concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's determination that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Michael Cancel's untimely motion to bifurcate Francisco Gutierrez's "liability" claim against Cancel and his "bad faith" and "breach of contract" allegations against State Farm. I likewise disagree with the majority's decision to remand for a new trial on Gutierres's negligence claim against Cancel. Instead, I believe that the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied Cancel's motion to bifurcate and, further, that the jury verdiet of $160,000 was within the bounds of the evidence presented such that a new trial is unwarranted.
The trial court has a wide degree of latitude in exercising its proper discretion in granting a motion for separation of trials, and we will reverse the denial only for an abuse of that discretion. See Ind. Trial Rule 42(B); see also Elkhart Cmty. Sch. v. Yoder, 696 N.E2d 409, 414 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). The trial court balances the interests of convenience and economy against the likelihood of substantial prejudice to the defendant's case. Yoder, 696 N.E.2d at 414. If practicable, one trial is preferred. Id. Indeed, while the avoidance of prejudice is a more than sufficient reason for a separate trial, a separate trial should not be granted solely upon the moving party's speculation that it might be prejudiced by certain testimony. See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Cloud, 569 N.E.2d 983, 990 (Ind.Ct.App.1991).
Here, in determining that the trial court committed reversible error by denying Cancel's motion to bifurcate, the majority first makes the blanket assertion "that a bad faith claim against an insurance company should not be tried with a liability claim against an insured." Op. at 579. *587However, a review of Indiana case law reveals that, in similar contexts, plaintiffs have brought bad faith claims against insurers simultaneously with an action against an uninsured motorist and/or a breach of contract action against the insurer. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hammond, 759 N.E.2d 1162, 1169 (Ind.Ct.App.2001) (citing Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman by Smith, 622 N.E.2d 515, 522 (Ind.1993) (insured filed a four-count complaint, two against the uninsured motorist, one against the insurer for breach of contract, and one against the insurer for bad faith) and Gooch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 712 N.E.2d 38, 39 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (insured sued insurer for breach of contract and later amended complaint to add bad faith claim), trans. denied ).
Next, to support its finding of reversible error, the majority seems to rely upon the following arguments made by Cancel and State Farm:
1. That "[Cancell suffered prejudice when Gutierrez's liability claim against him was tried with the breach of contract and bad faith claims against State Farm;"
That the " 'facts relevant to establishing Gutierrez's third-party neg-ligenee claim against Cancel and Gutierrez's claims of breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and for punitive damages against State Farm are so completely unrelated that they should have been tried separately;" '
That "'[tlhe evidence presented on all three claims together most likely .) 5 confused the jury; and
That "evidence of insurance is generally inadmissible in a vehicular accident case 'because it is irrelevant and likely to be prejudicial to the defendant." "
Op. at 579-580 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). These contentions, however, do not demonstrate that Cancel was actually prejudiced by the single proceeding or that the jury was actually confused by the evidence presented. To the contrary, as evidenced by their verdiets-which included only verdiet forms A, C, E, and G-far from being confused, this jury was able to distinguish between the various tort and contract claims alleged, separate the evidence relating to each claim, and assess damages within the bounds of the evidence presented. Mere speculation about possible prejudice is insufficient to justify a separate trial and thereby undermine the jury's well-founded verdict. See Frito-Lay, 569 N.E.2d at 990.
Nevertheless, the majority has concluded that "the admission of State Farm's claim file, which included its determination that Cancel was 100% at fault, was highly prejudicial" and, further, that it "cannot say that Caneel was not unduly prejudiced by evidence of both the existence and the amount of his insurance coverage." Op. at 580. I believe, however, that, under the circumstances of this case where there is no real evidentiary dispute regarding Cancel's liability, the prejudicial effect, if any, of admitting this evidence does not warrant a new trial. Granted, the opinions of management-as represented in the claim file-along with evidence of insurance in some cireumstances could be highly prejudicial and should, in foresight, be avoided; however, in hindsight, the jury verdict on the compensatory damage award in this case does not evince signs of prejudice.
First, and with respect to the "claim file," the evidence reveals that, after the playhouse fell out of the truck, Cancel pulled onto the shoulder of the road, put the truck in reverse gear, and attempted to back up to be closer to the playhouse. (Tr. at 758) However, Caneel was unable to *588back up because the chain, which had secured the playhouse, was wrapped around the rear axle. (Tr. at 758) At Cancel's request, Gutierrez "exited the vehicle to unhook the chain." Tr. at 758. When Gutierrez was finished freeing the chain from the axle, he "head[ed] back to the front of the truck to get in." Id.
Meanwhile, approximately five to ten seconds after Gutierres had exited the truck from the passenger-side door, Cancel started to back up the truck. (Tr. at 402) Although Cancel looked into his rear-view and side mirrors, he never turned his head to see where Gutierrez was located. (Tr. at 400-01) Nor did he make certain that the passenger door was closed. (Tr. at 402) As the truck reversed, the passenger door "swung open" and struck Gutierrez. Id. at 402. Further, there is no indication in the record that Gutierrez was comparatively at fault for the accident.7 In light of this overwhelming evidence of negligence, State Farm's determination that Cancel was 100% at fault for the accident was merely a summary of that which was obvious and clearly proven by the evidence presented to the jury. Accordingly, the trial court's denial of Cancel's motion to bifurcate and its admission of State Farm's claim file, even if erroneous, constitute nothing more than harmless error.
