*743OPINION
BAILEY, Judge.Case Summary
Appellant-Defendant T.L. Brandon Hol-lar challenges his sentence, claiming it is inappropriate. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On May 7, 2009, at the initial hearing on the charge, Hollar, pro se, entered a plea of guilty to Nonsupport of a Dependent Child, as a Class D felony.1 After the sentencing hearing, the trial court found aggravators of Hollar's eriminal history and numerous probation revocations and one mitigator of his guilty plea. The trial court concluded that the aggravators outweighed the mitigators and sentenced Hol-lar to three years imprisonment with two years suspended to probation.
Discussion and Decision
On appeal, Hollar contends that his three-year sentence consisting of one year imprisonment and two years suspended to probation is an inappropriate sentence. He requests that we review and revise his sentence. In Reid v. State, our supreme court reviewed the standard by which appellate courts independently review criminal sentences:
Although a trial court may have acted within its lawful discretion in determining a sentence, Article VII, Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize independent appellate review and revision of a sentence through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that a court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The burden is on the defendant to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate.
Reid v. State, 876 N.E.2d 1114, 1116 (Ind.2007) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
More recently, the court reiterated that "sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference." Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind.2008). Indiana's flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate sentence to the circumstances presented. See id. at 1224. One purpose of appellate review is to attempt to "leaven the outliers." Id. at 1225. "[ Whether we regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case." Id. at 1224.
In addition to the flexibility of selecting a sentence within a range to fit the circumstances of each case, a trial court generally, unless prohibited by statute, has the option of suspending a portion or the entire sentence to probation. Here, the trial court exercised its discretion to suspend a portion of Hollar's sentence. Hol-lar was convicted of a Class D felony, which has a sentencing range of six months to three years, with one and one half years as the advisory. See Ind.Code § 35-50-2-7. The trial court sentenced Hollar to the term of three years and suspended two years to probation.
Hollar argues that he received the maximum sentence despite two years being suspended to probation. The State disagrees, citing Jenkins v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1080 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied. The Jenkins court noted a split of *744opinion on this Court as to whether a fully executed sentence is equivalent to a sentence of equal length with part suspended to probation. Id. at 1084. While acknowledging that probation can be revoked,2 the court concluded that, in analyzing whether a sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), anything less than a fully executed sentence of the maximum length does not constitute a maximum sentence. Id. at 1085-86.
There is a "continuum of possible punishments" that essentially ranges in severity based on the degree to which the punishment impinges on a defendant's liberty. See Kopkey v. State, 743 N.E.2d 331, 337 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) ("On the 'continuum of possible punishments' mentioned by Griffin, in-home detention lies somewhere between incarceration and probation[.]" (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 975, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987))), trans. denied; United States v. Cardona, 903 F.2d 60, 63 (1st Cir.1990) ("On the Court's continuum of possible punishments, parole is stronger medicine; ergo, parolees enjoy even less of the average citizen's absolute liberty than do probationers." (citations and quotations omitted)). The consideration and imposition of alternatives 3 to incarceration is a "matter of grace" left to the discretion of the trial court. Wolf v. State, 793 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). As stated by the Jenkins court, this extension of grace or privilege by a trial court results in a sentence that is not equivalent to the restriction placed on one's liberties imposed by a fully executed sentence.
In light of this spectrum and its varying degrees of restraint on the liberty and freedom of a defendant, we look to whether the sentence is composed of executed imprisonment time, in whole or in part, or includes any alternatives to incarceration when performing 7(B) analysis. Here, Hollar was ordered to serve one year of imprisonment and two years of supervised probation. With credit time,4 Hollar could serve as little as six months in prison. With that in mind, we turn to our analysis under Appellate Rule 7(B).
As to the nature of the crime, Hollar failed to pay child support from August 1, 2008, to April 30, 2009. Hollar was laid off during the summer of 2008 and received unemployment checks thereafter. While unemployed, he worked for his father at P & T Farms in exchange for his father paying some of Hollar's financial obligations.
As to the character of the offender, Hol-lar has a lengthy criminal history, which includes convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated, public intoxication, theft *745and criminal mischief,. Hollar was placed on probation five times but only successfully completed two of the probation placements. Hollar pled guilty to the current conviction at the initial hearing on the charge. He did so without the benefit of a plea agreement.
Based on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, Hollar has not persuaded us that his sentence of one year imprisonment and two years of probation is inappropriate.
Affirmed.
BRADFORD, J., concurs. VAIDIK, J., concurs in result with opinion.. Ind.Code § 35-46-1-5.
. We also agree with the Jenkins court that, while the revocation of probation due to a violation can result in the execution of the suspended portion of the sentence, such reinstitution of part or the entire suspended sentence rests on the voluntary choices of the defendant. "[A) defendant can ensure that it will never become reality simply by abiding by the terms of his probation" Jenkins v. State, 909 N.E.2d 1080, 1085 (Ind.Ct.App.2009), trans. denied.
. There can even be a subspectrum of the level of restriction on one's liberty within the choice of a particular alternative punishment. As to probation, our supreme court noted that judicial practice in Indiana has been to authorize creative sentences for probation in order to obtain the most efficient sentences possible. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 187 (Ind.2007). It also pointed out, as evidenced in the action of the legislature clarifying the probation statute, "the legislative message of recent decades has been to encourage judicial flexibility." Id.
. See Ind.Code § 35-50-6-3(a) (noting that a person imprisoned for a crime or confined awaiting trial or sentencing earns one day of credit for each day of imprisonment when assigned to Class I).