I respectfully dissent. I would dismiss the purported appeal because the minute order sustaining demurrer is a nonappealable order, and I would decline to to make this order reviewable by mandamus. Further, I agree with the ruling of the trial court sustaining the demurrer for Mounger’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and would deny relief.
I
Dismissal of Appeal
Plaintiffs appeal from minute order sustaining demurrer of all named City defendants to counts 1 through 5 of the second amended complaint. The minute order is nonappealable. Only a judgment of dismissal entered on order sustaining demurrer is appealable (Taylor v. State Personnel Bd. (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 498, 501, fn. 1 [161 Cal.Rptr. 677]); no such judgment was entered in the instant case, and for good reason. The minute order disposed of only five counts of a nine-count complaint of which four counts against the demurring defendants are still pending in the trial court. The court’s ruling only could be and properly was embodied in a minute order pending final judgment in the action. Any judgment entered on such an order would not be a final judgment appeal from which would be prema*1261ture. (U.S. Financial v. Sullivan (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 5, 11 [112 Cal.Rptr. 18]; McMillin v. Ventura Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 588, 589 [93 Cal.Rptr. 359].) There can be but one judgment in an action. (Vasquez v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 800, 806 [94 Cal.Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964, 53 A.L.R.3d 513]; Bank of America v. Superior Court (1942) 20 Cal.2d 697, 701 [128 P.2d 357]; Mather v. Mather (1936) 5 Cal.2d 617, 618 [55 P.2d 1174]; De Vally v. Kendall de Vally O. Co., Ltd. (1934) 220 Cal. 742, 745 [32 P.2d 638].) Thus, I agree with the majority that to accept appellate jurisdiction in this proceeding is to do violence to the one judgment rule which precludes piecemeal disposition and immediate appellate consideration of rulings prior to the final adjudication of the entire cause. However, I cannot agree, under the circumstances here, that we should salvage this defective appeal by treating it as a proceeding for writ of mandate.
Many authorities view this innovation as a readily available method of assuming review jurisdiction, and uphold this court’s power to exercise its discretion to make nonappealable orders reviewable by mandamus (Schultz v. Regents of University of California (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 768, 788 [206 Cal.Rptr. 910]; Branham v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 27, 32 [121 Cal.Rptr. 304]; Clovis Ready Mix Co. v. Aetna Freight Lines (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 276, 282 [101 Cal.Rptr. 820]), but they all agree that we should not exercise that power except in “unusual circumstances.” (Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401 [197 Cal.Rptr. 843, 673 P.2d 720]; U.S. Financial v. Sullivan, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 5, 12). As stated in U.S. Financial, to justify such treatment, circumstances should be shown “compelling enough to indicate the propriety of a petition for writ of mandate in the first instance. . . .” (P. 12.) Otherwise, this practice would obliterate the one final judgment rule.
I perceive here no showing of unusual circumstances and, on the state of the record, this court should decline to assume jurisdiction by invoking the extraordinary writ process. (DeGrandchamp v. Texaco, Inc. (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 424, 437 [160 Cal.Rptr. 899].) The majority rationalizes its justification for an immediate appellate resolution of the issue raised by the trial court’s ruling by construing it as presenting “a question of public importance,” citing Estate of Hearst (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 777, 781 [136 Cal.Rptr. 821], which involved public access to certain court records. Both parties have briefed the issue and it is true, as asserted by the majority, that “respondent did not challenge [the] appealability” of the minute order involved. But that is a fact that troubles me. Respondents may or may not have weighed the question of appealability but, having found the appeal to be premature, we have no way of knowing their views concerning use of mandamus in these circumstances. Nor do I believe the issue here to be of such “public importance” as to warrant immediate appellate consideration *1262of the trial court’s ruling prior to final adjudication of the entire cause. Further, this is not a situation in which there is no adequate remedy by appeal. When the remaining counts are disposed of by the trial court and a final judgment entered in the case, all issues can then be resolved on appeal.
The second amended complaint contains nine counts each of which rests on facts “common to all,” names virtually all demurring defendants and arises out of the same series of administrative hearings. I find nothing in the circumstances here justifying, let alone compelling, the resolution of the issue by way of mandamus. Employment of the writ process in appeals such as this, absent a showing of extraordinary grounds for the issuance of the writ of mandate, should be discouraged as countenancing appellate review of nonappealable orders resulting in piecemeal disposition of causes and fostering shoddy appellate practice.
