I concur with that portion of the majority opinion which sustains the charges in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the order of contempt. I respectfully disagree, however, with the conclusion of my distinguished brethren that the charges in paragraph 1 have not been sustained.
It seems to me that some fundamental principles must be recognized at the very outset of the consideration of this case. First of all, we are dealing with the conduct of an attorney vis-a-vis the conduct of a trial judge during the course of a trial in the presence of a jury composed of laymen. On its face this is a setting, which should never be subjected toi the trauma that inevitably flows from a verbal conflict between counsel and court. That such should not occur is particularly true in California, where more than ample means and procedures are provided to parties and attorneys to avoid embarking on any potential collision course with a particular judge. For example,, a trial judge may be disqualified peremptorily (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6) or upon a showing of prejudice (Code Civ. Proc., § 170).
Once the trial begins, however, every lawyer should be conclusively presumed to know that it is totally improper for him to argue with a judge or to dispute a judge’s ruling in front of the jury.
Once again, very simple avenues are made available to trial counsel to accomplish the bona fide pursuit of any disagreement with the trial judge and/or his rulings. For example, counsel can request an immediate recess or wait for the next normal recess and have the matter heard out of the presence of the jury.
This, of course, assumes that the potential or actual collision course comes about by reason of good faith advocacy by counsel who is seeking to fully protect his client’s best interests.
However, as Mr. Justice Rouse correctly points out, a “very fuzzy area” between proper advocacy and contempt has been created by appellate decisions which have led some attorneys to conclude “that rudeness and discourtesy in the judicial proceeding are accepted methods to be employed by the successful practitioner.” In my view there simply is no room for the existence of any “fuzzy area” when dealing with this fundamentally simple problem.
With the readily available avenues suggested above I cannot find any *641justification for any lawyer—let alone a lawyer such as petitioner who possesses 35 years’ experience—precipitating a dialogue with the court in the presence of the jury which is contemptuous, either in content or demeanor or both. The sole and exclusive responsibility for this must rest upon the lawyer for it is he, and only he, who possesses the power to prevent its occurrence.
Certainly any judge who has sat on the trial court appreciates the awesome potential of the contempt power. It is a matter of common judicial knowledge that this power is exercised very rarely indeed with respect to conduct of lawyers. Any competent judge—and the record here discloses obvious competency on the part of the trial judge—is keenly aware of and able to distinguish between zeal of advocacy and disrespect, i.e., contempt of court. If a judge is unable, or refuses, to make that distinction there are remedies available running all the way from peremptory challenge and appellate reversal to disciplinary action through the Commission on Judicial Qualifications.
The plain fact of the matter is embodied in the age-old American concept that this is, and must remain, a government of laws and not men. The judge is simply the entity placed by government in a position which carries great responsibility and is accordingly entitled to great respect by counsel who are licensed by that same government to practice their profession before the court.
As the majority opinion points out, the American Bar Association has promulgated a compendium of rules or guidelines with respect to conduct of trials. Other interested and distinguished groups have undertaken similar action (see Report and Recommendations On Disruption of The Judicial Process, American College of Trial Lawyers (July 1970)). Articles dealing with the same subject have reached voluminous proportions. All of this effort is academically healthy; but the problem is not nearly as complex as suggested by these observers. On the contrary, in my view, the problem is so fundamentally simple that it should be likened to the forest obscured by the trees.
The entire problem of direct contempt—verbal or conduct—by a lawyer is simply a matter of overtly refusing to accede temporarily to duly constituted authority. The case at bench presents a classic example.
