dissenting.
I dissent. The trial court and the Majority of this Court have substituted themselves for the statutory factfinder, Superintendent John T. Shettle. Under the clear language of the Statute, IC 1971, 35-23-4.-l-5(a), the Superintendent is designated the factfinder — not the trial court or the Court of Appeals. After hearing the evidence, it is the Superintendent who is to determine whether the applicant is a “proper person” to have a license to carry a concealed handgun. After hearing the evidence, it is the Superintendent who must make the determination as to whether a “proper reason” has been given for issuing a license to carry a concealed handgun. My review of the evidence does not suggest in the slightest *742that the determination made by Superintendent Shettle was arbitrary or capricious. On the contrary, his determination is reinforced by the evidence. Therefore, I dissent for the same reasons that I dissented in Schubert v. DeBard (1980) Ind.App., 398 N.E.2d 1339.
Superintendent Shettle had this evidence before him. The applicant, Shearer, had never been threatened with bodily harm or had he ever been a victim of a violent crime. His employment did not require that he associate with “undesirable people” or people who might assault him for any reason. The sole reason given for having a permit to carry a concealed handgun was that any attempted assault on Shearer’s person might cause a brief period of incapacitation or death. Superintendent Shet-tle obviously recognized that Shearer’s assault anxieties had little basis in fact and that these assault anxieties could present a danger to the general public. Superintendent Shettle concluded that Shearer did not have a “proper reason” to obtain a permit and with the unsubstantiated anxiety which appeared to overwhelm Shearer’s reasoning, Shearer was not a proper person to have a permit to carry a concealed handgun.
It is Superintendent Shettle’s responsibility under the Statute to protect the public against the promiscuous issuance of permits to carry concealed handguns. It is the applicant who has the burden of proof to show the Superintendent that he has a “proper reason” to carry a concealed handgun and that he is a “proper person” to have a permit to carry a concealed handgun. A mere assertion on the part of an applicant that he needs to carry a concealed handgun for self-defense can never be enough under the Statute to justify the issuance of a permit. However, the Majority has made it so; furthermore, the Majority has placed the burden of proof on the Superintendent instead of the applicant which is clearly contrary to the intent of the Indiana Legislature. The Majority Opinion states: “Furthermore, Schubert determined that absent some evidence to refute self-defense as a reason, the superintendent could not deny an applicant a license on the basis of the superintendent’s subjective evaluation of the asserted reason.” Why should the Superintendent have to “refute” anything? He doesn’t have the burden of proof. The proceeding is ex parte not adversary. The Superintendent doesn’t have to refute anything. If his determination is arbitrary and capricious, the determination may be vacated in the same manner as any other administrative determination.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court for the simple reason that it has substituted itself as the factfinder and made a determination accordingly.