concurring in the result, and in part dissenting.
I find that while I concur with the result reached by the majority of the court in this case, I must in part dissent.
In particular, I agree with the majority of the court when it concludes that when the Governor returned to the Legislature L.B. 376, together with his letter setting out the reason why he would not sign the bill into law, the Legislature was required to reconsider the bill if it was to become law. For that reason, I agree with the majority’s opinion that judgment must be in favor of the defendants in this case.
I do not, however, agree with the conclusion reached by the majority of the court to the effect that the *233Lieutenant Governor is not eligible to vote for legislative bills on final reading. In my view this conclusion totally ignores the plain meaning of Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 10. I believe that the majority has reached the wrong conclusion because it has misinterpreted the meaning of Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 13, which provides in part: “No bill shall be passed by the Legislature unless by the assent of a majority of all members elected . . . (Emphasis supplied.) The majority concludes that only members of the Legislature may cast a vote in connection with a legislative bill on final reading. I believe that such a narrow reading of the Constitution is unnecessary.
In my opinion, the provisions of article III, § 13, are intended only to aid in determining how the necessary majority is to be computed. Under the provisions of Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 6, the Legislature shall consist of not more than 50 members and not less than 30 members. The exact number may vary from time to time. Furthermore, article III, § 10, provides in part: “A majority of the members elected to the Legislature shall constitute a quorum . . . .” Article III, § 13, is simply intended to prescribe the formula to be used in computing the number of votes required to effect passage of a legislative bill on final reading. Article III, § 13, provides, in effect, that when the Legislature consists of 49 members, 25 votes are required in order for a bill to pass on final reading. The language of article III, § 13, was necessary, otherwise one might argue that the majority necessary to pass a bill on final reading meant “the majority of those present and voting,” in this case 13 votes, as opposed to a majority of those constituting the legislative branch of government, whether present or not.
This is, to some extent, made clear by our decision in In re Contest Proceedings, 31 Neb. 262, 273, 47 N.W. 923, 926 (1891), where we said in part: “It was in obedience to this change of sentiment that our constitution finally provided that all bills and joint resolu*234tions should be read on three separate days in each house respectively, and also provided that all bills should pass by a majority — not of a quorum — which had once been the universal rule, but by a majority of all the members elected to each house, and that the votes should be taken by ayes and noes, and entered upon the journal.”
It occurs to me that any other interpretation has the effect of repealing article III, § 10, which provides: “The Lieutenant Governor shall preside but shall vote only when the Legislature is equally divided.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The framers of the Constitution had already provided that a majority of the members elected constituted a quorum, and therefore they wished to make it clear that it required more than just a simple majority present and voting to pass a bill.
It is suggested by the majority opinion that the provisions of article III, § 10, are not repealed because the Lieutenant Governor may vote on anything other than a bill on final reading. However, the reading of article III, § 13, makes no provision for anything other than final reading. The fact that the Legislature has determined by rule to have more than one reading of a bill is a matter of internal procedural rules and not a matter of constitutional requirement. Should the Legislature determine in the future to eliminate all of those procedures and simply follow the mandates of Neb. Const, art. Ill, § 14, no constitutional violation would occur, and yet, under that basis, the Lieutenant Governor would have no vote in any instance. It is difficult to conceive why the Constitution would authorize preliminary matters to be passed by a simple majority of the Legislature and authorize the Lieutenant Governor to vote to break a tie in such cases and at the same time require a majority of members elected to the Legislature to pass a bill on final reading and take away the Lieutenant Governor’s authority to break such a tie without specifically *235saying so. I cannot believe that is what the framers of the Constitution intended.
A number of states which have been presented with similar questions have resolved the issue in the same manner as suggested by this dissent. See, State ex rel. Easbey v. Highway Patrol Bd., 140 Mont. 383, 372 P.2d 930 (1962); Opinion of the Justices, 225 A.2d 481 (Del. 1966); Advisory Opinion on 1978 PA 426, 403 Mich. 631, 272 N.W.2d 495 (1978).