I. Contempt Incident No. 1.
During redirect examination of a defendant the prosecutor objected and the following colloquy took place:
*642“Mr. Grossman: Q. You mentioned Toyon as a surplus government property. Did you actually participate and occupy in Toyon? A. This— Mr. Gallagher: Your Honor, I’m objecting. I don’t know as it’s material for us to go through a litany of—Mr. Grossman: You want to- know about his activities. You are perfectly willing to ask him whether his activities was going around occupying—just one moment, please. The Court: Just a moment, please, Mr. Grossman. Let Mr. Gallagher finish first. Mr. Grossman: I started first. So- I’m entitled to finish. Isn’t that the rule in this court? If I start, I’m entitled to finish. The Court: .Not when an objection is being stated, Mr: Grossman. You know better than that. If you continue to interrupt in such a fashion, not only will your record be so fouled up that it will never be undone, but I will take more firm steps to see that it doesn’t recur. I think I make myself clear, do- I not? Mr. Grossman: I suppose so. The Court: Now, state yo-ur objection-. Mr. Gallagher: I object to this as going into matters that are immaterial. My question that I asked earlier merely called for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ matter, not a detailed report as to his activities in other regards. This courtroom is—I don’t feel that the courtroom is the proper forum for Mr. Hernandez to state bis beliefs in regards to- what’s happened to the Indians in the past. If Mr. Grossman would like him to be able to make a speech, he can find some other place to do it. Mr. Grossman: Very snide kind of legal objection. But now may I reply to it? The Court: You may. Mr. Grossman: The question that he asked was, ‘So- you go around the country occupying.’ All right. Doesn’t he open the question of whether he does go around the country occupying? So I want to ask him about a place that he did occupy. The Court: What has that to do with the issues in this case? Mr. Grossman:Well, then, why did he ask it? I’ve said it before: If he’s willing to open up an irrelevant field, then I’m entitled to redirect or on cross to- go into the same field, unless there’s a different rale for him than for me. The Court: Mr. Gross-man, you know better than that. Mr. Grossman: I don’t know better than that. So don’t say I know better than that. The Court : Mr. Grossman— Mr. Grossman: I say what I believe. Don’t say I know better than that. You’re saying I’m a liar. I’m not a liar, Judge. Don’t say I know better than that. The Court: I cite that as misconduct, Mr. Grossman. Mr. Grossman: What? That I said you call me a liar? The Court: Is misconduct. Your whole line of conduct, Mr. Grossman. I think at this time it might be a good place to- take our afternoon recess. I think counsel and the Court will have some conversation to- engage in which should more properly be done outside the presence of the ladies and gentlemen of the jury. Now, we’ll take our recess at this time until 10:00- o’clock on Monday morning. Once again, while we’re disbanded, once again let me *643remind you of my admonition about discussing the case or forming or expressing any opinions. I expect counsel to remain.”
The order of contempt as to this incident reads: “After having been repeatedly instructed and admonished by the Court to refrain from such activity and comment, [petitioner] continued to argue after the above-mentioned ruling of the Court [that the objection was sustained] had been made and announced.”
In holding that the evidence does not support the finding that petitioner “continued to argue after the above-mentioned ruling of the Court had been made and announced” the majority, I respectfully submit, takes an unnecessarily technical and microscopic position with respect to the fact that the court did not, in effect, say “Objection sustained.”
Although a categorical ruling on the prosecutor’s objection was not made by the court, the only rationally reasonable inference to be drawn from the colloquy is that the objection was, in fact, being sustained by the court. The record shows that both the judge and petitioner understood that the ruling had been made implicitly if not expressly.1
In sustaining the objection the court was clearly acting within its discretion in limiting or prohibiting the attempted line of inquiry. Evidence Code, section 774, which is quoted in the majority opinion, is a codification of the common law rule granting extremely broad discretion to the trial judge in allowing or restricting the scope of redirect examination. Thus, once the court made its position clear, which it did, counsel sho-uld have pressed his argument outside the jury’s presence as suggested above.2 Nothing in In re *644Hallinan (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1179 [81 Cal.Rptr. 1, 459 P.2d 255] suggests to me that the “ ‘right to press legitimate argument and to- protest an erroneous ruling’ ” is an invitation to engage in an argument with the judge before the jury. On the contrary, the Hallinan court, at page 1183, approved its earlier statement in Gallagher v. Municipal Court (1948) 31 Cal.2d 784 [192 P.2d 905]: “ ‘We do not mean to suggest by anything said herein, that it is impossible for an attorney to subject a judge to ridicule and insult by intonations and gestures accompanying words wholly innocuous, or that, in such event, the judge is powerless to protect the dignity of the court.’ ”3
*645If this is a “fuzzy area,” it should be eliminated so that the trial of contested cases, especially jury cases, can be conducted in an atmosphere of dignity and respect.4 Here, the aggravated conduct of petitioner is amply demonstrated by his refusal to heed the judge’s instructions and admonition.
