I concur in the judgment.
One on a work furlough program is guilty of escape if he willfully fails to return to jail at the specified time. (Pen. Code, § 4532, subd. (a).) Here, petitioner’s failure to return was hardly wilful, since it resulted only from his arrest on suspicion of an offense of which admittedly he was not guilty.
Of course, the rule governing such furlough prisoners is not so restrictive as to prevent a finding of escape earlier than the moment of the scheduled return. For example, a work furlough man found at an airport boarding an outbound plane could well be guilty of escape. But no facts tending to show escape are presented here. Far from indicating “willful failure ... to return to the place of confinement” (Pen. Code, § 4532, subd. (a)), the evidence here shows only an offense at the opposite end of the chronological scale—a failure to report to his place of employment. Thus he has violated the “conditions laid down for . . . employment” (Pen. Code, § 1208, subd. (g)). The pénalty for such violation is but administrative—“the work furlough administrator may order the balance of the prisoner’s sentence to be spent in actual confinement.”
This evidence has been thrice presented to a magistrate at preliminary hearing. The first two held it insufficient to support a holding order. The prosecution has shown a tenacity worthy of a much more serious offense, but the case must end sometime, and this seems an appropriate date.