Milwaukee County appeals from an order denying its motion to vacate a judgment assessing costs against the County as a subrogated party in a personal injury lawsuit in which the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The County argues that costs cannot be assessed against subrogated parties. We reject the County's argument and affirm.
In April of 1985, Patrick Sampson suffered serious injuries following a seizure during which he fell off the upstairs porch of the apartment building where he lived. He received extensive care at the Milwaukee County Medical Complex for his injuries, and Milwaukee County paid his medical expenses. Sampson commenced an action against his landlords, Earl Logue and Linda Logue, and their insurer, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. Sampson also named Milwaukee County as a defendant, identifying the County's subrogation interest under § 49.65, Stats.,1 and *24§ 803.03(2), Stats.2 On June 24,1988, the County filed a notice of appearance in the action.
On January 16,1992, eleven days before the trial, Sampson filed an amended complaint, which still named Milwaukee County as a defendant by virtue of the County's subrogated interest. On January 24, 1992, the County filed a notice of appearance, the caption of which still referred to the County as a defendant, but in the text stated that the "Principal Assistant Corporation Counsel" "appears for and represents plaintiff, County of Milwaukee." (Emphasis added.)
On January 27,1992, the first day of trial, counsel for the County entered late and did not formally state an appearance. He did, however, state his understanding that the County was involved in the action because *25of its subrogated interest and stated that the County-expected to be paid out of any verdict in favor of Sampson. Counsel for the County then asked to be excused from participating in the trial. The County's claim was placed on the verdict. The jury, however, returned a verdict against the plaintiff.
In the defendants' motion for judgment on the verdict, the defendants also requested that the trial court amend the case caption to "properly name Milwaukee County as a plaintiff, pursuant to sec. 803.03, Stats.," and to tax costs against the County, pursuant to § 814.03, Stats.3 Despite having received notice of the motion hearing, the County failed to appear. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to amend the case caption and also ordered judgment for the defendants with costs. The County subsequently filed a motion for relief from the trial court's judgment, pursuant to § 806.07(l)(d) and (h), STATS. The trial court denied the County's motion, stating:
This Court holds that where a subrogated party chooses under Sec. 803.03 Wis. Stats, to make an appearance in an action, elects not to participate in the trial itself and decides not to move for dismissal that the subrogated party is bound by the judgment including the imposition of costs.
This result appears to the Court to be the only result to be obtained from a reading of the involved statutes. Although risk attends the option chosen by Milwaukee County in this case it is clear Milwaukee County exercised the option and assumed the risk. The clear statutory intent is that unsuc*26cessful litigants be responsible for limited statutory costs incurred by the successful litigant. Where the County elected to put itself in a position of potential recovery it will not be heard to say that it is unjust for the County to pay for the costs of its failure.
On appeal, Milwaukee County contends that under § 806.07(l)(a), (d) and (h), Stats., it should have been relieved from the judgment assessing costs. The County does not dispute the amount of costs assessed against it. The County simply argues that costs under § 814.03(1), Stats., cannot be imposed against an unsuccessful subrogated party and that the trial court should not have amended the case caption to make it a plaintiff so that costs could be so imposed.
The County argues that it should be relieved from the judgment imposing costs under § 806.07(l)(a), Stats., which states that a court may relieve a party from a judgment because of "[m]istake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." The County, however, waived this argument by not raising it in the trial court. See Hough v. Dane County, 157 Wis. 2d 32, 48, 458 N.W.2d 543, 549 (Ct. App. 1990) (review by appellate court generally declined on issues raised for the first time on appeal).
The County also argues for relief under § 806.07(l)(d), Stats., which provides that a party may be relieved from a judgment where the judgment is void, and under § 806.07(l)(h), which provides that a party may be relieved from a judgment for "[a]ny other reasons justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." The County, however, fails to explain its argument that the judgment is allegedly void; instead, the County simply contends that "there is no statutory authority for the Court's imposition of costs against the *27County." The County further argues "it is clear" that § 814.03(1), Stats., "contemplates costs being absorbed by the litigating plaintiff when the defendant prevails," and that it never was "the litigating plaintiff."
Interpretation and application of a statute to a particular set of facts is a question of law which we independently review. See Franzen v. Children's Hosp., 169 Wis. 2d 366, 376, 485 N.W.2d 603, 606 (Ct. App. 1992).
We reject the County's arguments for several reasons. No authority or statutory analysis supports the County's contention that "plaintiff' under § 814.03, STATS., was not meant to include subrogated parties. Section 814.03(1), Stats., which states that "[i]f the plaintiff is not entitled to costs under s. 814.01(1) or (3), the defendant shall be allowed costs," is plain on its face and clearly applies to all plaintiffs, not just to non-subrogated plaintiffs. See Brown County Attorneys Ass'n v. Brown County, 169 Wis. 2d 737, 741, 487 N.W.2d 312, 313-314 (Ct. App. 1992) (statute plain on its face to be applied to facts of case). A prevailing defendant is entitled to statutory costs against each unsuccessful plaintiff in a lawsuit. See Gorman v. Wausau Ins. Cos., 175 Wis. 2d 320, 327-328, 499 Wis. 2d 245, 248 (Ct. App. 1993); see also Baldwin v. St. Peter's Congregation, 264 Wis. 626, 632, 60 N.W.2d 349, 352 (1953).
