(concurring). I concur with the court’s conclusion that the terms of the insurance policy require subrogation. I write separately to emphasize certain factors that the trial judge may consider regarding multiple damages and attorney’s fees.
The court has left open on remand the issue of multiple damages, because the judge’s award of treble damages may have been based on Allstate’s assertion of its subrogation rights. I do not agree. As I read the judge’s findings and conclusions, the award of treble damages was based on the character of Allstate’s violation of c. 93A, and not on its assertion of subrogation rights. The judge found that Allstate had several alternative methods available to protect its rights in the subrogation dispute, including the plaintiff’s offer to place the contested proceeds in escrow pending a judicial decision. Nevertheless, the judge found that Allstate chose “to withhold payment of its legal obligation,” and attempted “to force [the] plaintiff to accept Allstate’s interpretation of the contract and the law.” The dispute continued over a two and one-half to three-year period, and the judge found that Allstate, during this period, “[m]aintain[ed] its position of withholding payment of an acknowledged liability of $35,000 to a seriously injured and incapacitated plaintiff when its right to subrogation could have *375been more than adequately protected by other means . . . .” The judge’s findings and award of treble damages indicate “that the trial judge made a determination that [Allstate] acted ‘wilfully’ or ‘knowingly’ ” in violation of c. 93A. See Service Publications, Inc. v. Goverman, 396 Mass. 567, 578 n.13 (1986). Our resolution of the dispute in Allstate’s favor does not alter the character of Allstate’s violation of c. 93A.
As regards the assessment of attorney’s fees, the court correctly notes that the judge should consider the amount of the over-all recovery. However, this is only one factor. “[T]he judge on remand should consider the nature of the case and the issues presented, the time and labor required, the amount of damages involved, the result obtained, the experience, reputation and ability of the attorney, the usual price charged for similar services by other attorneys in the same area, and the amount of awards in similar cases.” Linthicum v. Archambault, 379 Mass. 381, 388-389 (1979). “The amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees under c. 93A is within the broad discretion of the trial judge,” DiMarzo v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85, 106 (1983), and will be upheld absent an abuse of such discretion. See id. As I read today’s opinion, there is no suggestion that the award for the trial proceedings in any way constituted an abuse of discretion. The judge merely is directed to reconsider the award in light of the court’s opinion.