dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. During the cross-examination of Shaffer, the deputy prosecutor deliberately destroyed any chance Shaffer may have had to receive a fair trial by *10gouging his defense with the following evi-dentiary harpoon:
Now, isn’t it a fact that your own daughter, [name], did not want to be left alone with you?
The majority incorrectly characterizes this question by stating that the deputy prosecutor merely “implied that Shaffer’s daughter was afraid to be alone with him.” (Op. p. 6). The statement, “[n]ow, isn’t it a fact,” designates much more than an implication. It constitutes a representation that the prosecutor had special knowledge of “a fact” that Shaffer would want to keep from the jury. In the context of Shaffer’s prosecution for the molestation of young girls, the statement was obviously and deliberately calculated to imply that Shaffer had molested his own daughter and, thus, was predisposed to molest the alleged victims. This is a clear case of prosecutorial misconduct which was purposefully perpetrated to strip a criminal defendant of the presumption of innocence and deny him his right to a fair trial.
Under these circumstances, Shaffer is entitled to a new trial under either the fundamental error doctrine or his claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel. The injection of evidence of uncharged misconduct strips the defendant of the presumption of innocence, stigmatizes the defendant, and predisposes the jury to find him guilty. Thompson v. State, 612 N.E.2d 1094, 1097-98 n. 6 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. denied. An evidentiary harpoon occurs when the prosecution places inadmissible evidence before the jury for the deliberate purpose of prejudicing the jury against the defendant and his defense. Evans v. State, 643 N.E.2d 877, 879 (Ind.1994). The injection of an evidentiary harpoon by a prosecutor can constitute pros-ecutorial misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error. Stowers v. State, 657 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied (citing, White v. State, 257 Ind. 64, 272 N.E.2d 312 (1971)). The failure of defense counsel to request that the jury be admonished regarding prosecutorial misconduct can constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel requiring retrial. Tucker v. State, 646 N.E.2d 972, 977 (Ind.Ct.App.1995).
The majority’s conclusion that any error in the prosecutor’s statement was cured by the trial court’s instruction of the jury is erroneous as contravening controlling Indiana supreme court precedent governing “prosecuto-rial misconduct” cases. See Maldonado v. State, 265 Ind. 492, 355 N.E.2d 843, 848 (1976); White, 272 N.E.2d 312. In White, our supreme court held that where inappropriate evidence was deliberately injected for the sole purpose of prejudicing the jury against the defendant, the need for appellate intervention becomes more compelling than would be under ordinary circumstances. 272 N.E.2d at 319. Accordingly, in order to obtain reversal in a “prosecutorial misconduct” case, the defendant need only show that he was subjected to grave peril to which he should not have been subjected. Maldonado, 355 N.E.2d at 848 (Expressly recognizing the White “grave peril” standard for cases of prosecutorial misconduct); Garcia v. State, 509 N.E.2d 888, 890 (Ind.Ct.App.1987). Thus, under the White “grave peril” standard, the giving of an admonishment or curative instruction is irrelevant, and will not cure an evidentiary harpoon deliberately inserted by the prosecution to prejudice the defendant. Pillow v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1301, 1306 (Ind.1985); White, 272 N.E.2d at 319. See also United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246, 250 (7th Cir.1972) (Improper questions were so prejudicial that damage could not be removed by jury instruction and constituted “plain error” operating to deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial). Under the present circumstances, Shaffer is entitled to a new trial under the White “grave peril” standard as well as fundamental principles of due process.
Frankly, I am “taken aback” by the majority’s holding that any error resulting from the prosecutor’s statement was harmless. First of all, under the White “grave peril” standard, the defendant need not show that the outcome of his trial would have been different but for the harpooning, Garcia, 509 N.E.2d at 890, as the majority would appear to require on page 8 of the slip opinion. More importantly, the evidence against Shaffer cannot be appropriately characterized as overwhelming; the case was essentially a swearing contest between Shaffer and the *11victims. Thus, the deliberate injection of the evidentiary harpoon which stripped Shaffer of the presumption of innocence undermined any chance he had of receiving a fair trial.
Moreover, as noted in the majority opinion, Shaffer’s conviction was obtained through the use of a substantial amount of expert “child sexual abuse syndrome” evidence which has since been condemned by our supreme court because it also unjustly strips away “the presumption of innocence in a criminal case.” Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind.1995). In Buzzard v. State, 669 N.E.2d 996 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), we recently reversed five child molesting convictions due to the introduction of expert testimony that the defendant fit the profile of a pedophile. Id. at 999-1000. We noted that the defendant’s failure to object to the testimony in a timely manner had not subjected the error to waiver due to his claim that he had received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 999.
Regardless of whether the use of improper, expert character evidence in the present case constitutes reversible error in and of itself, its use against Shaffer in the State’s case-in-chief elevated the gravity of peril to which Shaffer was later subjected from the injection of the evidentiary harpoon and further serves to undermine any confidence that Shaffer received a fair trial as required by fundamental principles of due process. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 491, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 1937-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 468 (1978) (Where the presumption of innocence in favor of the defendant has been compromised by deficiencies in the trial proceedings, reversal and retrial are constitutionally mandated).
Indiana supreme court precedent, as well as fundamental principles of due process guaranteed by the United States and Indiana constitutions, mandate that Shaffer receive a new trial. Therefore, I dissent.