concurring.
I concur with the majority's holding that the evidence seized by the police officers in these cireumstances should not have been suppressed. But I part ways with the determination that Best's Fourth Amendment rights may not have been violated with respect to the Treaty Line Road Property. The majority observes that Best was never an overnight guest at the Treaty Line Road property, and he was only there with Fleming's permission to manufacture methamphetamine. Op. at --. Thus, Best could not establish that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to present a Fourth Amendment challenge. See id.
Granted, the record shows that Best used the premises for commercial purposes and he thus may not enjoy the identical rights under the Fourth Amendment that an owner or occupant of the premises might have. That distinction is of no moment here, however, inasmuch as the record reflects-and the majority so notes-Best testified at the suppression hearing that all of the items seized by the police from the Treaty Line Road property belonged to him. To be sure, both Coby and Fleming denied that any of the items belonged to them. Hence, inasmuch as Best admitted owning the property that was seized, it is my belief that he enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy sufficient to challenge the search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. For that reason, the same rationale should apply in these circumstances as that which applies to the determination that Best may assert a claim under Article I, Section 11. To hold otherwise might imply that a defendant may only raise a Fourth Amendment claim in a residence, and never upon premises where only "business" is conducted.
Be that as it may, I also agree with the rationale espoused by the majority that the good faith exception applies in these circumstances. Hence, the trial court properly determined that the evidence seized at the Treaty Line Road premises should not have been suppressed. For these reasons, I also vote to affirm the trial court's decision.