concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur as to Issues II and III. I dissent as to Issue I.
Indiana recognizes the gratuitous assumption of duty rule set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324(A) (1965):
“One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise rea*482sonable care to protect his undertaking, if
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking.”
Perry v. Northern Indiana Public Service Company (1982) 4th Dist.Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 44, 50. It is well established that whether a party has assumed a duty and the extent of the duty, if any, are questions for the trier of fact. Phillips v. United Engineers & Constructors Inc. (1986) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 500 N.E.2d 1265; Plan-Tec, Inc. v. Wiggins (1983) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 443 N.E.2d 1212.
Here, there was deposition testimony that Bill Quinley, an employee of Browning Construction, Inc., affirmatively undertook to make sure that no one would be underneath the area in which the crane was to be performing the dangerous pallet shifting operation. Even if that undertaking and the failure to carry it out be considered nonfeasance as opposed to misfeasance, the question was ripe for jury determination.
In any event, comment (b) to the Restatement provision clearly states that liability may arise for failure to exercise reasonable care to complete an undertaking, as well as for the negligent performance of the undertaking.
Even if I were to agree that our case involves nonfeasance, the majority erroneously holds that in such circumstance, the requisite reliance upon the proffered performance must be that of the innocent injured party rather than the reliance of the party to whom the undertaking is extended.
Comment (e) notes that the actor is subject to liability “where the harm is suffered because of the reliance of the other for whom he undertakes to render the services, or of the third person himself, upon [the actor’s] undertaking.” Restatement, supra, at 144 (emphasis supplied). Furthermore, Comment on Caveat (f) states:
Again there is no essential reason why the breach of a promise, relied upon by the promisee or by a third person, with resulting physical harm to the latter, should not result in liability in tort.” Restatement, supra, at 145 (emphasis supplied).
Here, Quinley’s promise was made to the Fuller employees for the protection of third persons. The Fuller employees were entitled to rely upon that promise. The resultant injury to Daugherty, the third person, was sufficient to permit the trier of fact to consider application of § 324 A. Williams v. Saga Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 225 Cal. App.3d 142, 274 Cal.Rptr. 901; Keenan v. Miriam Foundation (1990) Mo.App., 784 S.W.2d 298; Scott & Fetzer Company v. Montgomery Ward & Company (1984) 129 Ill.App.3d 1011, 473 N.E.2d 421, aff'd (1986) 112 Ill.2d 378, 98 Ill.Dec. 1, 493 N.E.2d 1022.
Although the degree of involvement by Quinley may appear to be less extensive than was present in Teitge v. Remy Construction Company, Inc. (1988) 3d Dist. Ind.App., 526 N.E.2d 1008, Plan-Tec, supra, and Phillips, supra, it is adequate to require the submission of the question to the trier of fact. In the other three cases, the undertaking was general in nature as to such things as conducting safety meetings and safety inspections. Here, the gratuitous undertaking was very specific and left little doubt that it was narrowly focused upon the specific incident which led to Daugherty’s death. Accordingly, this undertaking may have been more clear-cut than those in the other three cases. There was evidence from which the jury might have reasonably concluded that Quinley, and through him, Browning Construction, Inc., undertook to clear the area beneath the pallet-lifting site and, having negligently failed to carry out that undertaking, became liable.
The summary judgment as to appellees Quinley and Browning Construction, Inc. should be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.