II
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires a party to use all available administrative procedures before resorting to the courts for relief. (McHugh v. County of Santa Cruz (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 533, 538 [109 Cal.Rptr. 149].) The exhaustion of administrative remedies requires not merely the initiation of prescribed administrative procedures, but also requires pursuing them to their appropriate conclusion and awaiting their final outcome before seeking judicial intervention. (Wilkinson v. Norcal Mutual Ins. Co. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 307, 313-314 [159 Cal.Rptr. 416].) The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is a jurisdictional defect which bars court action. (Miller v. United Airlines, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 878, 890 [220 Cal.Rptr. 684]; Barnes v. State Bd. of Equalization (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 994, 1001 [173 Cal.Rptr. 742].)
While it is true that plaintiff did not allege Mounger had exhausted his administrative remedies and the face of the complaint does not show that he had, it cannot be denied by appellants that he did not. In oral argument on hearing on the demurrer, appellants conceded, as recited by the trial court in its minute order, “that there was an official reprimand with a grievance procedure to follow”; thus, the court found, “counts 1-5 must await administrative remedies being exhausted” and “Insofar as [Government Code section 3303 et seq.] may prevent injunctive relief to proceed without embarking on the administrative route has been waived, demurrer to 1st through 5th counts are [vie] sustained without leave.” The purpose of section 3309.5, Government Code, well may be, as asserted in the majority opinion, “to allow immediate judicial relief for police officers instead of *1263requiring them to ‘exhaust lengthy administrative procedures,’ ” but in my view, the statute does not in all instances change the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the police officer in no manner engaged in the administrative procedure to obtain redress for alleged violations of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (§ 3300 et seq., Gov. Code) and, without pursuing any administrative remedy, sought injunctive relief from the courts in the first instance, i.e., initially, I might agree that under section 3309.5, the superior court would have “initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought” for the alleged violations. However, this is not our case. Mounger did not “initially” seek injunctive relief for the alleged violations. He was the subject of an administrative investigation and hearing, during which Mounger claims the violations occurred, which led to administrative discipline; in fact, he admitted that the administrative hearing resulted in an official reprimand and there was a grievance procedure to follow. Mounger did not seek injunctive relief until after the official reprimand. Section 3309.5 may or may not authorize a police officer to bypass administrative procedures altogether and initially apply to the court for relief, but it is my view that once an officer elects to pursue his administrative remedies, he must see that process through to its conclusion before seeking judicial relief under section 3309.5. He may not, as Mounger attempts to do, cut short the administrative proceedings by filing an action pursuant to section 3309.5 before those proceedings have terminated.
Legislative enactments should not be construed to overthrow long-established principles of law unless such a intention is clearly made to appear either by express declaration or by necessary implication. (Tos v. Mayfair Packing Co. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 67, 77 [206 Cal.Rptr. 459].) “Unless expressly provided, statutes should not be interpreted to alter the common law, and should be construed so as to avoid conflict with common law rules. [Citations.] A statute will be construed in light of common law decisions, unless its language “‘clearly and unequivocally discloses an intention to depart from, alter, or abrogate the common-law rule concerning a particular subject matter.. . .” [Citations.]’ [Citation.] There is a presumption that a statute does not, by implication, repeal the common law. [Citation.] Repeal by implication is recognized only where there is no rational basis for harmonizing two potentially conflicting laws.” (People v. Zikorus (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 324, 330 [197 Cal.Rptr. 509].) The language of section 3309.5 does not expressly abrogate the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The apparent conflict between the statute’s grant of initial jurisdiction to the superior court on the one hand, and the common law requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies on the other, may be reconciled by construing the statute to mean that a court has exclusive initial jurisdiction over disputes arising under Government Code section 3300 et seq. only when a police officer applies directly to the court for relief *1264without first having initiated administrative proceedings for the resolution of such disputes.
Petitions for a rehearing were denied August 28, 1987, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above.The majority opinion concludes that, in any event, Mounger’s failure to exhaust available administrative remedies does not bar the present action because his administrative remedy is inadequate in that “the administrative appeal Mounger elected to pursue was from the discipline imposed” whereas in this action he seeks redress for the “violation of his procedural rights during the interrogation.” This is not a valid consideration in determining the applicability of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. “Even where the administrative remedy may not resolve all issues or provide the precise relief requested by a plaintiff, the exhaustion doctrine is still viewed with favor ‘because it facilitates the development of a complete record that draws on administrative expertise and promotes judicial efficiency.’ [Citation.] It can serve as a preliminary administrative sifting process [citation], unearthing the relevant evidence and providing a record which the court may review.” (Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1232, 1240 [230 Cal.Rptr. 382].)
Lillie, P. J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.