In State ex rel. Easbey, a bill presented to the Montana Senate resulted in a final reading vote of 27 senators in favor and 27 senators opposed, with two senators excused. The Lieutenant Governor, who was then presiding over the Senate, broke the tie by voting in favor of the bill. The applicable provisions of the Montana Constitution were identical with the Nebraska Constitution. Finding that the Lieutenant Governor did have authority to vote, the Montana Supreme Court said at 391, 372 P.2d at 935: “The people of Montana have specifically supplied the answer to the above question in their Constitution wherein they have ‘expressly directed or permitted’ and conferred various special powers on the Lieutenant Governor, not the least of which, is the power, right and high privilege of presiding over the sessions and meetings of the State Senate as its President with the express direction that, while so presiding, he ‘shall vote only when the senate is equally divided.’” (Emphasis omitted.)
The Montana court went on further to say at 399, 372 P.2d at 939: “The power which the people of Montana expressly conferred upon their Lieutenant Governor, to give the casting vote ‘when the senate is equally divided,’ [citation omitted] vests in the Lieutenant Governor alone. At no time does such power vest in any State Senator. Since the Lieutenant Governor is not empowered to vote unless and until ‘the senate is equally divided,’ it necessarily follows that, with this single, specific and express exception, *236the right to vote in the Senate is restricted to the duly elected and qualified State Senators, there present and voting. However, ‘when the senate is equally divided’ by reason of a tie vote, it is then and there that the Lieutenant Governor, is expressly empowered, permitted and directed to step in, take over and cast the deciding vote either for or against the bill, resolution, question or proposition being voted upon. This ‘casting vote’ of the Lieutenant Governor, so expressly provided for, when cast, is to be counted and when counted it becomes and is the efficient parliamentary device that decides and determines the fate of the bill or proposition being voted upon. Such ‘casting vote’ tips the scales and breaks the deadlock and tie of an ‘equally divided’ Senate. It produces ‘a vote of a majority of all the members’ present in the Senate and voting upon the proposition submitted. It specifically meets and fully satisfies the general provisions and requirements of section 24 of Article V of Montana’s Constitution.” (Emphasis omitted.)
And in Opinion of the Justices, supra, the Delaware court, in deciding an identical question as that presented here, said at 484-85: “The applicable rules of construction require that effect be given, if possible, to the whole Constitution and to every word thereof. If different portions of the Constitution seem to conflict, they must be harmonized if possible. That construction must be favored which will render every word of the instrument operative; and that construction must be avoided which would make any provision idle and nugatory. Every provision of the Constitution must be construed, whenever possible, to give effect to every other provision. Otherwise stated, whenever avoidable, no constitutional provision should be so construed as to nullify, or substantially impair, any other constitutional provision or to produce an irrational result. . . .
“It is unreasonable to assume, we think, that the *237framers of the Constitution intended to limit the casting vote, vested in the Lieutenant Governor by Art. 3, § 19, to those less important functions and decisions which were left by the Constitution to a majority of a quorum of the Senate. It is more reasonable to assume, in our opinion, that the casting vote of Lieutenant Governor was intended to break ties in the more important matters before the Senate, as well as the less important ones. It is in the public interest that there be a proper method to break deadlocks and to avoid impasse in the Senate. This was the rationale for vesting in the Vice President the casting vote in the United States Senate: ‘to secure at all times the possibility of a definitive resolution of the body.’ The Federalist Papers, No. 68: Hamilton. The more important the matter pending for decision, the more essential such tie-breaking device is to the public welfare.”
The Michigan Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in analyzing a somewhat identical constitutional provision in the case of Advisory Opinion on 1978 PA 426, supra.
I believe that by taking the position which we have taken today, we have effectively eliminated the office of Lieutenant Governor as the president of the Legislature and have, in effect, repealed article III, § 10. I see no reason for us to do so, and I would have held that the Lieutenant Governor does indeed have the right to cast a tie-breaking vote on final reading.
Clinton and Brodkey, JJ., join in this concurrence and dissent.