Jay Coy Taylor (Jay) appeals the property distribution in a dissolution decree dissolving his marriage with Juanita Marilyn Taylor (Juanita). Jay raises a number of issues for review; however, because we reverse, we shall address only the following issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in valuing the marital property at the time of separation?
Taylors separated October 1, 1974, at which time they divided their personal assets and belongings. Subsequently, Juanita and Jay became financially independent. Juanita remained in the house owned as tenants by the entireties, maintained the house, paid the mortgage payments, and raised and supported their son. Jay left the marital residence, paid off certain presepa-ration joint debts, and made some cash payments to Juanita. On June 5, 1979 Juanita filed a petition for dissolution of marriage.
The decree of dissolution awarded the marital residence to Juanita but provided that Juanita should pay $2,000 to Jay as his share of equity in the marital residence. The special findings of fact reveal the trial court calculated the equity in the marital residence using October 1974 values as follows:
Value of house $34,450
Less: mortgage 26,500
Equity: $ 7,950
As of the date of the final hearing, the house was valued at $56,000 and the mortgage balance was reduced.
Both parties agree that distribution of marital property is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court. Geberin v. Geberin, (1977) 172 Ind.App. 255, 360 N.E.2d 41. However, Jay argues the trial court abused its discretion in using the 1974 value of the house as a basis for his $2,000 equity award. We agree and hold in using the value of the entireties-owned real estate on the date of separation, October 1974, the trial court erred as a matter of law and hence abused its discretion.
The dissolution of marriage act and case law is silent as to the date of valuation of the marital property. IC 31-l-11.5-ll(a) (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1979) speaks only to the property subject to division and therefore valuation, but not to the date of valuation. Therefore we must determine: 1) whether a date certain for valuation is required, and 2) if such a date is required what that date should be.
In a marriage of any duration the possible equitable valuation dates are limitless. Hence, the necessity for a date certain is obvious. Meaningful settlement discussions would be virtually impossible; trials would be lengthened; fees for experts would skyrocket as they assimilate the necessary data to have an opinion on the fair market value of the numerous items of marital property on any number of dates, including, for example, the date of first separation, the date of final separation, the date of filing the petition, the date of filing the cross-petition, and the date of trial. Therefore, the statutory mandate of a just and reasonable division requires the division of marital property be based on values determined as of a date certain.
The dissent would leave the date of valuation to the “equities of the case.” We certainly agree valuation of the property is an indispensable part and necessary component of the power to divide. However, we fail to understand the basis for the opinion that the statutory requirement of a just and reasonable division necessarily leads to the conclusion that the trial court may choose the date of valuation based on the evidence that best suits the equities of the case. The factors which the dissent would have the trial court weigh in determining what date of valuation best suits the equities of the case are factors which the trial court should indeed consider. However, the factors are properly considered under the mandate of IC 31-l-11.5-ll(a) (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1979) in determining what is a just and reasonable division of the property.
The next step is to determine the date certain. Unquestionably, the selection of the date is a legislative prerogative which unfortunately has not been explicitly exercised. The court, then, must fill the void until the legislature speaks.
*651Several dates might be selected, but one is the most reasonable — the date the dissolution action is commenced. By the terms of IC 31-l-11.5-ll(a) (Burns Code Ed., Supp.1979), the parties may acquire separate properties after the date of final separation. While there may have been some ambiguity as to what the date of final separation is, any such uncertainty has been put to rest by legislative clarification. The 1980 General Assembly amended IC 31-1-11.5-11 to specifically define the date of final separation as the date the petition is filed. IC 31 — 1—11.5—11(a) (Burns Code Ed., Repl.1980) Thus, the date has significance in determining the property within the marital pot. If that date puts a lid on the pot, it is logical to simultaneously determine the value of its contents. If the value of items in the marital pot increases or decreases after the date of final separation due to the conduct of the parties, the trial court may, of course, take this into account under IC 31-1 — 11.5-11. Valuation of marital property on the date of final separation will also assist the parties in marshalling the evidence and appraisals of property in preparation for the final hearing date.
Were this court entitled to weigh the evidence, we might hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the instant case in dividing the marital property. However, we do not have that alternative. Because the trial court exercised its discretion under a misconception of the law, it is pure conjecture that the trial court would exercise its discretion in the same manner using the proper valuation date. Only the trial court can make that determination and it must be given the opportunity to do so.
Reversed and remanded.
SULLIVAN, J., concurs. BUCHANAN, C. J., dissents, with opinion.