dissenting.
I read Indiana's Trial Rules 17(B) and 17(E) as mandating that unincorporated associations, be they religious or otherwise, may now be sued as any other person or legal entity, and that a judgment may be taken against such unincorporated associations. If the Calvary Baptist Church in this case is the common name of an unincorporated religious association, it is subject to a civil suit and will be bound by a judgment against it in that name as in the case of natural persons and corporations. This of course does not answer the questions of who may sue the church and what for.
The definition of the tort duty of a church to its members and the duty of one member to another member should be profoundly effected by the manner in which they have chosen to structure their relationships. The legal obligations of a church operating as a not-for-profit corporation to its members would ordinarily be governed by the Indiana Not-For-Profit Corporation Act of 1971, and the charter of the corporation. The legal obligations of a church operating as a voluntary association for religious purposes to its members would be governed by I.C. 23-10-2-1 to -22, and the constitution and by-laws of the association. If a charter or set of by-laws can reasonably be construed to mean that by taking up membership in an association, a person consents to assuming the risk of tortious injury through the conduct of fellow members or employees of the association, when engaged in association activities, then a suit by a member against the association or a fellow member should be foreclosed. In the absence of such a provision, I do not believe that mere membership can reasonably be regarded as constituting such a consent or waiver of right. Under my view of this case, the grant of summary judgment by the trial court should be set aside and the case remanded for further consistent proceedings.