement was filed after the rates had been initially approved does not establish per se that the statement was biased and not issued in good faith. All that is required is that the agency make a reasonable good faith effort to comply with the procedural requirements of N.E.P.A. That the statement may have been prepared after the decision to proceed had already been made is not a fatal procedural error requiring the process to begin all over again. Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1973); Upper Pecos Ass’n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 1971); City of New York v. United States, 344 F.Supp. 929 (E.D.N.Y.1972).
Even assuming technical non-compliance with N.E.P.A., if the Commission has considered all relevant environmental factors and has reached a fair and informed decision under N.E.P.A. its finding should not be set aside. First National Bank of Homestead v. Watson, 363 F.Supp. 466 (D.D.C.1973).
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent and would hold that the motions of the plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs for summary judgment and for injunctive relief be denied, the case be dismissed, and judgment be rendered for the defendants with normal costs.
. 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1970).
. United States v. Students Challenging Reg. Agcy. Pro. (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973).
. United States v. Students Challenging Reg. Agcy. Pro. (SCRAP), 414 U.S. 1035, 94 S.Ct. 533, 38 L.Ed.2d 326 (1973).
. 412 U.S. 800, 93 S.Ct. 2367, 37 L.Ed.2d 350 (1973).
. 372 U.S. 658, 83 S.Ct. 984, 10 L.Ed.2d 52 (1963).
. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. at 807, 93 S.Ct. at 2375; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194, 61 S.Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271 (1941).
. Alabama Power Co. v. United States, 316 F.Supp. 337 (D.D.C.), aff’d by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 73, 91 S.Ct. 259, 27 L.Ed.2d 212 (1970) ; Electronic Industries Ass’n v. United States, 310 F.Supp. 1286 (D.D.C.1970), aff’d per curiam, 401 U.S. 967, 91 S.Ct. 1188, 28 L.Ed.2d 318 (1971) ; Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. United States, 306 F.Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y.1969), aff’d by an equally divided court, 400 U.S. 73, 91 S.Ct. 259, 27 L.Ed.2d 212 (1970).
. United States v. Students Challenging Reg. Agcy. Pro. (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 93 S.Ct. 2405, 2418-2419, 37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973).
. 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971).
. Students Challenging Reg. Agcy. Pro. (SCRAP) v. United States, 353 F.Supp. 317, 323-324 (D.D.C.1973).
. 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 16, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (1972).