II. Contempt Incident No. 2.
In addition to the reasons advanced by the majority for upholding the order of contempt as to this incident, I believe further comment is appropriate.
The order of contempt as to this incident reads: “In a loud, disorderly, contemptuous, insolent and rude manner and tone of voice, and in the presence of the jury, accused the Court of exercising different standards of judgment in favor of the prosecution and against the defense in determining the admissibility of proffered evidence.”
As pointed out in the majority opinion, the offending words of petitioner were “unless there’s a different rule for him [the prosecutor] than for me.” The majority opinion presents an excellent analysis of In re Little (1972) 404 U.S. 553 [30 L.Ed.2d 708, 92 S.Ct. 659], and its foundation cases. There are, however, two fundamental differences between the situation in Little and the case at bench. These differences, in my view, are of such significance that In re Little is, upon analysis, not germane to our inquiry.
*646The first significant difference is that Little does not involve attorney contempt. To one not trained in the law, application of rules concerning verbalized or conduct contempt should obviously be made with greater hesitancy and less frequency than in the case of an attorney.
The second difference of moment is that in Little the United States Supreme Court suggests that a charge of bias on the part of the judge made in plain English cannot constitute contempt unless; either (a) it was uttered in a loud and boisterous tone or (b) actually disrupted the court proceedings. But the court in Little took pains to point out: “There is no indication, and the State does not argue, that petitioner’s statements, were uttered in a boisterous tone or in, any wise actually disrupted the court proceeding.” In the case at bench, however, the order clearly recites that petitioner did speak in a “loud, disorderly, contemptuous, insolent and rude manner and tone of voice . . . .” Additionally here, as distinguished from Little, there was interruption of the proceedings of the court. As pointed out in the portions of the transcript quoted above, the episode caused the court to recess the case for the purpose of accomplishing further dialogue with counsel out of the presence of the jury. It should, also be observed in passing that the remarks cited as contemptuous in Little came during the closing argument of the defendant appearing in propria persona. Here the remarks came during the testimony of a witness and the proceedings were clearly interrupted thereby.
I must also disagree with the majority’s narrow interpretation of Little that a charge of bias against a judge cannot be the basis, of a contempt charge unless (a) it was uttered in a loud and boisterous tone, or (b) actually disrupted the court proceedings.
For this proposition, the court in Little relied on its earlier decision in Holt v. Virginia (1965) 381 U.S. 131 [14 L.Ed.2d 290, 85 S.Ct. 1375], a case presenting a totally different courtroom situation from that involved in either Little or the case at bench. Holt involved statements contained in a written motion for change of venue read by the litigant’s attorney at a hearing on that motion. No jury was present in Holt; and the attorney was not engaged in a disrespectful dialogue with the court as here.
A word should also be said about the California requirement of a warning in instances of contempt based on tone of voice or manner. (In re Hollinan, supra, 71 Cal.2d 1179.)
The Hallinan rule of warning is limited to “statements of an attorney made in open court the language of which is in itself not insolent, contemptuous or disorderly, . . .” (P. 1181; italics added).
*647Although the words involved in this incident are per se contemptuous and therefore required no warning, the rationale of requiring a warning from the court with respect to an attorney’s statements is, in my opinion, unrealistic. Language which on its face does, not seem to be insolent or contemptuous or disorderly may very well be all of those things in a given context or setting or in the reflection of a background of days, weeks or even months of trial wherein courtroom contact between attorney and judge is a constant environment.
The consternation of trial judges charged with the duty of maintaining order and dignity in the proceedings over which they preside in attempting to draw sophisticated and artificial lines between those incidents which require a precedent warning and those which do not should be understandable by anyone who has experienced this judicially declared dilemma. (See Goff, In re Hallinan: Does It Really Shrink the Contempt Power? (1971) 46 State Bar J. 155.)
A major reason for the warning rule “ ‘is the fundamental interest of the public in maintaining an independent bar. Attorneys must be given a substantial freedom of expression in representing their clients.’ ” (In re Hallinan, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 1183; quoting Gallagher v. Municipal Court, supra, 31 Cal.2d 784; italics added. )
But I submit that there is a deeper fundamental interest of the public in maintaining orderly, dignified, court proceedings; and that inherent in this consideration is the necessary ingredient of expecting attorneys who are privileged to participate in the maintenance of this public trust to live up to their responsibilities without being warned or reminded of them in the fashion of a child. The image of lawyers—bench and bar—is today in such poor position in the public view because the legal profession, charged and entrusted with the resolution of many of society’s greatest problems, fails to display the maturity required to attain a vitally essential goal—its own self-discipline.
