(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion which holds as a matter of law that failure of the plaintiff Schmidts to take such means as were available to them to protect their property was a “substantial factor” and, therefore, a cause of the collapse of the building.
The jury found that the Schmidts failed to take such means as were available to them to protect their property but found that such neglect was not a cause of the collapse.
Clearly our function on review is to search the record for credible evidence or reasonable inferences therefrom that will sustain the verdict. If the jury had found that plaintiffs’ failure was a cause I would not complain. However, from my review of the facts in the record before us, I conclude there is a credible basis for the jury’s finding of no cause.
*28It appears without dispute that Caroline. Perssion and not Dr. Chapman owned the intervening six-foot strip, so that in reality the Schmidts and Dr. Chapman were not adjoining owners, and that Chapman was a trespasser on the land of Perssion. It further appears that after the preliminary excavation in August, and the written notice in September, the Schmidts contacted Mr. Perssion and that he confirmed his wife owned the six-foot strip and that no permission had been given to Chapman or anyone to excavate the intervening strip.
The jury could find from disputed testimony that Perssion immediately thereafter notified Chapman of the ownership of the property and that Chapman had no right to excavate it. Perssion then told the Schmidts of the substance of his ■conversation with Chapman.
After the preliminary excavation, a four by four by six-foot portion was left adjacent’ to the Schmidt building. Although the foundation of the building was partially exposed, it remained erect and undamaged by virtue of the lateral support furnished by this triangular remaining portion of the intervening strip. This condition remained without change until the final excavation of this remaining portion of the intervening strip in December. After Perssion talked to Chapman in September no additional notice, written, oral, or constructive, was given by or on behalf of Chapman to the Schmidts of additional excavation.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, as we are required to do, the jury could find from the credible evidence and reasonable inferences that the Schmidts as reasonable persons could conclude the intervening strip (after the preliminary excavation) was sufficient to support the building, that Perssion owned the strip and had not consented to its removal, and that Chapman had been so informed. From these factual conclusions the jury could *29and did find that the Schmidts failed in their duty in not advising Chapman that Perssion owned the strip but that such failure was hot causal because Chapman already knew of these facts by virtue of his conversation with Perssion.
I conclude that there is sufficient credible evidence in the record to sustain the verdict. It is significant that the verdict had the approval of the trial court. I would affirm.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Fairchild and Mr. Justice Hallows join in this dissent.