(dissenting).
While the majority opinion argues that the issuance of a writ of error coram nobis was in error because Davis had the statutory'remedy of direct appeal available, this remedy is *209no longer available and therefore, I would affirm the order. See Brockmueller, 374 N.W.2d 135 (affirming the order even though no post-conviction proceedings were initiated by Brockmueller). As this court stated in Brockmueller, “statutory remedies must be unavailable ... before a petition for coram nobis relief can be granted.” Id. at 137 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
[I]t is apparent that no other statutory remedy is available to Brockmueller to vacate his invalid felony conviction. SDCL 23A-30-1 authorizes a court to arrest judgment for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, but only upon motion to the court made within ten days after the verdict. Brockmueller correctly argues that he could not be charged with the knowledge that approximately nine months subsequent to his felony conviction this court would hold that a court could not acquire jurisdiction over a DWI offense in the absence of an information.
Id. at 138 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
As in Brockmueller, Davis cannot be charged with the knowledge that seven days after she made a motion to dismiss her appeal, this court would hold that “the accused must unlawfully remain” in an occupied structure. Oster, 495 N.W.2d at 311-12 (emphasis in original). See Brockmueller, 374 N.W.2d at 140 (Henderson, J., concurring specially).* If the word “remains” means “unlawfully remains” as the majority subsequently held in Oster, then Davis is entitled to have the benefit of that interpretation. Id. (“Events occurring after the judgment have been treated as within the ambit of coram nobis.”) It doesn’t make any sense for the majority to free Oster as a result of their interpretation but refuse to vacate Davis’ conviction. As I stated in Moeller v. Solem, 395 N.W.2d 165 (S.D.1986), “Enough is enough! Even the State has an interest in cutting through this red tape. This Court should grant a writ of error cor'am nobis in accordance with Petition of Brockmueller, 374 N.W.2d 135 (S.D.1985).” Id. at 166 (Sabers, J., concurring specially).
Because the remedy of appeal is not available to Davis, I would affirm, not reverse, the trial court. To allow this conviction to stand is an injustice of the first magnitude. Brockmueller, 374 N.W.2d at 138-39.
As Justice Henderson stated in his writing:
When Brockmueller was called to trial on the Part II Information (felony), he was in no position to call to the attention of the trial court a decision made by this Court in Honom-ichl v. State, 333 N.W.2d 797 (S.D.1983). This legal point is critical.... That the judgments, upon which the felony was predicated, would be later vacated due to jurisdictional defects, was a fact unknown to him at the time of entry of his plea and without fault on his part. It was a mistake of fact on his part. This was also unknown to the trial court when the plea was accepted. If known to Brockmueller or the trial court, rendition of the felony judgment would not have taken place. Coram nobis therefore lies.
Brockmueller, 374 N.W.2d at 140 (citations omitted).