It is time for all members of the legal profession to- stand back and take a hard look at ourselves, the positions that we occupy with respect to each other, and most importantly, the fundamental purpose for which courts exist—to serve the public good.
III. Each of the incidents of contempt comes within the purview of Code of Civil Procedure, section 1209, subdivision 3.
Code of Civil Procedure, section 1209, provides in part: “The following acts or omissions in respect to a court of justice, or proceedings therein, *648are contempts of the authority of the court: ... 3. Misbehavior in office, or other wilful neglect or violation of duty by an attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, coroner, or other person, appointed or elected to perform a judicial or ministerial service;” (italics added).
Business and Professions Code, section 6068, provides in pertinent part: “It is the duty of an attorney-. ... (b) To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. ... (f) To abstain from all offensive personality . . . .” (Italics added.)
As to paragraph 1 of the order of contempt, petitioner’s conduct in refusing to accede to the court’s ruling, despite admonition from the court, shows an unequivocal failure to “maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (b)).
As to paragraph 2 of the order of contempt, petitioner’s intimation that the court was biased in favor of the prosecution, which intimation was made “In a loud, disorderly, contemptuous, insolent and rude manner and tone of voice, and in the presence of the jury,” clearly constitutes disrespect of the court and judge, a violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068, subdivision (b), and patently reveals a display of “offensive personality,” a violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068, subdivision (f).
As to paragraph 3 of the order of contempt, the majority correctly holds that it is beyond all doubt that petitioner’s false assertion that the judge had called petitioner a liar is contemptuous per se. At the same time it is, per se, a failure to> maintain respect (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (b)), and an unambiguous display of “offensive personality” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (f)).
In this state there are approximately 800 trial court judges. In the fiscal year July 1, 1970 to June 30, 1971, 7,762 superior court and 12,260 municipal court juries were sworn to try cases.5 In 1969-1970 the totals were about the same. This court can take judicial notice of the fact that the number of citations of attorney contempt is de minimis when compared to the volume of jury cases processed.
It is readily apparent from this brief statistical analysis that the overwhelming majority of lawyers are conducting themselves in the manner required by law and expected by society.
When a lawyer violates his duty, the sanctions of the law should be imposed swiftly. Appellate courts should be scrupulously hesitant to “second-*649guess” the actions of a trial judge who alone is—to use contemporary vernacular jargon—“where the action is.”
If the integrity of our judicial system is to be maintained and if the confidence of the citizenry in it is to be restored, we should broaden, not weaken the authority of the trial courts to control the conduct of those persons—particularly attorneys—who appear there; and the one and only meaningful tool which the law gives to the trial judge to maintain control of lawyers who violate their duty is the power of contempt.
I would affirm the order of contempt in its entirety.
Petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 23, 1972.
That the judge thought he had sustained the objection is demonstrated in the order of contempt itself, viz.: “after the abovementioned ruling of the Court had been made and announced.”
Petitioner’s clear understanding is demonstrated by his own statement made immediately following the episode after the court had excused the jury for the day: “[Mr. Grossman:] But what I was trying to do was to get you to change your ruling on this point, because I felt the ruling on this point proved conclusively this question of whether there is a discriminatory way. . . . Well, your ruling started it; your ruling started it. You can’t forget how it started.” (Italics added.)
It is manifestly clear that petitioner knew that the proper way to pursue his argument was out of the jury’s presence for the record, a portion of which is quoted in footnote l,-ante, shows that petitioner did press his argument forcefully. Many of petitioner’s comments during this argument are themselves disrespectful and display an offensive personality per se. For example: “The Court: The record should note that the ladies and gentlemen of the jury have now cleared the courtroom.
