State Farm Life Insurance v. Pearce

FROEHLICH, J., Concurring.

I concur in the ruling of the majority, which is to reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings and trial, if appropriate. I do not join in the reasoning of the majority opinion because I believe it is misplaced in its emphasis on a search for the hypothetical, presumed, or to be discovered donative intent of the deceased insured. Rather, I believe the review of evidence should focus on an attempt simply to prevent enrichment of the murderer by reason of her crime. If there is no evidence of such enrichment through execution of the plain terms of the policy, then those terms should be followed.

In Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co. (1952) 38 Cal.2d 643, 647 [241 P.2d 544, 26 A.L.R.2d 979], the court awarded the life insurance proceeds to an alternate beneficiary (not related to the primary beneficiary who had murdered the insured) because such was the clear intent of the deceased. The literal wording of the beneficiary clause was such as to transfer to the unrelated friend the policy benefits in the event the insured’s husband could not receive them. The reason for award of the policy benefits to the alternative beneficiary was not the predecease of the husband, which would have been expected by the insured based on the beneficiary designations. The husband was precluded from taking not because of his prior death, but because of the equitable doctrine preventing one from benefiting from his own wrong. This unexpected cause for activating the alternative nomination in no way, however, invalidated it.

It is to be noted that the “intent” relied upon in Beck was the intent of the insured at the time of execution of the policy beneficiary provision. Such is entirely in accord with ordinary contract construction principles.1 The opin*1696ion of the majority would appear to require the trial court to look into the intent of the insured illuminated by events occurring after the execution of the beneficiary designation. Indeed, by referring to the domestic restraining order in effect at the time of his death, the majority appears to require the trial court to speculate as to what action the deceased would have taken absent the order.

If we were to follow Beck literally in this case we would be required to award the policy benefits (less the community interest in the cash surrender value as it existed prior to death, as per Estate of Hart (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 684 [185 Cal.Rptr. 544]) to the contingent beneficiary, Miles. The decedent by his designation of beneficiary chose Miles to receive the policy benefits in the event of the predecease of his wife, and under Probate Code section 252 because of the murder the policy benefits must be paid “as though the killer had predeceased the decedent.”

In my view the case is controlled by the principle that the murderer can in no manner be benefited by her own crime. The application of this principle to the facts of this case is best described by the comments of Judge Fee in Beck v. Downey (9th Cir. 1952) 198 F.2d 626, 628, quoted at length in the majority opinion. The central theme of the effort is to prevent enrichment as the result of one’s own wrong. If the result of this effort is to preclude the receipt of benefits by an otherwise innocent third party, so be it. (Cf. Meyer v. Johnson (1931) 115 Cal.App. 646, 650 [2 P.2d 456]: “. . . personal representatives of murderously inclined beneficiaries [may not] take money made bloody by the slaying of those inclined to generosity.”)

In my view, therefore, the proper inquiry at trial of this matter will be whether and to what extent the implementation of the alternative beneficiary provision in the murdered decedent’s insurance policy will benefit, or will represent the objectives of, the murderer. Evidence as to the original motivation for naming Miles the alternative beneficiary would be instructive. If it can be shown, for instance, that Miles’s designation was the result of the importuning of Roberta, the murderer, then the award of the insurance proceeds to Miles might well be conceived by the court as violative of the prohibition against rewarding the objectives of the wrongdoer.

In any event, I concur in the conclusion that this was not a case to be resolved by summary judgment, and that its ultimate determination will *1697better be made after a full investigation of the facts. In my opinion the relevant facts are those that disclose both the motivation and the objectives sought, and who was seeking them, in the original designation of Miles as alternate beneficiary.

A petition for a rehearing was denied October 31, 1991.

Insurance policies are contracts (Ins. Code, § 22) and are interpreted in accordance with contract principles (Boyer v. United States F. & G. Co. (1929) 206 Cal. 273, 276 [48 Cal.Rptr. 540]). The guiding principle is the intention of the parties as expressed at the time of policy *1696execution. (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 271 [419 P.2d 168]; Protex-A-Kar Co. v. Hartford Acc. etc. Co. (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 408, 412 [227 P.2d 509].) This rule is applicable to provisions designating beneficiaries. (Turner v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1943) 56 Cal.App.2d 862 [133 P.2d 859]; 39 Cal.Jur.3d, Insurance Contracts, § 464, pp. 783-784.)