(concurring in result).
Although I vote for a public censure in this ethics case, I cannot join it wholeheartedly *240because of its erosion of precedent. In Matter of Discipline of Schmidt, 491 N.W.2d 754, 756 (S.D.1992), we expressed:
Private reprimands are not ordinarily subject to public disclosure but under the circumstances of this case, namely that there was a prior formal proceeding, including oral argument before the Supreme Court, the subject of the private reprimand was a formal record of this Court. Thus, we hold that it is appropriate to disclose it in this, a separate disciplinary proceeding.
Here, the majority writer reaches back to “11 complaints previously filed against Bihl-meyer since 1981, some of which were dismissed and others resulting in an admonishment or .caution from the Board.” (Emphasis supplied mine.)
In reading the record in this case, the FORMAL ACCUSATION against attorney Bihlmeyer does not refer to said 11 complaints. If these are being used as a basis for discipline in this case, it should be pleaded; also, the FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION of the Referee do not allude to any 11 complaints against attorney Bihl-meyer. Furthermore, the FINDINGS OF FACT AND PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS of the Disciplinary Board do not refer to said 11 complaints. Like anyone who is charged with wrongdoing before the Bar of Justice, an attorney should only have to answer for those matters he is accused of doing. In my opinion, it is unfair to bring up 11 complaints against attorney Bihlmeyer, obviously some being dismissed and “others resulting an admonishment or caution from the Board.” Essentially, it is a deprivation of due process to now accuse someone, after the formal accusation has been made, based upon previous informal proceedings. “Courts uniformly insist that discipline is not a ‘criminal’ proceeding, to which the stricter requirements of due process apply.” Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 3.4, at 99 (1986). In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), tends to agree, but holds that due process requires that the respondent receive sufficient notice of the charges to be considered upon which the disciplinary agency bottoms its findings. Therein, a charge — not among the charges that brought attorney Ruffalo to the proceedings — was used to disbar him. In a sense, this case is somewhat comparable. Apparently, the Board utilized information which was not equivalent to the level of “charges” when contemplating the sanction. Surely, dismissed complaints are not the same as “charges” nor are they the same as “discipline.” In Goodrich, followed by the majority opinion, we had before us a case which permitted consideration of past “discipline.” It strikes me that there is surely a legal difference between “discipline” and “complaints;” and to compare “discipline” with “dismissed complaints” is wrong.
This Court has, with few exceptions, long moored its ethics decisions to past reported ethics cases in this state. With the advent of uniform adoption of ethics rules throughout the United States, it becomes more important for South Dakota’s legal profession to review ethics treatises in other states or written by the academe. Slowly, but surely, even the midwestern states are being brought in to American Bar Association standards and interpretation of those standards. It is beyond cavil that the Supreme Court of South Dakota has the ultimate decision on disciplining attorneys. SDCL 16-19-21. Within the framework of that statement, the Supreme Court must grow, in its reflections, by a review of present standards which the legal profession has imposed upon the lawyers of this state. Therefore, in the metamorphosis of ethics cases, we must review outside authorities, from time to time, for enlightenment. Modern Legal Ethics § 3.5, at 119, states that the disciplinary agency can consider “other indicators or whether the conduct was isolated or part of a pattern of repeated behavior” in determining sanctions. ABA/BNA, Lawyers’ Manual on Professional Conduct § 101:3101 (1987) states that “matters not directly connected to the alleged misconduct are relevant in aggravation or mitigation of the sanction to be imposed.” However, a listing of six general examples of other indicators did not list “prior complaints.” Instanter, to repeat my earlier remarks, neither the Findings and Recommendation of the Referee nor the Findings of Fact and Proposed Recommendation of the Disciplinary Board refer to said eleven com*241plaints. This takes us back to the due process question.
It appears that an attorney cannot be ambushed with new charges after the disciplinary proceeding is underway, per Buffalo, which also calls for a degree of due process disciplinary actions. Legal authorities and the ABA allow for the admission of other indicators, but does not comment on the element of surprise. Hence, notice that the eleven prior complaints will be considered appears to be required under Buffalo. If Bihlmeyer does not have notice that eleven complaints were to be used as indicators for enhancing his sentence, the Board has erred (in my opinion) by using these eleven complaints. Lawyers are always fighting for their clients to get due process. Lawyers owe a duty to give their fellow lawyers due process. Many moons ago, as a cub on this Court, I wrote in Light v. Elliott, 295 N.W.2d 724, 727 (S.D.1980) (Henderson, J., dissenting), “Lawyers are people, too.”
Admonishments are not a “private reprimand ” and a “caution” is not a “reprimand.” Same are to be considered private sanctions. ABA/BNA, Lawyers’ Manual on Professional Conduct § 01.818 (1986).
The wording in Schmidt was joined by Chief Justice Miller, Justice Wuest, and Justice Amundson. Only Justice Sabers disagreed with the wording “private reprimands are not ordinarily subject to public disclosure ...”
If “admonishments” are disclosed, if “private reprimands!’ are disclosed, their purpose is defeated.
There are few real “doctrines” in the law. There are some “rules of law.” Stare decisis is not a “rule of law;” it is not a “precedent.” It is a doctrine. Within “stare decisis,” obviously, there is precedent. It means to stand by precedent. We should stand by precedent.
Metamorphosis in South Dakota Ethics. Consider: Code of Professional Responsibility was originally approved by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in 1970; it was amended in 1979, 1984, and 1986. The current code was adopted and reenacted in 1987, effective July 1, 1988. Although it is now known as the South Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct, notice that the subtitle dubs it: “Model Rules of Professional Conduct.” (Emphasis supplied mine.) Lawyers and the Disciplinary Board must keep abreast of change. I say this in light of statistics which I have garnered on attorney disciplines filed in this state. In the 1950s, this Court had 8 attorney disciplinary actions; in the 1960s, there were 10 of said actions; in the 1970s, there were 17 attorney disciplinary actions; this Court had 54 disciplinary actions in the 1980s; and three years into the 1990s, we have had 35 of said actions. There is an increase of 575% in the 1980s over the 1950s. At the present rate of 35 disciplinary actions for the first three years in the 1990s, a projection for the 1990s (assuming the present rate continues), we would have a 1,300% increase from the 1950s.