Appellants, by their amended complaint, seek to enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance No. 1972 — 1962 of the City of Richmond, which amends the Master Plan Zoning Ordinance of that city, and rezones described real estate and property owned by the appellees Andrew F. Scott, Martha H. Scott, and Ruth E. Scott, from “A” and Suburban Residential to General Business in order to provide for the construction of a new shopping center.
Appellees demurred to the amended complaint on the ground that it does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. One reason advanced in support of the demurrer is that the amended complaint alleges no property or civil rights of the appellants which will be violated by the enforcement of the alleged invalid ordinance. The court sustained the demurrer and appellants refused to plead over. Judgment followed that appellants take nothing by their action.
In order to invoke the jurisdiction of equity to determine the validity of an ordinance, something more than the mere allegation of the invalidity of the ordinance must appear. It must first be asserted that some property or civil right of the complainant will be infracted.
The involved complaint, in pertinent substance, alleges that “individuals” interested in developing a new shopping center petitioned the common council of the City of Richmond for an amendment of the Master Plan Zoning Ordinance to rezone the Scott property in order to provide for the construction of the shopping center ; that the petition was referred to the Plan Commis*580sion; that the Plan Commission gave notice and held a public hearing at which appellants and others, as remonstrators, were represented by counsel and were given full opportunity to present evidence and offer argument; that the Commission took the matter under advisement and deferred its decision until February 26, 1963; that the proponents of the petition requested additional time to be heard on February 26, 1963 and no public notice of the “rehearing” on that date was given; that counsel for the “remonstrators” appeared on said date and objected by written motion to the “rehearing” on the ground of improper notice, which motion the Commission refused to consider. Complaint is made that at the February 26, 1963 meeting, nine of the eleven members of the Commission were present and voted five to four in favor of the proposed amendment which, it is alleged, were insufficient to authorize official action of the Commission under the provisions of §53-719, Burns’ 1951 Replacement requiring action by a majority of the members of the Commission.
It is further alleged that the Commission made no findings or determinations but through its secretary communicated the result of said vote to the City Council and that the latter, consisting of nine members, at its meeting on the third Monday of March, 1963, voted six to three to adopt the proposed “recommended” amendment; that if the vote of the Commission be treated as a rejection of the amendment, then the ordinance is void since under the provisions of §53-765, Burns’ 1951 Replacement, a three-quarters vote of the members of the Council was required to override the adverse recommendation of the Commission.
The two rhetorical paragraphs of the amended complaint concerning appellants’ interest in the subject matter are set forth, for clarity, in haec verba, to-wit:
*581“(8) Plaintiffs bring this action in behalf of themselves and all other owners and operators of businesses and business properties in the downtown-business area of Richmond, Indiana, the owners of real estate in the immediate vicinity of the downtown business section of Richmond, Indiana, and the owners and operators of businesses and business properties in the existing Shopping Center at U. S. Highway 40 and Garwood Road, similarly situated and constituting a class too numerous to name specifically. Plaintiff Albert B. Ratner, as Trustee, is the owner of the real estate lying to the east of the Scott property and across Garwood Road and south of U. S. Highway 40, which property is zoned for business and is utilized as a Shopping Center. The owners and operators of the businesses located in said Shopping Center are lessees of Plaintiff Ratner. Plaintiff Albert B. Ratner, Trustee, and said lessees have invested substantial sums of money in said Shopping Center and in developing the same. The said real estate, the leases and the business interests incident thereto constitute valuable property rights. Plaintiff Brouse Rinehart is the owner and operator of a commercial business property located in the downtown business section of the City of Richmond and has substantial sums of money invested therein and has a substantial and valuable property interest therein and in the preservation and normal expansion of said downtown business section. There are numerous downtown business merchants situated similarly to Plaintiff Rinehart, including Plaintiff Al Birck, who is also the owner and operator of a commercial business and business property in said downtown business section. In addition, Plaintiff Al Birck is the owner of residence properties located in the area immediately adjoining the downtown business . section of Richmond. The value of said residence properties reflect and are enhanced by the elements of said properties’ nearness to said downtown shopping area and their availability for normal expansion of the commercial and business area of the City of Richmond. The named plaintiffs and. the other members of the class represented' by them are taxpayers of the City of Richmond and as such *582have an interest in the integrity and preservation of the said Master Plan Zoning Ordinance and interested in amendments thereto being made only in accordance with law.”
