(dissenting). I dissent.
Judge McGregor states:
"It is apparent from the pleadings that the transaction in this matter was not unitary, but binary, in that plaintiff first made and signed a purchase agreement with the real estate company, and several weeks later, in an independent transaction, concluded a mortgage agreement with the mortgage company.”
The final typed-in sentence of the purchase agreement reads as follows: "If purchaser is unable to obtain mortgage, deposit to be refunded less cost of credit report”.
Count IV of plaintiff’s first amended complaint alleges that defendant Michigan, as part of its normal pre-loan credit check on plaintiff, knew that plaintiff was receiving welfare assistance, was unemployed, had little formal education, and had little, if any, experience in any kind of commercial transactions. Count IV further avers that defendant Michigan knew, as a result of repeated business dealings with defendant Montgomery, that Montgomery was an experienced real estate com*742pany with a notorious reputation for using unscrupulous and deceptive practices. Finally, said count alleges that defendant Michigan knew, or should have known through its preliminary investigation, the various facts charged to establish fraud by Montgomery, and that since Michigan knew or should have known all of these facts it made itself an integral and necessary part of the fraudulent transaction when it entered into the mortgage loan agreement with plaintiff without warning her of her peril and imminent financial loss. Count V of plaintiff’s first amended complaint contains similar allegations and avers that defendant Michigan disregarded its duty to warn plaintiff of her peril or to refrain from taking any action which would increase her danger.
Michigan’s motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s first amended complaint, made pursuant to GCR 1963, 117.2(1), is accompanied by the affidavit of Norman I. Leemon, President and Chief Operations Officer of Michigan Mortgage Corporation: The affidavit is surplusage since the motion was made to test whether plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.1 Meadows v Depco Equipment Co, 4 Mich App 370 (1966). However, it may be noted that the affidavit contains no statement whatsoever as to whether or not Michigan obtained a pre-loan credit check on plaintiff or as to whether it had had repeated business dealings with defendant Montgomery or as to the extent of the knowledge it had, or should have had, of Montgomery’s alleged fraud upon plaintiff. The affidavit contends that Michigan had no knowledge of any repairs to be made by Montgomery, that it had no knowledge of the previous *743price of the property, and that it is "an innocent third party and has not colluded in any way with any parties to cause plaintiff any damage whatsoever”.
Judge McGregor states: "It may be conceded arguendo that, if the mortgage corporation were intimately affiliated with the real estate company, the real estate company’s fraud could be chargeable against the mortgage corporation”. Since the purchase agreement is specifically provisioned upon the securing of a mortgage, and in view of the serious allegations raised in plaintiff’s complaint,2 I am unable to conclude, as Judge Mc-Gregor does, that the transaction in this case was binary and not unitary and that plaintiff’s pleadings failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The appellate courts of this state have repeatedly warned against the improper use of summary proceedings to preclude a party from his day in court. Durant v Stahlin, 374 Mich 82 (1964); Sun Oil Co v Rosborough, 6 Mich App 176 (1967). I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
The trial court specifically granted Michigan’s motion on the basis of subrule 117.2(1).
In evaluating defendant’s motion for summary judgment, both at the trial and appellate levels, every well-pleaded allegation in the complaint is assumed to be true. Bielski v Wolverine Ins Co, 379 Mich 280 (1967).