dissenting.
C. Patricia Skinner sued Ogallala Public School District No. 1 (District) for injuries sustained when she fell through an open trapdoor into a 4-foot-deep tunnel. The accident occurred between 7:30 and 8 p.m. on July 16, 1996, when Skinner, a teacher for the District, was helping her husband, the District’s band director, return some equipment her husband had borrowed.
The trial court found as a matter of law that Skinner’s injury did not occur in the course and scope of her employment. This court has affirmed the judgment of the trial court. I respectfully dissent.
An injury is said to arise in the course of the employment when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while the employee is fulfilling work duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 12.00 (2001). Skinner was at the school for the purpose of helping her husband, who was there on school business. Skinner, by helping her husband, was doing something incidental to her employment, as teachers routinely help other teachers.
An activity is related to the employment if it carries out the employer’s purposes or advances its interests directly or indirectly. 2 Larson & Larson, supra, § 20.00. An act outside an employee’s regular duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the employer’s interests, whether or not the employee’s own assigned work is thereby furthered, is within the course of employment. Id., § 27.00.
*410If an employee’s activity aids a coemployee in a matter entirely personal to the coemployee, then it is outside the course of employment, unless the deviation is insubstantial. See id.., § 27.01[5]. The activity undertaken by Skinner’s husband was not a matter entirely personal to him. He was at the school to return school property. Therefore, Skinner’s activity in helping her husband was not outside the course of her employment. Skinner was in the process of helping a coworker perform work for the District, and the work was done in a good faith attempt to assist a coworker with the implied authorization of the District. See Brown v. Leavitt Lane Farm, 215 Neb. 522, 340 N.W.2d 4 (1983).
Whether Skinner was an invitee or a licensee is a question of fact. See McIntosh v. Omaha Public Schools, 249 Neb. 529, 544 N.W.2d 502 (1996). The trial court found that Skinner was an invitee. An invitee is a person who goes on the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant on the business of the owner or occupant or for their mutual advantage. See Derr v. Columbus Convention Ctr., 258 Neb. 537, 604 N.W.2d 414 (2000). If the invitation relates to the business of the one who gives it, or is given for the mutual advantage of a business nature for both parties, the party receiving the invitation is an invitee. See Palmtag v. Gartner Constr. Co., 245 Neb. 405, 513 N.W.2d 495 (1994). An invitation to a business visitor need not be express, as an invitation is inferred where there is a common interest or mutual advantage. See id. An “invitation,” as a layperson might use the term in ordinary affairs of life, is not required for one to be an invitee as the term is used in law. See Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons’, Inc., 174 Neb. 1, 115 N.W.2d 776 (1962).
In my opinion, Skinner cannot be an invitee and also be excluded from the provisions of the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act. When the trial court determined that Skinner was an invitee, it had to conclude that Skinner was on the premises for the mutual benefit of Skinner and the District. In fact, the majority concludes that the record supports the trial court’s finding that Skinner’s visit to the school was to the mutual advantage of Skinner and the District.
Skinner, as an employee of the District, was injured in the course and scope of her employment with the District. The *411purpose of her visit to the school was to return school property, which was a part of her husband’s duties as the District’s band director, and the return of the property was in furtherance of the interests of the District. Since Skinner was assisting her husband in this endeavor, I would conclude that she was in fact covered under the Nebraska Workers’ Compensation Act and that the act is her exclusive remedy.
On the other hand, a licensee is on the premises of another for the licensee’s own interest or gratification. Such person is exercising the privilege solely for that person’s own convenience and benefit and does not stand in any contractual relation with the owner of the premises. See Malolepszy v. Central Market, 143 Neb. 356, 9 N.W.2d 474 (1943). Skinner was not found to be a licensee.
I would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the cause with directions to dismiss.
Connolly, J., joins in this dissent.