(dissenting).
I dissent. I would affirm the trial court.
Plaintiffs-appellants Daniel Regan, John Regan, Michael Regan and Mark Regan appeal a trial court order granting summary judgment and dismissing their action against defendant-appellee Denbar, Inc. for injuries suffered in a fight. I would affirm.
Defendant operates a bar in Davenport, Iowa. Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant for injuries they received both inside and outside defendant’s premises. The issue was whether there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could determine an intentional assault by another was foreseeable by defendant’s bartender. I agree with the trial court that there was not substantial evidence.
. There were two assaults. The first occurred when a customer of defendant assaulted plaintiffs in the bar. There is no evidence from which the bartender could have concluded the customer would have thrown a punch.
The second incident happened off defendant’s premises. Plaintiffs’ position is the bartender should have known another assault was about to occur. The only evidence is one of the plaintiffs asked the bartender to call the police. This is not substantial. I would affirm.
The general rule is a person has no duty to prevent a third person from causing harm to another. Davis v. Kwik-Shop, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 877, 878 (Iowa 1993); Leonard v. State, 491 N.W.2d 508, 509-10 (Iowa 1992); Kelly v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 476 N.W.2d 341, 354 (Iowa 1991).
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 315 (1965), provides:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to protection.
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 314A(3) sets out a special relation giving rise to the claimed duty:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public is under a similar duty to members of the public who enter in response to his invitation.
*754Restatement (Second) of Torts section 314A comment c specifically states as follows:
The rules stated in this Section apply only where the relation exists between the parties, and the risk of harm, or of further harm, arises in the course of that relation. A carrier is under no duty to one who has left the vehicle and ceased to be a passenger, nor is an innkeeper under a duty to a guest who is injured or endangered while he is away from the premises. Nor is a possessor of land under any such duty to one who has ceased to be an invitee. (Emphasis added).
The undisputed facts of this case are there is no evidence defendant’s bartender knew plaintiffs would be punched in the bar, nor after they were asked to leave. See Kelly, 476 N.W.2d at 355. The trial court was correct in sustaining the motion for summary judgment.
I would affirm the trial court.
HABHAB, J., joins this dissent.