I dissent. The majority opinion holds that the law in question imposed the first “lieu tax” in the year 1962, and that therefore the personal property of the plaintiff savings and loan association was not exempt from taxation for the year 1961. The opinion completely ignores the fact that this statute imposes an annual tax upon savings and loan associations for the privilege of transacting business within the State during any part of the tax year, “commencing January 1, 1961.” The tax is measured by the net income of the association for the “preceding calendar year,” the levy being four per cent of the net income, with a minimum tax of fifty dollars. This tax is in lieu of all other State, county, and local taxes, except taxes upon the real property of an association. It is therefore in lieu of its personal property taxes.
It is impossible for me to read this statute without concluding that it levied a tax on such association for the privilege of doing business from and after July 1, 1961. Thus the provisions of the Act became effective and applicable to business done by such association for the last half of 1961. It requires that the tax for that period be measured by the net income of the association as determined from a report filed with the Tax Commissioner before March 1, 1962. The year 1961 is the “preceding calendar year” mentioned in the statute. The amount of the tax is determined by four per cent of the 1961 income, with a minimum tax of fifty dollars. That is the proper tax due from the plaintiff for 1961 for the privilege of doing business during that year. And, under the provisions of this Act, this tax is in lieu of personal property taxes for that period.
By holding that the first “lieu tax” imposed is in the year 1962, the majority members of the court are closing their eyes to the clear language of the statute, and are imposing a personal property tax for 1961 contrary to the clear language of this law. Personal property of savings and loan associations was specifically exempted from taxation from and after July 1, 1961. On that date, no personal property taxes had been levied for 1961. Personal property taxes for 1961 had not become a lien on the property of the owners. The Act contains no provision delaying its effective date or allowing levying of personal property taxes after its effective date. After the exemption became effective, no lien or liability could be perfected. This was the clear intent of the legislative enactment, and to hold, as does the majority, that this law did not become effective until 1962 is contrary to the legislative intent and contrary to Section 67 of the North Dakota Constitution which provides that all Acts of the Legislature shall take effect on July 1 following the close of the legislative session at which they were enacted unless the Legislature, by a two-thirds vote, declares an Act to be an emergency measure.
For reasons stated herein, I would reverse the judgment of the district court.