I dissent.
The question is whether an informal agreement between real parties and the insurance carrier of petitioner (referred to in the April 26, 1977, letter of petitioner’s insurance carrier), giving petitioner “an open extension of time with 10 days written notice to answer, demur or otherwise plead to the Summons and Complaint,” brought into effect one of the exceptions to the general rule of dismissal of Code of Civil Procedure section 581a, subdivision (a).
One of these exceptions is where the defendant has made a general appearance. In Woodruff v. McDonald’s Restaurants (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 655 [142 Cal.Rptr. 367], a judgment of dismissal pursuant to section 581a, subdivision (a), was affirmed, the court holding that a written stipulation extending time in which to plead constitutes a general appearance only where the stipulation was entered into between attorneys. The contrary rule, preferred by the majority, does not seem so clearly correct as to justify creating a conflict of decisions.
Another exception may arise under the doctrine of estoppel. In regard to estoppel the Woodruff court stated, in footnote 2 of the opinion, as follows: “. .. plaintiff raises the argument that the doctrine of estoppel should be applied because the insurance company’s letter induced plaintiff to overlook return of the summons.... Plaintiff was represented by an attorney who must be presumed to know that section 581a required him to return the summons within the three-year period, . . . The attorney’s failure to file the requisite proof of service was caused by his mistaken belief that the stipulation extending time constituted a general appearance, and the conduct of the insurance company in no way lulled plaintiff into a false sense of security.” (75 Cal.App.3d at p. 658; also see Owen v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1977) 68 *806Cal.App.3d 566 [137 Cal.Rptr. 378].) Again, I am unwilling to create a conflict with prior decisions.
There are no additional facts in the present case which might be taken as giving rise to an estoppel. Since the April 26, 1977, letter of petitioner’s insurance carrier was not a general appearance in the action and did not estop petitioner to take advantage of the statute, petitioner’s motion to dismiss pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 581a, subdivision (a), should have been granted.
I would issue a writ accordingly.
A petition for a rehearing was denied May 12, 1978. Christian, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted. Petitioner’s application for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 22, 1978. Clark, J., Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., were of the opinion that the application should be granted.