“Mr. Grossman, I’ve cited you for misconduct and taken exception to your remarks and the charges, both implied and explicit, that the Court has different rules for the prosecution than the defense, and the accusation of judicial misconduct. Now, I would expect, first of all, an apology. Is one forthcoming? Mr. Grossman: Well, I would suggest you have the record read back. You did not cite me for misconduct *644for that. You cited me for misconduct because I said that you were calling me a liar, and I’m no liar. And I suggest, before you engage in ruling on whether I’ve committed contempt, you better be sure that the record, which you’re going to have to depend on, says that. Now, I say you cited me for misconduct for that. And you’ve realized since then how off base you were, because the remark you made to me, if I may finish, the remark you made to me was not that ‘you ought to know better,’ but ‘you should know better.’ And I’m smart enough to know you’re calling me a liar before the jury. You’re saying, ‘You know better,’ and I said to you, ‘I don’t know better and you don’t call me a liar.’ Now¡ I’ve got some rights. And you’re prejudicing this jury against me. The Court: I take it that that is not the form of an apology. Mr. Grossman: What do you want an apology for? The Court: Well, then, I need—Mr. Grossman: I say, what do you want an apology for, what statement?" (Italics added.)
Of coincidental interest is the earlier case of Hallinan v. Superior Court (1925) 74 Cal.App. 420 [240 P. 788], which deals with the precise question of the extent of the attorney’s right to argue a matter before the court. In upholding an order of contempt against the attorney for continuing to protest the court’s ruling on an objection, the court made the following observations which are as sound today as they were 46 years ago: “This right to argue a matter before the court, however, is not unlimited. It must be exercised under the direction of the court and within such limits as may be prescribed by the court in the exercise of its discretion to regulate such matters. Otherwise, an attorney might delay and impede the trial of a case far beyond any legitimate limits. Argument of counsel, upon questions arising during the progress of a trial, is addressed solely to the court and its object and purpose is to enable the court to have the benefit of the views of counsel upon the questions under discussion in order that the court may be better advised upon such questions before it is called upon to decide them. The court, rather than the attorneys in the case, must be the judge as to the extent and scope of such argument. This must necessarily be so for two reasons. In the first place, the court is primarily responsible for the prompt and orderly dispatch of business pending before it. To permit attorneys in all cases to decide how often and how long they will argue questions arising during the trial, would mean that the direction and control of litigation would be taken from the court and transferred to counsel in the case, and would often result in the unwarranted consumption of the time of the court to the great detriment not only of the parties to the pending litigation, but also of those whose actions are awaiting trial. In the second place, as the argument of counsel is directed to the court alone, the court is in far better position than counsel to decide when it is sufficiently informed as to the subject under consideration. When the court reaches the point that it feels that it is fully advised as to the question under discussion and ready to- rule upon the same, and, therefore, requires no further enlightenment from counsel, it is surely clothed with adequate power and authority to order the argument at an end, and, *645when necessary, in order to enforce its order, to punish the attorney 'guilty of its infraction. Under such circumstances, the action of counsel, in persisting in arguing a matter to the court, after the court has repeatedly ordered him to desist, amounts to disorderly behavior toward the fudge of the court, which directly tends to interrupt the due course of the trial and is also disobedience of the lawful order of the court. Such acts are defined as contempt by the provisions of section 1209 of the Code of Civil Procedure." (Pp. 425-426; italics added.)
This is not a novel proposition at all. It was recognized and imprinted upon the law of this state in 1930 in the case of In re Grossman, 109 Cal.App. 625 [293 P. 683], where the court clearly points out that zeal of advocacy must yield to the dignity and authority of the court: “ ‘Attorneys at the bar are properly termed the “court’s constituency", to aid it in the due administration of justice. Each one is required to take an oath that he will honestly and faithfully discharge his duties as such attorney, and one of the cardinal duties enjoined upon him by law is to maintain the respect that is due to the court of justice and judicial officers. ... In the determination of the question as to whether a contempt has been committed, it does not depend upon the intention of the offending party, but upon the act he has done. A disclaimer of intentional disrespect or design to embarrass the administration- of justice is no excuse for the person charged with the offense, when the contrary appears, from a fair interpretation of the language used. ... It is the imperative duty of an attorney to respectfully yield to the rulings and decisions of the court, whether right or wrong, reserving the rights of his client by proper and necessary exceptions thereto. A remedy for the correction of the court’s errors, if any, is fully provided by law.’ ” (P. 631; italics added.)
Annual Report of The Administrative Office of the California Courts (Jan. 1972).