— I dissent.
The two questions stated in the first paragraph of the majority opinion should be answered in the negative.
I. The trial court in the contested divorce case chose to treat division of property separate from allowance of support in the form of periodic payments of alimony. Having done- so the decree established the right of support tó be essentially the same as prior to divorce. The amount available to the wife both before and after the decree was determined by the husband’s earnings and subject to modification (section 598.14).
Ordinarily a decree of divorce settles all the property rights and interests of the parties in the property of each other. Carr v. Carr, 185 Iowa 1205, 171 N.W. 785; Kraft v. Kraft, 193 Iowa 602, 187 N.W. 449; Fitch v. Fitch, 229 Iowa 349, 294 N.W. 577. The decree here gave the property to the wife. Now she contends the husband’s property acquired apparently after the divorce is subject as of the time of his death to the alimony payments.
- The unreasonableness of her 'contention is shown by this statement at page 749, 17 Am. Jur., Divorce and Separation, section 694: “Strictly considered, alimony awarded in conjunc*10tion with a final decree of divorce is essentially of the same character as the right of support which the wife loses by the dissolution of the marriage. It is difficult, therefore, to see why the rights of the divorced wife should be greater than those which she would have enjoyed had she not been divorced. Moreover, there is a practical objection to considering the decree of alimony as surviving the demise of the husband where his income upon which the award of alimony was based was derived from professional or business exertions.”
I would hold the trial court, after making a separate property division, had no power without the husband’s consent to require payments of alimony to continue after his death. By the decree she was awarded and accepted the real and personal estate of her husband. Her interest in his estate was thereby exhausted. The trial court was without authority to impose a charge upon his estate after his death. Any such attempt is unjust to other claimants of his property. See annotation, 39 A. L. R.2d 1406 to 1409.
II. I do not believe the trial court. intended the alimony payments should continue after the husband’s death.
The decree should be construed in accordance with its evident intention. The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the decree. Effect is to be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed. Whittier v. Whittier, 237 Iowa 655, 662, 23 N.W.2d 435, 440; In re Estate of Yoss, 237 Iowa 1092, 1096, 24 N.W.2d 399, 401; Mullen v. Mullen, 246 Iowa 1255, 1262, 69 N.W.2d 420, 424; Carrell v. Carrell, 250 Iowa 983, 984, 96 N.W.2d 315, 316. See also annotations in 39 A. L. R.2d 1412.
In the last three cited cases we consider the question of whether alimony payments were intended to continue after the husband’s death. In each we avoid deciding whether the trial court has power to make such an order in the absence of a stipulation or agreement of the parties.
In Mullen and also Carrell we recognize the general principles involved and quote from In re Estate of Yoss, 237 Iowa 1092, 1094, 24 N.W.2d 399, 400, as follows:
“It is undoubtedly the general rule that periodic payments *11of alimony to a divorced wife terminate, or at least are presumed to terminate, upon tbe husband’s death, in the absence of a provision in the decree which requires the payments to continue after such death. 17 Am. Jur. 473, section 608; 27 C. J. S. 998, 999, section 240b; 2 Schouler on Marriage, Divorce, Separation and Domestic Relations, Sixth Ed., 1995, section 1833; Annotations 18 A. L. R. 1040, 1045, 101 A. L. R. 323, 324. There is some authority that a court has no power without the husband’s consent to require payments of alimony to continue after his death. Ibid. In general, the reason for the above general rule is that an allowance of alimony is a substitute for the right of marital support and since such right of support terminates upon the husband’s death, periodic payments of alimony should also terminate with the husband’s death.”
In Yoss the payments were provided “during the life of the wife” and the decree adopted the stipulation of the parties containing such provision. We affirmed the trial court’s order'allowing the wife’s claim. In Mullen the decree incorporated the parties’ stipulation requiring payments “so long as the plaintiff shall live, the sum of $500 per month, subject, however, to conditions as hereinafter set out in this decree”. We held there was no intention on the part of the court or the parties to hold the husband’s estate liable for payments falling due after his death. In Carrell the decree required decedent to pay the wife, “the sum of $160 per month as long as defendant remains unmarried”. She remained unmarried at the time of his death. We held the provision did not show an intent of the court to depart from the general rule. Her claim was denied.
Here, it is interesting to note the provision the monthly payments were to “continue during the lifetime of the plaintiff and while she remains unmarried” is not found in the record prior to the decree. No reason for such a provision is indicated by any finding or conclusion of the court.
The provision is only a statement of the law. Of course she would not be entitled to support if she married another and certainly payments would stop at her death. That is all the trial court intended to say. The experienced trial court knew the general rule the periodic payments of alimony terminate upon *12tbe husband’s death. If the trial court did not intend to have the general rule apply he could have clearly so stated.
I would reverse.
ThorNTON and Stuart, JJ., join in this dissent.