Second, Cancel was not unduly prejudiced by evidence of both the existence and the amount of his insurance coverage. In Indiana, a person may not operate a vehicle on a public road, street, or highway unless he or she continuously maintains proof of financial responsibility. See Ind. Code §§ 9-25-4-1, 9-25-4-8, and 9-25-4-4. Thus, the issue of insurance, in the case at bar, is like the story of the Emper- or's New Clothes: the Emperor, wearing only his invisible suit of clothing, stands naked in the courtyard but no one is permitted to, or dare, discuss that which is obvious and known to all. In the majority's view, by merely mentioning that which was obvious, Cancel was presumptively prejudiced and is entitled to a new trial. However, the jury verdict tells a different story. The jurors were specifically instructed that, in deciding what or whom they believe, they should use their knowledge, experience, and common sense gained from day-to-day living. (Tr. at 1074) Insurance is known by the responsible citizen to be required to operate lawfully upon our roadways. This knowledge and experience is not lost on those responsible citizens who are called upon to serve as jurors. Thus, the existence of insurance coverage, while potentially prejudicial in some cases, does not appear to have had an impact on the determination of compensatory damages in this case.
Further, to the extent that the jury verdict exceeded the amount of Cancel's insurance coverage, we should not force Gutierrez to retry the case. Cancel has other remedies available to him to rectify the situation if he believes that his contentions were not properly defended. However, reversing a jury verdict that was based upon the evidence rather than the limited amount of liability coverage is not, in my opinion, the appropriate course to follow.
Finally, it is important to note that Indiana courts have a high regard for the trial court's discretion in determining whether to bifurcate a proceeding. In Frito-Lay, for example, another panel of this Court cautiously held that the trial court had abused its discretion by denying bifurcation of the liability and damages *589issues. 569 N.E.2d at 990. There, the jury was "inundated" with evidence that created sympathy for the gravely disabled, sixteen-year old victim-who was a junior varsity cheerleader-and may have prejudiced the verdict on the lability issue. Id. This evidence included testimony regarding the victim's youth, social nature, lost career opportunities, the gruesomeness and severity of the injuries to her brain and body, and the severe and permanent neuropsychological and economic effects of these injuries. Id.
Before trial, the Frito Loy trial court denied the motion for separation because the plaintiff alleged that the issues concerning the cause of the accident and the injuries suffered by the victim were intertwined.8 However, the plaintiff presented no evidence during the trial to show the cause of the accident through the injuries, and this Court found that Frito-Lay's defense on the issue of liability was "very strong," ie., the victim had failed to yield to the traffic on a preferred highway. Id. at 991. Indeed, even though the trial was inundated with the potential for sympathetic prejudice and permeated with errors, the jury still allocated fault on the victim's part just 1.1% shy of complete exoneration for Frito-Lay. Id. Interestingly, however, the Frito-Lay Court recognized that had it not been required to reverse on other grounds-i.e., issues of liability and damages for errors unrelated to bifureation-it would have been extremely reluctant to invade the province of the trial court's discretion on the issue of bifurcation. Id. at 991.
By contrast, in Yoder, 696 N.E.2d at 415, the Court determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to bifurcate the trials on the damages and liability issues. There, the school defendant had not demonstrated any independent grounds for reversal, nor had it shown a defense on the liability issue as strong as that of Frito-Lay, where the victim failed to yield to the Frito-Lay truck when the truck was traveling on a preferred highway. Id. The Yoder Court also noted that the issues of damages and liability were far more intertwined than they were in Frito-Lay. Id. Specifically, the basis for the defendant's lHability-i.e., the breach of its duty to provide functional seat belts-was directly related to the nature and severity of the victims' injuries. Id.
In my view, the present case is more similar to Yoder than Frito-Lay. In particular, here, Cancel has not demonstrated any independent grounds for reversal, nor has he shown a strong defense on the liability issue. Rather, as previously mentioned, the evidence reveals that, after Gutierrez exited the passenger side of the truck, Caneel-without turning his head to see where Gutierrez was located-began to drive the truck in reverse gear. The truck's passenger door struck and injured Gutierrez. Moreover, like the defendant in Yoder, Cancel has failed to proffer a persuasive argument on the question of liability sufficient to justify bifurcated proceedings. Accordingly, I do not agree that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Cancel's motion to bifurcate and would affirm the jury's verdict in the amount of $160,000, in favor of Gutierrez.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. However, in all other respects, I concur in the majority opinion.
. After Gutierrez had exited the vehicle, another passenger existed the same door to help retrieve the playhouse.
. There, plaintiff's counsel had suggested that the evidence of the severity of the victim's injuries would prove the speed of defendant's van and the manner in which the vehicles impacted with each other. Frito-Lay, 569 N.E.2d at 990.