“(28) If such shopping center or other commercial businesses are constructed on the Scott property across the road from the existing Shopping Center and on property presently legally zoned for residence but purportedly, though illegally, zoned for business, as above alleged, there would result an over-development and concentration of shopping center, creating traffic congestion and confusion in the area around the existing Shopping Center and bringing about vacant and distressed retail store locations in the downtown Richmond business section, all of which will be detrimental and damaging to the downtown property values and business interests and detrimental and damaging to the business property values and interests in the existing Shopping Center, such as the properties and interests of the named Plaintiffs and all others similarly situated. In addition, such persons thus would be subjected to illegal competition and interference with their established businesses resulting from the illegal zoning of the property herein alleged. All of the above will be to the great and irreparable damage of Plaintiffs and for which they have no adequate remedy at law for the protection of their property rights and they have no remedy other than this proceeding by which to preserve the integrity of the said Master Plan Zoning Ordinance and prevent amendment thereof through illegal and unauthorized action and proceedings.”
It is radiantly clear that this complaint fails to state facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of equity. Appellants allege no right, title, or interest in or to any part of the real estate intended to be rezoned. Consequently, the amendment involved in this controversy does not constitute a taking of any of their property.
*583The only damage or injury sought to be alleged by appellants may be termed resultant and problematical, that is, that their business interests will be adversely affected and interfered with in futuro, as a result of competition and that an overdevelopment and concentration of shopping centers with congestion and confusion “around the existing shopping center” owned by the appellant, Albert B. Ratner, as Trustee, (emphasis supplied), will result. Further, that this additional shopping center and the overdevelopment of the shopping centers will bring about vacant and distressed retail store locations in the business section of Richmond. There is no allegation, however, that appellants, or any of them, own, lease, or possess any of the retail stores which they say will be distressed or made vacant. In short, their only claim of injury is that they would be “subjected to illegal competition and interference with their established businesses” if the new shopping center is permitted. No facts are alleged which support the charge that the competition would be “illegal”. There are no allegations that appellants, or any of them, possess any franchise or purchased licensed rights which will be violated or unlawfully infringed by the objected to amending ordinance authorizing the new shopping center.
“Lawful interference with business as a result of the economic law of competition cannot be enjoined .......and an unauthorized act which does not infringe on another’s right may not be enjoined merely because it will enable a third person to enter into competition with that other.” 43 C. J. S., Injunctions, §138a, notes 47 and 54, on pages 685 and 686.
It is alleged that the appellant, Birck, owns a residence in an area adjoining the downtown business section of Richmond and that the value thereof is enhanced *584by its nearness to said downtown business section and “their” availability for normal expansion of the business area of Richmond. But in what way or manner the value of the residence of said appellant is or may be damaged, lessened, depreciated, or affected by the proposed shopping center is left undisclosed.
It is also alleged in the amended complaint that appellants, as taxpayers of Richmond, have an interest in the “integrity and preservation” of the Master Plan Zoning Ordinance and in the amendments thereto being made “in accordance with law.” Such “interest”, however, in the Master Zoning Ordinance and the amendments thereto is not sufficient of itself, standing alone, to invoke the power of the court of equity to enjoin the operation of the amending ordinance. There must exist, or be alleged to exist, some property or civil right which allegedly will be violated by the enforcement of the ordinance or a statement of circumstances showing that a great and irreparable injury will result to the complainant by the enforcement thereof. 16 I. L. E., Injunction, §75, notes 40 and 41, page 54; Indianapolis Market Association et al. v. City of Indianapolis et al. (1934), 207 Ind. 356, 192 N. E. 754; Males, Mayor v. Elbert (1932), 203 Ind. 512, 180 N. E. 193; 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, §190, page 694.
The complainant must show that enforcement of the ordinance will affect his personal or property rights, and that it will cause him personal, direct, and irreparable injury, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally. 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, §191, page 696. Massachusetts State Grange v. Benton (1926), 272 U. S. 525, 71 L. Ed. 387. When the enforcement of the invalid ordinance will require the expenditure of pub-*585lie money, a taxpayer may maintain an action to enjoin such enforcement, but not where the statute has no force or effect prejudicial to the complainant as a taxpayer. 28 Am. Jur., Injunctions, §191, notes 17 and 18, page 697. The amended complaint at hand contains no allegations that the enforcement of the complained of ordinance will require the expenditure of public funds nor that any of the tax money paid by appellants as taxpayers is or will be involved in the subject matter of the ordinance.
In our opinion the challenged amended complaint fails to state facts sufficient to justify the Wayne Circuit Court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction and grant the prayed for injunctive relief.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Mote and Pfaff, JJ., concur. Hunter, C. J., dissents with opinion to follow.