Additionally, the County's argument that costs should be imposed against only the "litigating plaintiff when the defendant prevails" and not against any sub-rogated party is contrary to § 803.03, STATS. Under § 803.03, subrogated parties must be joined by any *28"party asserting a claim for affirmative relief." After joinder, a subrogated party must choose from three options or risk dismissal with prejudice: (1) "participate in the prosecution of the action"; (2) agree to have its interest represented by the party that caused its joinder; or (3) move for dismissal with or without prejudice. Section 803.03(2)(b), STATS.; Radloff v. General Casualty Co., 147 Wis. 2d 14, 20, 432 N.W.2d 597, 599 (Ct. App. 1988). Although the County was originally named as a defendant, it should have been joined as a plaintiff. See Anderson v. Garber, 160 Wis. 2d 389, 398-399, 466 N.W.2d 221, 225 (Ct. App. 1991) (§ 803.03 contemplates joining insurer with subrogated claim as a party plaintiff); see also Garrity v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 77 Wis. 2d 537, 541, 253 N.W.2d 512, 514 (1977) (party with a subrogated claim has an independent, albeit derivative, claim).
Additionally, by virtue of its January 24, 1992, notice of appearance as a "plaintiff," its absence from active participation at trial, and its agreement to be bound by the verdict, the County exercised the first and, in a sense, the second options under § 803.03(2)(b). Thus, the County, despite its lack of active participation, was a "litigating plaintiff' and had its interest represented to an extent by Sampson.4 *29Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by amending the case caption to reflect the County's appropriate status as a party plaintiff. See § 802.09(1), STATS, (pleadings may be amended at any stage of the proceedings "when justice so requires").
The County protests that subrogated parties are somehow inferior parties with little control of their involvement in the litigation of a claim. We reject this argument. A subrogated party enters litigation on an even playing field together with any non-subrogated party, subject to and able to invoke all substantive and procedural rules. The extent to which a subrogated party elects to protect, or for that matter, not protect its claim by which option it elects under § 803.03, Stats., carries certain risks, including having costs assessed against it if the jury returns a verdict favorable to the defendants.5
The County was an unsuccessful plaintiff by virtue of the verdict rendered in favor of the defendants. *30Therefore, the trial court order assessing costs against the County was proper, and we affirm the judgment.6
By the Court. — Order affirmed.
Section 49.65(2), STATS., in part, states:
(2) SUBROGATION. The . . . county . . . providing any public assistance under this chapter as a result of the occurrence of an injury ... which creates a claim or cause of action, whether in tort or contract, on the part of a public assistance recipient... against a 3rd party, including an insurer, is subrogated to the rights of the recipient . . . and may make a claim or maintain an action or intervene in a claim or action by the recipient....
Section 49.65(3), Stats., in part, states:
(3) Assignment OF actions. The ... county . . . providing any public assistance authorized under this chapter, including medical *24assistance, as a result of the occurrence of injury ... which results in a possible recovery of indemnity from a 3rd party, including an insurer, may require an assignment from the . . . recipient... of such public assistance . . . giving it the right to make a claim against the 3rd party.
Section 803.03(2), Stats., in part, states:
(2) Claims aeising by subrogation, derivation and assignment. (a) Joinder of related claims. A party asserting a claim for affirmative relief shall join as parties to the action all persons who at the commencement of the action have claims based upon subro-gation to the rights of the party asserting the principal claim, derivation from the principal claim, or assignment of part of the principal claim.... Any public assistance recipient... asserting a claim against a 3rd party for which the public assistance provider has a right of subrogation or assignment under s. 49.65(2) or (3) shall join the provider as a party to the claim. Any party asserting a claim based upon subrogation to part of the claim of another, derivation from the rights or claim of another, or assignment of part of the rights or claim of another shall join as a party to the action the person to whose rights the party is subrogated, from whose claim the party derives his or her rights or claim, or by whose assignment the party acquired his or her rights or claim.
Section 814.03(1), Stats., provides that "[i]f the plaintiff is not entitled to costs under s. 814.01(1) or (3), the defendant shall be allowed costs." Section 814.04, STATS., defines what fees and disbursements are allowed as "costs."
Section 803.03(2)(b), STATS., provides that if a subrogated party chooses to have its interests "represented by the party who caused the joinder, the- [subrogated party] shall sign a written waiver of the right to participate which shall express consent to be bound by the judgment in the action." The record does not, however, indicate whether the parties complied with this requirement. Noncompliance with this technical requirement would not affect our analysis of this issue under these circumstances.
Relying on DILHR v. Coatings, Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 338, 376 N.W.2d 834 (1985), the County also argues that costs should not be assessed against the County when the County is seeking reimbursement of its subrogated interest. The County's reliance on Coatings is misplaced. In Coatings, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated, "It is a well-established rule in Wisconsin 'that costs may not be taxed against the state unless authorized by statute.'" Coatings, 126 Wis. 2d at 346, 376 N.W.2d at 838 (citation omitted). Unlike Coatings, however, this case involves the County of Milwaukee. Under § 814.23, STATS., "In all actions by or against a county,... costs shall be awarded to the prevailing party as in actions between individuals."
The respondent moves for frivolous appeal costs and the County counter-moves for frivolous costs based on the respondents' motion. The motions of both parties are denied.